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ABSTRACT 
Within philosophical literature on democratic education, philosophers of education 
embrace the existence of cultural, religious, racial, gender, and other social differences as 
important to a thriving democracy. However, they frequently ignore or marginalize the potential 
significance of ability differences, especially those associated with intellect and reasoning 
ability. In fact, prevailing understandings of civic engagement within political philosophy, social 
and educational policy, and institutional practice conform to norms of development, behavior, 
and civic contribution that assume the presence of able-bodied and able-minded individuals. 
There is therefore an unchallenged assumption that those who experience significant difficulties 
in reasoning are unable to perform the tasks of citizenship. My dissertation investigates and 
challenges this assumption. I consider how the recognition of existent intellectual ability 
differences alters our philosophical theorizing about democratic education and suggests the need 
for alternative frameworks of democratic participation and the education that supports it. I 
propose that individuals’ existent variability in intellectual processing, communicative modes, 
and behavior should guide our reasoning about what is required for civic participation. My view 
places demands on educational policy, schooling practices, and teacher education to re-examine 
curricula, teaching practice, school-community partnerships and, importantly, ideas about how 
civic knowledge is acquired and put into practice in light of varying abilities. Answering the 
question of whether individuals with intellectual disabilities are owed an education that prepares 
them to participate in democratic citizenship not only concerns the extent to which we embrace 
differences of ability within education in general, but also hinges on whether a just society can 
be one that does not enable the civic contribution of those with significant disabilities.   
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Meet Christine. Christine is unable to manage her basic finances, arrange and attend 
medical appointments, or sign up for a phone plan without assistance of a family member or 
friend. She struggles to understand the meaning of things like civil rights or jury duty. Christine 
also requires the support of a caregiver in communicating her preferences or making decisions. 
Although Christine is unable to complete these practical and cognitive tasks on her own, she 
nevertheless continues to watch the nightly news, attends town hall meetings, laments the closure 
of her local park, and commiserates with her friends about the changes to her bus route. Does 
Christine have political interests? Does she deserve a political voice? Is she owed an education 
aimed at enabling her to use this political voice?1  
Current philosophical models of democratic citizenship education are not equipped to 
provide comprehensive or well-reasoned answers to these questions. This is because these 
models of democratic citizenship education either omit or defer consideration of individuals 
labeled with intellectual disabilities. While educational theorists, especially those within the 
discipline of philosophy of education, are mindful of the importance of cultural, religious, racial, 
gender, and other social and political differences to a thriving democracy, they frequently ignore 
or marginalize the potential significance of ability differences, especially those associated with 
intellect and reasoning ability. In doing so, they present a vision of democratic citizenship 
education that is inattentive to a significant social group, and one already politically and socially 
disenfranchised. Answering the question of whether individuals with intellectual disabilities are 
owed an education that prepares them to participate in democratic citizenship is vital, as it not 
                                                
1 This story is a composite of several people labeled with intellectual disabilities who have been involved in legal guardianship 
cases or who have protested the role of guardianship in contemporary society. For the story of Roberta Blomster see Leonard 
(2012). For the court case regarding Damaris L. see Matter of Damaris (2012).  
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only concerns the extent to which we embrace differences of ability within education in general, 
but also hinges on whether we regard individuals with intellectual disabilities as members of the 
political community.  
In what follows, I explore and address these questions. I argue that within philosophical 
literature on democratic citizenship education there is an unchallenged assumption that those 
who experience significant difficulties in reasoning or who require sometimes significant support 
in decision-making are unable to perform the tasks of citizenship. I expose and challenge this 
assumption, revealing its theoretical weakness and its lack of consistency with empirical 
research. In doing so, I raise questions about what constitutes “significant difficulties” in 
reasoning or “significant support” in decision-making relative to democratic citizenship. I ask 
whether and how these needs bear on our educational theorizing and policy-making about 
democratic citizenship. Further, I explore what is meant by “democratic citizenship” historically, 
philosophically, and in contemporary North American society. I describe how democratic 
citizenship is a messy or “contested” concept (Field, 2000; Lister 1997) that is frequently co-
opted as a mechanism of dominance. I ask how our definition of citizenship – and the power 
behind this concept – shapes the aims and values that are described and instantiated in 
educational policy and practice.  
 
Schooling and the Citizenry 
Educational theorists have long recognized the significant role that educational 
institutions play in establishing, perpetuating, and also potentially transforming existing social, 
political, and economic arrangements, including relations of civic membership and social 
belonging. Those critical of the traditional models and structures in which schooling is delivered 
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often focus their critique on questioning the sorts of assumptions that uphold existing practice. 
These assumptions include those about how schooling ought to look, towards what it should be 
aimed, and for whom it is directed. In particular, educational scholars have challenged the 
classed, raced, and gendered organization of schools and schooling in the US and how existing 
curricular, pedagogical, and assessment policies and practices privilege dominant social classes 
and racial, cultural, and gender groups (e.g. Artiles, 2011; Delpit, 1995; Gutierrez, Rymes & 
Larson, 1995; Kozol, 2005; Ladson-Billings, 2006; Minow, 2008; Oakes, 2005). Similarly, in 
their efforts to promote inclusive educational policy and practice, scholars of inclusive education 
and disability studies in education have challenged the ways that educational institutions and 
policy privilege able-bodied and able-minded norms of learning, behavior, and identity (e.g. 
Bogdan & Biklen, 1977; Danforth & Smith, 2004; Ferri & Connor, 2005a; Hehir, 2002; Hehir, 
2007; Rubin et al., 2001; Slee & Allan, 2001; S. Taylor, 2006). Foremost, these latter scholars 
criticize the long history of active and tacit exclusion of children labeled with disabilities from 
mainstream schooling, as well as the contemporary patterns of exclusion and marginalization 
that result from special education practices, including labeling, ability tracking, and segregation 
(e.g. Artiles, 2011; Barton, 2006; Danforth & Ressa, 2013; Ferri & Connor, 2005a; Ferri & 
Connor, 2005b; Gallagher, 2006). By maintaining a clear line between normal and abnormal 
development and learning, these practices direct attention towards managing labeled students’ 
differences rather than focusing on understanding and adapting educational practice to the 
differences that exist among all learners. 
Even as these scholars critique educational policy and practice, they have expressed hope 
in the capacity of schools to act as sites of social transformation, especially in promoting the 
inclusion of individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities in the broader 
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community. Says Roger Slee (2001), “Democratic schools represent new social settlements that 
liberate us from the yoke of the fortresses buttressed by traditional special education thinking and 
practice” (p. 385-6; see also Ware, 2006). Because of the relationship between learning and 
social justice and social change, educational policy and educational institutions are in a unique 
position to influence the ways that people with disabilities, and members of other marginalized 
groups, are positioned in society.  
Historically, schools for individuals with disabilities – often educational in name only– 
have played an important role in maintaining and reproducing attitudes and practices surrounding 
who belongs in the public sphere. Training schools and asylums, like the New York State Asylum 
for Idiots at Syracuse, (ware)housed and managed individuals regarded as slow learners or 
labeled with intellectual and developmental disabilities, under the belief that these institutions 
could best protect such individuals from the demands of society – and protect society from them 
(Carlson, 2010; Ferguson; 1994; Stuckey, 2013; Trent, 1994). In the latter half of the twentieth 
century and into our contemporary era, schools have continued to play the role of managing 
disability and students labeled with disabilities, largely through complex legal and policy statutes 
and the bureaucratic management they entail. In the United States and Canada, education law 
and policy have placed increasing demands on school systems and professionals to recognize and 
accommodate the diversity of learners in mainstream school practices. Although these are 
positive advancements, they are nevertheless regulatory ones, and they highlight the important 
role that educational institutions play in regulating the role of people with disabilities in society. 
Educational policy, pedagogy, and curricula are thus shaped by and subsequently shape 
attitudes towards who belongs as a citizen and act as the arbiters of social belonging. As I will 
discuss, citizenship has been understood as an able-bodied or able-minded membership, 
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something not simply into which we are born, but into which we qualify according to our 
possession of particular capacities. Although this position runs counter to anti-discrimination 
laws, it is nevertheless still maintained in relation to those with intellectual disabilities (see 
Agran & Hughes, 2013; Spicker, 1990). People with disabilities are and have been for centuries 
spoken about and spoken for by non-disabled people and this is regarded as justified because 
they have been or are assumed to be in need of such intervention. These interventions persist 
even while it is clear that our education systems do not adequately educate children with 
disabilities. In many Western countries people with intellectual disabilities are not barred 
outright from the regular participatory mechanisms of citizenship as they were in the past, but 
experience their access to these activities as restricted, whether by guardianship laws or 
substantive forms of discrimination and neglect (see Abbott & McConkey, 2006; Agran & 
Hughes, 2013; Gougeon, 2009; Jordan & Dunlap, 2001; Meekosha & Dowse, 1997). This 
neglect occurs in a number of ways. Firstly, it occurs through the failure to properly inform, 
educate, and support people with intellectual disabilities to understand and exercise activities of 
citizenship – including understanding their own personal desires or needs as part of a broader 
political structure that can be responsive or unresponsive to them. Secondly, it occurs through a 
lack of attentiveness to and support of the particular ways that people with intellectual 
disabilities may express their political agency. Finally, as I hope to show, it occurs through the 
devaluation and ignorance of the role that dependency and relationality play in political agency 
for all of us.  
The failure to recognize people with intellectual disabilities as political agents does not 
just point to the need to provide accommodations and support for people with intellectual 
disabilities to access existing democratic systems, but, as I will argue, it also highlights the 
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importance of analyzing how we conceptualize democratic citizenship and the education that 
supports it in the first place. What expectations of ability are built into dominant philosophical 
frameworks of democratic citizenship? In what ways do they support policies that inadequately 
attend to people with intellectual disabilities? How is philosophical reasoning about such policies 
and practices limited by dominant understanding of intellectual disability and people with 
intellectual disabilities? 
In the beginning of this introductory chapter, I described how individuals’ challenges in 
independently performing some practical and cognitive tasks coexist with their ability to take an 
interest in and participate in the activities of democratic citizenship. I asked whether these 
characteristics ought to disqualify them from receiving an education aimed at becoming 
democratic participants. Fundamentally, these are questions about whether people with 
intellectual disabilities have democratic interests and how these interests should be represented: 
What does it mean to have democratic interests? How might people with intellectual disabilities 
be understood as having democratic interests? What is the value of self-representation? Are 
people with intellectual disabilities entitled to the support to enable self-representation (and how 
does that support change the definition of self-representation)? What role does public education 
play in the cultivation of these interests and in their representation? These questions ought to be 
burning ones for social theorists and educational researchers alike. Not only do such questions 
influence our perceptions about our responsibilities to individuals who require care and support; 
they also bear directly on the kind of society – and the kind of democracy – we want to live in.  
While this project will contribute insights into how we conceptualize education in 
general, and especially in relation to individuals with disabilities, it is intended centrally to draw 
attention to how social, political, and cultural norms shape democratic citizenship education as 
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an able-minded and able-bodied enterprise, and to draw attention to the ways in which this 
orientation further entrenches existing assumptions about intellectual disability and the role of 
people with intellectual disabilities in society. As an endeavor to reveal and debunk the 
presumptions implicit within academic conceptions of citizenship, this project takes cues from 
the work of feminist scholars who have argued that the concept of citizenship is gendered and 
racialized (Lister, 1997; Pateman, 1989; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Walby, 1994). This not only means 
that men and women, for example, learn through civic education that they are valued differently, 
but also that they are expected to develop the skills, knowledge, and dispositions that privilege 
and perpetuate male dominance. As I will discuss, this pattern of privileging dominant norms 
within the curricula of civic education likewise positions the standard citizen as able-bodied and 
able-minded. In making this argument, I draw upon the work of feminist and critical disability 
studies scholars who have traced the way that citizenship status acts as a sorting mechanism to 
separate abled from disabled (Erevelles, 2002; Erevelles, 2011; Garland-Thomson, 2006; 
Schweik, 2009). These scholars have argued that citizenship is a construct negotiated and 
renegotiated through gendered, racialized, sexed, and abled norms that are constantly in flux. As 
I will discuss, it is not only the definition of the citizen but also the meaning of ability that is 
structured by philosophical work on democratic citizenship and democratic citizenship 
education.  
In addition to this deconstructive project, my dissertation also attempts to shift 
philosophical discussion of democratic citizenship into a more inclusive paradigm, one in which 
the presence, participation, and support of individuals with intellectual disabilities is assumed 
and expected. To this end, I highlight the ways that people with intellectual disabilities already 
engage in civic projects and exercise political agency. This not only means looking at how 
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individuals participate in existing practices of citizenship – like voting, activism, public 
representation and debate – but also illustrating those activities that are rendered unintelligible by 
able-bodied and able-minded norms of participation – those that take place within the private 
sphere, those requiring significant support, and so on.   
 In meeting these goals, I am guided by a number of important questions. These include 
(1) Who is a democratic citizen? Who is the subject of democratic citizenship education? 
Who has democratic interests? And, who is tasked with expressing and exercising these interests 
and, indeed, learning to do so? What are the lenses and measures through which theorists and 
practitioners recognize democratic interests? (2) What is democratic citizenship? What is 
democratic citizenship education? What does participation in democratic citizenship mean and 
entail? How do philosophers describe democratic citizenship? How does democratic citizenship 
emerge conceptually within contemporary political contexts and within education policy? How is 
it understood in relation to people with intellectual disabilities? What sorts of assumptions about 
“the citizen” are built into described expectations of ability for democratic citizenship? (These 
include autonomy, self-representation, communication, competence, participation, and so on); 
(3) What are philosophical strategies for reasoning justly about democratic citizenship 
aims? How does the recognition of epistemic limitations in reasoning affect how philosophers 
understand the conclusions they make and whether these are justified? Specifically, how do 
contemporary norms of able-mindedness and able-bodiedness detrimentally affect strategies for 
reasoning effectively and justly about democratic citizenship aims? (4) What is the relationship 
between the features of contemporary political life and educational policy on the one hand 
and philosophical reasoning about educational justice on the other? To what extent do 
existing structural conditions – existing expectations of “citizens,” existing education policy, 
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existing ways of conceptualizing disability – and economic constraints – scarce education 
resources, inequalities in education resource distribution, balancing and distributing resources 
fairly to all students – shape how philosophers think about democratic citizenship aims and 
individuals with intellectual disabilities?  
 
Methodological Considerations 
A number of methodological considerations warrant attention before I pursue answers to 
these questions. The first concerns the form of inquiry that this project takes, namely 
philosophical analysis. The second concerns the justification for what might be called my 
political – that is, value-laden – stance towards disability and considerations of inclusivity. The 
third has to do with the tension between ideal and non-ideal theory that is at work within the 
chapters that follow.  
 
Form of Inquiry 
The four categories of questions I asked in the previous section are conceptual: that is, 
they suggest an inquiry about the nature, formation, and usefulness of concepts like citizenship, 
disability, intellect, and participation, among others. In this sense, such questions cannot be 
answered through reference to empirical data alone, but rather require attention to what 
constitutes educational justice and equality in light of intellectual ability differences. My 
dissertation therefore employs philosophical methods of analysis and critique. Drawing on 
interdisciplinary literature from disability studies, inclusive education, feminist philosophy, 
political philosophy, and philosophy of education, I consider how the recognition of existent 
intellectual ability differences, as well as societal attitudes towards these apparent differences, 
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alters philosophical theorizing about democratic education and suggests the need for alternative 
frameworks of democratic participation and the education that supports it. I examine how 
existing frameworks rest on assumptions about the capabilities of individuals labeled with 
intellectual disabilities. I ground my philosophical analysis in empirical data, stories, and 
personal experience that document the existing civic practices and democratic participation of 
people with intellectual disability labels and their current participation in classrooms (Carey, 
2009; Docherty et al., 2010; Kliewer et al., 2004; Redley & Weinberg, 2007; Tisdall, 1994; 
Verdonschot et al., 2009). As a result, this project presents a philosophy of education informed 
by principles, scholarship, and narratives from disability studies.  
Scholarship that engages across the disciplines of philosophy of education and disability 
studies/inclusive education has not been plentiful. In fact, the gap between these disciplines is 
apparent in the divergent approaches that each discipline takes to understanding and reasoning 
about societal obligations towards individuals labeled with disabilities, a topic I discuss at length 
in the next chapter. I therefore endeavor to support a more sustained conversation between 
educational philosophers and disability studies/inclusive education scholars by exploring the 
areas of tension as well as the areas of mutuality and intersection between these fields. In 
creating dialogue between these usually disparate fields, I also aim to contribute to the analytic 
practices and knowledge base of both fields. For philosophers of education, this project is 
valuable for at least two reasons: First, it can assist in the development of more just and accurate 
depictions of democratic citizenship and democratic citizenship education, and second, because 
it can advance philosophers’ justice-interest in ensuring that groups of society are not unfairly 
excluded. Simultaneously, philosophers of education as educational scholars have contributed 
significantly to an understanding of democratic citizenship, civic engagement, and civic 
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development as they relate to educational contexts. While this literature is troubled by an implicit 
assumption of exclusion of individuals with significant disabilities, it nevertheless contributes 
rich and important arguments regarding the nature of equality, inclusion, and democratic 
belonging. Disability studies and inclusive education theorists can benefit from this rich 
discussion by educational philosophers in forming arguments for the moral imperative of 
inclusive education for a democratic society. 
 
Justification for the Political Stance 
At a recent conference involving academics from multiple disciplines in education, I was 
asked how I justify my expressed non-neutrality about the value of disabled lives and individuals 
with disabilities’ right to educational and democratic opportunities. The questioned stemmed, I 
imagine, from a worry over my ability to be impartial in my philosophical analysis of arguments 
for and against providing educational opportunities for individuals with intellectual disabilities to 
engage in the activities of democratic citizenship. Indeed, as my interlocutor understood, my 
analytic approach does take for granted certain principles and values – and assumptions – 
regarding individuals with intellectual disabilities and what they are owed as a matter of justice. 
From his position, my interlocutor appeared confident that such assumptions would endanger the 
quality of my philosophical analysis and potentially guide my reasoning towards predetermined 
conclusions. Other readers of this dissertation may have a similar concern: would not a good 
philosophical analysis remain neutral – that is, value free – in evaluating arguments, concepts, 
and so on? 
 In “Objectivity and the Role of Bias” Susan E. Babbitt (2001) argues that “[i]n certain 
situations of understanding, it is important to recognize the struggle for the story, for the 
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theoretical and moral perspective, and the narrowly focused, biased commitment required to 
achieve it” (p. 313). In this dissertation, I pursue a more adequate and more just understanding of 
what intellectual disability entails for democratic citizenship. Because I am working against 
dominant constructs of citizenship and of civic participation that presume the incompetence of 
individuals labeled with intellectual disabilities, I must begin from the perhaps political (or 
biased) stance that they are wrong. Yet as Elizabeth Anderson (2004) explains in defending 
against criticism of feminist values in scientific research, value judgments enter into all forms of 
inquiry (acknowledged and unacknowledged), although they do so in legitimate and illegitimate 
ways. Says Anderson, “From an epistemological point of view, value judgments function like 
empirical hypotheses” (2004, p. 11); in other words (and within the scientific domain), they lead 
us to choose particular instruments of measurement, to ask one question and not another, and so 
on. Nevertheless illegitimate value judgments that drive inquiry to a predetermined conclusion 
do arise, and this was the sort of worry my conference interlocutor appeared to have. Illegitimate 
value judgments are those held dogmatically (Anderson, 2004, p. 11) – that is, they are not held 
open to reconsideration in light of new evidence or new arguments. By contrast, the non-
dogmatic viewer “treats her intrinsic value judgments as open to criticism in light of experience” 
(Anderson, 2004, p. 9).  
Let’s consider how value judgments might guide my analysis in this dissertation. Imagine 
first that one starts from the perspective that disability is abnormal and consists in an individual’s 
experiencing a biological deficit. This perspective on disability would lead researchers to ask 
certain questions relative to well-being and justice. For example, it might lead them to 
investigate the sorts of educational endeavors that minimize, hide, or fix disabilities rather than 
those that accommodate, naturalize, or even celebrate disabilities. More specifically, if 
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individuals with intellectual disabilities are seen as different kinds of persons (or not persons at 
all), then philosophers are led to ask particular questions in considering what constitutes 
educational justice. For example, they might ask, “What are our obligations to school-aged 
children with intellectual disabilities?” rather than “What are our obligations to school-aged 
children?” Or, if we hold a particular conception of citizenship fixed – for example, citizenship 
defined in terms of the capacity for rational reflection – we are led to different questions about 
educational aims in light of intellectual disability. That is, we are likely to start from the 
assumption that citizenship aims will not extend to some range of people with significant 
intellectual disabilities.  
My objective in this project is to ask what happens when we remain open to the 
possibility that people with intellectual disabilities need not be excluded from democratic 
citizenship aims. What would democratic citizenship look like if it included people with 
significant disabilities? And what educational lessons can we learn if we envision inclusion in 
the production of citizens in a democracy? To ask these questions, it is necessary that I be guided 
by some value judgments; indeed, an putatively unbiased position might guide me to simply 
reaffirm exclusions. Accordingly, I aim not for an unbiased perspective, but rather to use bias in 
an “appropriate way” (Babbitt, 2001, p. 298). In approaching this project, then, I take what I will 
later call an “affirmative stance” towards the inclusion of individuals with intellectual disabilities 
in democratic citizenship aims of education. This affirmative stance is my value position. From 
this stance, I am able to ask particular questions about citizenship, pedagogy, and educational 
policy that I would not be able to ask if I presumed that people with intellectual disabilities could 
not benefit from democratic citizenship aims of education. While I hold this stance, and proceed 
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with an analysis accordingly, I remain open to – and explore – objections to my arguments as 
well as to considering evidence that would disprove my claims.  
 In general, my stance is consistent with the political stance taken by many scholars in 
disability studies and disability studies in education. These scholars are frequently accused of 
being partial, uninterested in “evidence” and closed to philosophical arguments that do not 
support their conclusions (see Brantlinger, 1997). These accusations frequently stem from the 
fact that disability studies scholars work to reveal what is concealed by dominant and taken-for-
granted assumptions about the nature of disability. Viewing disability as a tragedy, as a deficit, 
and as an undesirable state is so socially pervasive and powerful that it appears natural. 
Importantly, this often makes arguments consistent with the tragedy and deficit view appear 
neutral. Nevertheless, this stance is informed by value judgments that can also push even the 
most reasonable scholar towards predetermined conclusions. I describe these “epistemic pitfalls” 
in Chapter Four.  
 
Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory 
The tensions surrounding how democratic citizenship is understood and how democratic 
interests are recognized further points to an important underlying feature of this project, which is 
to explore the role of ideal and non-ideal reasoning in approaching questions of educational 
justice. On the one hand, philosophical reasoning about educational policy and practice ought to 
be informed by considerations of equality and justice that ignore the economic and social 
constraints of our contemporary social and political world. This is so because in order to 
understand what is owed to children with intellectual disabilities, we must be attentive to those 
matters that bear non-contingently on our reasons; that is, the values or concerns that are not 
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dependent on existing societal conditions (including negative attitudes towards disabled people 
or economic and social policies built in histories of exclusion). On the other hand, existing 
conditions – scarce education resources, inequalities in educational resource distribution, 
balancing resources for students with disabilities, students assigned as English Language 
Learners, low-income students – are realities of our contemporary educational world, as are the 
experiential realities of life lived with disability. Ignoring these can lead to support for policies 
that are grossly mismatched, ineffective, and unjust. For example, if we ignore individuals’ 
needs for support in performing cognitive or practical tasks, we can arrive at frameworks of 
democratic citizenship that inform policies inconsistent with – and oppressive to – individuals 
with intellectual disabilities. One question we might ask, then, is: should we focus on generating 
arguments for why people with intellectual disabilities are owed an education that would prepare 
them for existing conditions of democratic citizenship or is doing so complicit in and affirming 
of able-minded and able-bodied ideals of citizenship and democratic participation that are 
undesirable and oppressive to us all? We must be careful to avoid idealizing citizenship or civic 
participation, imagining it in ways unrecognizable to our current existence and the diversity of 
lived experience. While ideal theorizing has led to conclusions that ignore the lived realities of 
individuals’ lives – especially women, people of color, people with disabilities, and those who 
are non-normatively gendered (see Mills, 2005 for discussion) – over-attention to contemporary 
constraints on education can prevent us from imagining alternative realities and to envisioning 
conditions of justice. The challenge here is to attend carefully to existing conditions of material 
concern, the practical needs, pressures, and social barriers within individuals’ lives, the 
capabilities and limitations individuals experience, while also imagining a more just social and 
educational world. This balancing of the ideal and the non-ideal reflects the effort of 
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philosophers and theorists of education to work within existing conditions shaped by historical 
patterns without falling into those patterns (that is, to retain a transformative approach2).  
This tension between ideal and non-ideal theory is ever-present in my analysis and 
instantiated within the following guiding questions: How does the recognition of finite resources 
shape how we understand citizenship education for people with disabilities? To what extent do 
we acknowledge and factor in our epistemic limits regarding disability in theorizing about 
democratic citizenship aims? What is the right balance between reconceptualizing civic 
participation and citizenship education and enabling the inclusion of people with intellectual 
disabilities in existing conceptions of citizenship?  
 
Some Notes on Language 
 Throughout the ensuing chapters, the reader will encounter a number of phrases and 
terms used to describe the individuals and groups with which I am especially concerned in this 
dissertation. For clarity, I define these terms and explain my use of them here. It is important for 
the reader to keep in mind, however, that these terms are categories and constructs created and 
monitored by social, medical, and legal institutions. As I discuss at length in Chapter Four, these 
are very much contested terms and constructs.  
(1) “Intellectual Disability:” The American Association of Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities defines intellectual disability as “a disability characterized by significant 
limitations in both intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior, which covers many 
everyday social and practical skills. The disability originates before the age of 18” (AAIDD, 
2013). In general, I use the term “intellectual disability” to describe the label and not a 
condition that exists apart from assessment and diagnostic practices. This does not mean that 
                                                
2 I will work out what is meant by a transformative approach in Chapter Five.  
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I deny that differences in intellectual ability – reasoning, processing, problem-solving, and so 
on –exist; indeed my argument advances the need for educational supports in performing 
these cognitive tasks. However, the category “intellectual disability” is a constructed one that 
attempts to capture a broad range of abilities that are themselves performed relative to 
environmental contexts, including educational ones. Many philosophers use the term 
“cognitive disability” rather than (and often interchangeably with) “intellectual disability” in 
describing individuals who experience (or are assessed as experiencing) cognitive limitations 
(measured against a standard, such as IQ). Cognitive disability is a more capacious term, 
however, that includes some learning disabilities and brain conditions of aging. This 
distinction is, however, to a certain extent unimportant to my overall argument, as the 
frameworks that I critique omit or defer consideration of those whose 
intellectual/cognitive/mental abilities do not measure up to a standard of able-mindedness.  
(2) “Labeled Student” or “Student labeled with an intellectual disability:” Throughout the 
dissertation I will qualify “intellectual disability” with the phrase “labeled with.” The 
purpose of doing so is to call attention to the sense in which the category of “intellectual 
disability” is a disputed construction and classification (Carlson, 2010; Linton, 1998; Rapley, 
2004) and to the role that (educational) labeling practices play in this classification and 
construction. 
(3) “Significant Disability:” This term is not meant to refer to any clinical category. Rather, 
where I use “significant disability,” I do so to demarcate an imaginary and constructed line 
between those disabilities generally considered assimilable into some standard of normalcy 
and those that are not. Intellectual disabilities are usually regarded as significant disabilities.  
 
  
18 
CHAPTER TWO  
EDUCATIONAL AIMS AND EMBODIED DIFFERENCES 
 
 
Education debates over tracking/inclusion, testing and “accountability,” 
curriculum, pedagogy, and so on, are essentially debates over two opposing ideals 
of what constitutes a “good” society. On the one side are those who view social 
hierarchy as natural and therefore, if not good, then certainly inevitable. On the 
opposing side are those who not only see nothing natural about social hierarchy 
but also view it as inimical to the ideals of social justice and equality (Gallagher, 
2006, p. 65) 
 
In this passage Deborah Gallagher (2006), prominent scholar within the field of disability studies 
in education, describes what she perceives as opposing viewpoints within contemporary debates 
concerning the education of students labeled with disabilities: those who regard ability 
differences as necessitating inequalities in social and educational status, and those who do not. 
Whereas the former regard ability differences as inevitably resulting in social hierarchies, the 
latter see these social hierarchies as the unnatural consequence of attitudes and structures of 
oppression. The question at the center of this disagreement, then, is whether differences in ability 
– unlike differences of race, sex, and so on – necessarily lead to individuals’ differential 
positioning in a social hierarchy. 
 How one understands educational aims in relation to disability depends on many things 
but certainly or perhaps most importantly on one’s definition of disability and how one 
understands disability relative to ideas about equality. In this chapter I will begin to demonstrate 
this relationship by examining two prevailing understandings of disability relative to educational 
aims: that which corresponds to traditional special education models as well as dominant 
contemporary philosophical conceptions of disability and its place in education, on the one hand; 
and, that which corresponds to the views of scholars within disability studies in education and 
inclusive education, on the other hand. While the former tend to regard separate aims as 
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necessary in light of embodied differences (what I call the deferral stance), the latter oppose 
separate aims and advocate for inclusion (and take what I call the affirmative stance). 
Importantly disability studies scholars see inclusion going well beyond physical access and 
extending to the pedagogical, curricular, and conceptual processes of educational planning and 
theorizing as well as students’ opportunities for meaningful participation and social belonging. 
The opposing viewpoints of the deferral and affirmative stances exist within a context of limited 
dialogue across the frequently disparate fields of educational philosophy and disability studies in 
education. 
 
Divergent Approaches to Thinking about Disability in Education 
The debate over status inequalities has received significant attention within the field of 
philosophy of disability within recent years, in which philosophers disagree over whether, and in 
which cases, disabilities necessitate status inequalities (see Anderson, 1999; Kelly, 2010; Wolff, 
2009). Within philosophy of education, this debate emerges in relation to the question of what 
constitutes educational justice for children with disabilities and under what conditions their 
opportunities can be equalized (Ladenson, 2005; Terzi, 2005a; Terzi, 2005b; Terzi, 2008; 
Norwich, 2010; Warnock, 2010). Over the last ten years concerns over the schooling of students 
with disabilities has received increased attention in the field of educational philosophy (Ahlberg, 
2014; Ben-Porath, 2012; Cigman, 2007; Lekan, 2009; Norwich, 2002; Reindal, 2010; Surbaugh, 
2010; Terzi, 2005a; Terzi, 2005b; Terzi, 2007; Terzi, 2008; Vorhaus 2005; Norwich, 2010; 
Warnock, 2010). This literature has primarily focused on what is owed to children with 
disabilities as a matter of justice, including questions of how education can be distributed more 
fairly and equitably to children with disabilities so as to enable them to have access to adult 
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opportunities and conditions of well-being. These educational philosophers have understood that 
the educational needs of children with diagnosed disabilities frequently differ from those of 
“typical” children and demand additional resources in the form of, for example, increased 
teacher-attention, technological tools, one-on-one classroom supports, as well as 
accommodations and/or modifications to curricula and assessment.  
While some philosophers of education contend that human and civil rights-based 
approaches are best at defending special education access (e.g. Ben-Porath, 2012), others (e.g. 
Robeyns, 2006; Terzi, 2005a; Terzi, 2005b; Terzi, 2008) look to particular justice frameworks to 
formulate arguments for educational distribution to students with disabilities. For example, 
Lorella Terzi (2005a, 2005b, 2008) has developed frameworks for establishing and justifying the 
distribution of resources to children with disabilities based on the Capabilities Approach (see 
also Nussbaum, 2006; Skrtic and Kent, 2013). The Capabilities Approach looks not just at how 
resources are distributed in a formal sense, but also how individuals are able to convert these into 
opportunities. Relative to the education of children with disabilities, this framework can provide 
justification not only for the expenditure of additional resources to support children’s varying 
educational needs, but can also evaluate whether these resources are translating into substantive 
educational growth and well-being. Terzi’s work therefore provides compelling arguments in 
support of educational practices like unequal distribution of resources to children with 
disabilities. However, it leaves room for but does not explicitly advocate inclusion. Others, like 
Mary Warnock (2010), Ruth Cigman (2007), and Robert F. Ladenson (2005) discuss the 
potential limits of inclusion and provide philosophical analysis of the normative dimensions of 
inclusion debates. Others consider what are the appropriate aims of education for children with 
disabilities in particular, especially those labeled as severely or profoundly intellectually disabled 
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(Ahlberg, 2014; Vorhaus, 2005). In general within this scholarship, questions of justice 
surrounding children with intellectual disabilities are considered separately from the questions of 
justice surrounding children deemed typical or normal. 
Only a few philosophers (Carlson, 2010; Kittay, 2010; Surbaugh, 2010; Terzi, 2008; 
Vorhaus, 2005; Vorhaus, 2014) explicitly describe intellectual disability, or the existent diversity 
of intellectual abilities, as calling into question key assumptions and expectations about our 
educational practices and aims. Licia Carlson and Eva Kittay are among those who do so. In their 
introduction to Cognitive Disability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy (2010) they argue 
that intellectual disability is a feature of the human condition and that if philosophers were to 
take this seriously “a number of fundamental philosophical presumptions and received views are 
up for reconsideration, including the centrality of rational thought to our conception of humanity 
and moral standing, the putative universality of philosophical discourse, and the scope and nature 
of moral equality” (p. 310). This challenge to core philosophical concepts and presumptions 
could have far-reaching consequences within philosophy, including within the realm of 
philosophical theorizing about educational equality and democratic education.  
Despite these recent challenges from philosophers of disability, the contestation of 
assumed wisdom about disability and educational inequality has come primarily from disability 
studies scholars and scholars of inclusive education, whose work in fact predates and informs the 
critiques of the philosophers mentioned above. Disability studies and inclusive education 
scholars regard the matter of whether ability differences necessitate inequalities in social status 
as settled: the field of disability studies is premised on the view that differences of ability do not 
necessitate inequalities in the social hierarchy. Rather, disability studies scholars, including those 
who study the education of labeled students, see such inequalities as the result of historical and 
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contemporary investments in and promotion of able-bodiedness and able-mindedness (e.g. 
Bogdan & Biklen, 1977; Danforth & Smith, 2004; Davis, 2006; Ferri & Connor, 2005a; 
Gallagher, 2006; Garland-Thomson, 1997; Hehir, 2002; Hehir, 2007; Price, 2011; Rubin et al., 
2001; S. Taylor, 2006).3 In short, social hierarchies that leave people with disabilities as having 
lower status are the result of deep-seated investments in ableism. These scholars argue, further, 
that an assumption of normal ability permits and justifies the exclusion of children with disability 
labels from the regular classroom and from the opportunities afforded to non-labeled children. 
Say Scot Danforth and Susan L. Gabel (2006), “educational research has long perpetuated the 
myth of the need for distinctions between research about disabled students and research about all 
other students” (p. 3). Frequently, disability – and usually too much disability – becomes the 
justification for separation or deprivation, ignoring the actual potential of labeled students who 
simply fail to fit with the expected pace and form of development of “normal” children. While 
students have varying developmental and educational abilities, the assumption of a “normal” 
level of functioning obscures the reality of human cognitive, physical, behavioral, and 
communicative differences and the contingency of exclusions and inequalities based on 
perceived ability. For disability studies in education scholars, then, the good society is one that is 
inclusive and we should approach questions of justice through inclusive theorizing.  
This frequent difference in the treatment and conceptualization of disability reflects 
broader disagreement in educational scholarship about whether it is cognitive inability or social 
and structural impediments that lead to the exclusion of people with intellectual disability labels 
from different aspects of education, including democratic citizenship aims. Indeed, the differing 
                                                
3 It is important to note here that I am describing what we might call an ethical orientation to which scholars of disability studies 
and disability studies in education subscribe. I do not mean to gloss over or in any way diminish debates that are internal to these 
fields. However, in endeavoring to contrast two very different orientations towards thinking about intellectual ability differences 
in relation to education, it is necessary that I make some generalizations. For discussion of historical roots of disability studies in 
education as a field, as well as some of the foundational ideas in the field, see Steven J. Taylor (2006) and Linda Ware (2011).  
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perspectives I have described echo long-standing debates among researchers within special 
education over how to conceptualize disability and how to conceptualize pedagogy, curricula, 
and policy in light of students’ disabilities (see Danforth & Gabel, 2006; S. Taylor, 2006). As I 
will discuss, where we land in this distinction has important consequences for how we view the 
problem of the exclusion of many children with intellectual disabilities from democratic 
citizenship aims, indeed whether we see it as a problem to begin with. As I alluded to in the 
introduction, I position myself among those who argue that the presence of disability does not 
necessitate lowered status; neither do I see it as necessitating separate educational aims.  
Importantly, the field of disability studies emerged from the activist work of the disability 
community and remains very tightly interwoven with that community (see Linton, 1998). 
Disability Studies has become an exemplar of interdisciplinary scholarship, influencing 
important debates within sociology, history, medicine, education, and philosophy, among other 
fields. One of the main contributions that disability studies scholars have made across these 
disciplines is in revealing ability/disability as an important category of analysis in research on 
equality, social justice, and democracy (e.g. Artiles, 2011; Baynton, 2013; Linton, 1998; S. 
Taylor, 2006). Despite this increasing interdisciplinary influence, however, the important 
insights of disability studies scholars regarding social belonging, citizenship, and democratic 
inclusion have remained separate from the work of philosophers who theorize about community 
and civic engagement and how we prepare students for their roles as citizens. That is, 
philosophers of education who write about democratic citizenship aims of education (e.g. Callan, 
1997; Gutmann, 1987; Galston, 2001; Giroux, 2005; Levinson, 2012) have remained largely 
uninfluenced by disability studies and have proceeded without recognizing arguments emerging 
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from disability studies about citizenship and inclusive education.4 Nevertheless, scholars from 
within the field of philosophy of education have produced perhaps the most comprehensive 
scholarship about, and discussion around, democratic citizenship aims of education and how 
individuals are prepared for their future roles as citizens. This disciplinary conversational gap is 
not just interesting or surprising; rather, it is a problem for philosophers of education and 
disability studies and inclusion scholars alike.  
 
The Deferral Stance 
 
Educational philosophers often concern themselves with how the aims of education 
reflect particular justice-related goals. Many, and especially those espousing a liberal political 
view of education, believe that reflecting upon these aims will guide them towards a normative 
framework by which to evaluate and justify the distribution of education to children. Because 
educational aims inform our distributive principles and define how schools and school systems 
deliver curricula and resources to students, they also reflect and reinforce social values about the 
sort of education valued within a society. In this section, I describe the philosophical deferral of 
individuals with intellectual disabilities. Later, I discuss instances of deferral in educational 
policy and practice.  
In considering educational aims, some liberal egalitarian philosophers (e.g. Levinson, 
2003; Levinson, 2012; Morton, 2011) have joined critical educational theorists of race/ethnicity 
(e.g. Collins, 2003; Lindkvist, 2008), class (e.g. Oakes, 2005), and gender/sexuality (e.g. Payne 
& Smith, 2012) in being mindful of how educational goals, including those expressed within 
educational policy and theory, can privilege dominant racial, gender, cultural, and religious 
                                                
4 Lorella Terzi (2008) could be considered an exception. Terzi engages carefully, albeit critically, with arguments from inclusive 
education and disability studies theorists. However, Terzi is not directly discussing citizenship aims.  
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groups. This work suggests that embracing racial, gender, cultural, and religious differences – 
and even some ability differences – in our educational theorizing can strengthen our educational 
policy and practice. However, the educational aims described by philosophers of education do 
not generally embrace significant differences in intellectual ability, adaptive behavior, or 
communication that some children exhibit. In fact, educational aims often appear suited to the 
imagined “normal” child, who possesses an expected level of intellectual ability, adaptive 
behavior and communicative competence. Meanwhile, these aims have important consequences 
for how educational practices, pedagogy, and curricula are conceptualized. The failure to 
acknowledge and embrace differences in ability leaves open the question of the extent to which 
students with intellectual disabilities are subject to the same aims as their “typically-developing” 
peers. More pointedly, it leads to the conclusion that some students are too different and too 
cognitively impoverished to be subject to the same broad educational aims as their (“normal” or 
“typically-developing”) peers.  
Taking a closer look at how educational aims have been described by philosophers of 
education helps us to better understand how educational aims express important societal values 
and expectations of children and young adults. Educational theorists have envisioned a variety of 
aims for education based on particular views of what individuals ought to know, do, and be. We 
might hope, for example, that children develop the skills, knowledge, and dispositions required 
for economic self-sufficiency in adult life. Economic aims might thus identify the knowledge, 
skills, and character dispositions that individuals need to possess in order to be successful and 
productive members of an economic system. We might also regard schooling as aimed at 
children’s development of autonomy, however understood (Brighouse, 2006; Callan, 1997; 
Levinson, 1999; Reich, 2002), or as aimed at the development of capabilities for community 
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living (Dewey, 1916; Meier, 2002; Strike, 2004), for membership in a diverse political and 
cultural world (Curren, 2009), or for the duties of citizenship, however conceived, within a 
democracy (Callan, 1997; Gutmann, 1987; Gutmann, 2009; Levinson, 2012). Reflecting upon 
educational aims informs how we think about what forms of education are valuable (those that 
support economic reproduction, those that support citizenship), but also the normative principles 
by which to evaluate and justify the distribution of educational goods to children. For example, 
because democratic citizenship aims support a view of education as aimed at children’s 
development of those capabilities deemed necessary for adult citizenship, proponents (Anderson, 
1999; Satz, 2007) are inclined to support a distributive principle according to which educational 
resources are distributed in ways that allow all children to develop civic capabilities.  
Of course, schooling resources are not typically distributed according to a single aim of 
education and educational systems follow a plurality of economic, civic, and cultural aims, many 
of which overlap, a point acknowledged by philosophers reasoning about aims.5 For example, 
many philosophers conceive autonomy aims as fundamentally tied to citizenship aims (albeit 
according to different conceptions of autonomy) (e.g. Brighouse, 2006; Burtt, 2003; Callan, 
1997; Kymlicka, 1995). Accordingly, we should hope for an education for our children that 
cultivates the knowledge, skills, and dispositions that are understood to promote all of the 
learning ends listed above. However, while none of these aims is prima facie inconsistent or in 
conflict with the others, sometimes aims do conflict. For example, economic aims may require 
the educational pursuit of capabilities consistent with labor market advantage, even while these 
impede the development of autonomy, critical thinking skills, or cultural connectedness (see 
                                                
5 I am describing here philosophical conceptions of aims. Later, I will discuss how aims are reflected within policies in ways that 
express not only a plurality of values, but also a plurality of ways to enforce and reinforce social stratification.  
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Morton, 2011).6 When aims conflict, we are left to consider how we ought to value these aims 
relative to one another, or, especially when faced with economic or cultural constraints, how we 
practically distribute conflicting but valued aims. 
Tackling such questions is made especially complicated by the fact that the children who 
arrive in educational contexts embody a diversity of intellectual and physical abilities – as well 
as a diversity of cultural, religious, and social backgrounds – such that the philosophical task of 
deciding on aims that are inclusive of this diversity is very challenging. This is, in part, because 
of the difficulty in deciding on what constitutes educational equality for children with ability 
differences in the first place (Jencks, 1988; Terzi, 2008). Indeed, the sorts of differences that 
children embody – differences in learning style and pace, differences in economic, cultural, or 
linguistic background, and so on – complicate how aims are cultivated. This existent diversity 
may appear to support applying separate aims to some children, whether on the basis of their 
social disadvantage, as in the case of historically disadvantaged groups, or because valued aims 
do not accommodate or reflect children’s abilities. In defending an aim of education, such as 
democratic citizenship, philosophers therefore often concede that such an aim will exclude some 
students. This is because the content of aims – that is, the sorts of abilities that they require 
children to have – are not well suited to the abilities of all children.  
Indeed, some aims are more and some less demanding of individuals in terms of their 
intellectual and physical abilities. Critical thinking aims, for example, emphasize independent 
cognitive reasoning and are therefore demanding of individuals in terms of expected intellectual 
abilities. Many aims that emphasize high levels of independent cognitive ability fail to account 
for those with intellectual and developmental disabilities, especially those understood as severely 
                                                
6 Educational researchers have explored how economic aims have permeated educational institutions, policies, and practices 
especially in the United States, where neoliberal policies have appeared to steer educational aims away from democratic goals 
and towards labor market ones (see Lipman, 2011). 
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or profoundly intellectually disabled (Ahlberg, 2014; Vorhaus, 2005). While many theorists 
simply fail to acknowledge this exclusion (e.g. Callan, 1997; Galston, 2001; Hanson & Howe, 
2011), some have drawn the conclusion that what society owes to people with significant 
disabilities is different than what is owed to those without, on the basis that the former lack the 
capacities requisite to achieving articulated aims (e.g. Gutmann, 1987; Kelly, 2010; Rawls, 
2001). Consideration of these populations is therefore deferred, to be decided separately. Some 
aims, then, become exclusive: that is, they are inclusive only of those children who possess 
particular abilities – of reasoning, of mobility, of communication, and so on. Such exclusion 
demands that we either abandon a particular aim because it fails to be inclusive – that is, fails to 
apply to all children – or we justify the use of separate aims for children with intellectual 
disabilities. When we have good reason to value particular aims it does not seem correct – and it 
may in fact be unjust – to abandon them simply because they do not reflect the capacities of all 
children. On the other hand, it may be unjust to apply separate aims. We need an account, then, 
of whether and why exclusive aims are fair and justified.  
Importantly, the turn to separate aims is based on the idea that while some children are 
unable to acquire the knowledge and skills or competencies expected of them in connection with 
particular educational aims, they are nevertheless owed an education that is of high quality and 
good for them, and, as Amy Gutmann argues, “not simply convenient for us” (1987, p. 155). 
Let’s call this the deferral stance because it involves deferring consideration of the educational 
entitlements or practices for a specific group. The deferral stance is not intended to deny 
opportunities, mistreat, or undermine the educational quality of labeled students. In fact, one 
argument that has been given for separate aims, as I will discuss below, is that holding to the 
same aims can actually set some students up for failure because they are expected to achieve 
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learning objectives that are beyond their developmental reach. Doing so expresses disregard of 
and disrespect for students’ differences and results in their being deprived of an education from 
which they can benefit. From the standpoint of these considerations of educational equality and 
justice for children with significant disabilities, then, separate aims can appear not only justified 
but also necessary. Let us consider how arguments that propose to support this view are 
structured. 
 
The Philosophical Origins of the Deferral Stance  
Egalitarian responses to the existence of ability differences have tended to consider 
disability as natural deficit and as the product of individual bad luck that they claim may in 
certain forms prevent or impede individuals’ full membership in the political community (see 
Anderson, 1999). People with intellectual disabilities in particular have been treated as 
“profoundly other” because, it is asserted, and in some cases assumed, that they lack the requisite 
capacities for equal citizenship and equal participation in society. 
A clear example is found in John Rawls’ (1971, 2001) work on justice where he defends 
a view of the citizen as a “fully cooperating member of society over the course of a complete 
life” (2001, p. 18). For Rawls, a just society is founded on a principle of reciprocity conceived as 
“a cooperative venture for mutual advantage” (1971, p. 74) wherein persons benefit from their 
mutual and cooperative production and participation in civil society. This principle is both what 
defines citizenship and provides stability for a well-ordered society (1971, p. 74). Being a citizen 
in Rawls’ conception depends on one’s ability to participate in social, political, and economic 
life and to exercise certain rights and duties, activities which demand possession of what Rawls 
calls the two moral powers. These are the capacity to form a sense of justice, and the capacity to 
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form a conception of the good life and to rationally pursue such a conception over the course of a 
complete life (see 2001, p. 18-19). Individuals must possess these moral powers to the minimum 
degree necessary to engage in social cooperation and to participate in political society as equal 
citizens (Rawls, 2001, p. 20). They must fall within what he calls “the normal range,” or “the 
range of differences in citizens’ needs and requirements compatible with everyone’s being a 
normal and cooperating member of society” (Rawls, 2001, p. 170). Within this range, there is 
flexibility, but it is clear that a demarcated line exists between those who are included as 
decision-makers and those who are excluded as such. Rawls emphasizes the role of background 
institutions in creating the enabling conditions for the development of these capacities, but 
nevertheless concedes that some “scattered individuals” will be unable to form these two moral 
powers necessary for participation as fully-cooperating members of society because they lack or 
are impaired in their rational capacities (2001, p. 170). These individuals fail to meet the 
minimum requirements of equality and citizenship. As a result, consideration of their needs and 
interests are deferred to the later legislative stage of justice in his procedural account, wherein 
information pertinent to policy-making is known (Rawls, 2001, p. 173). In other words, they are 
the passive recipients of justice, but do not take part in constructing the justice contract. Thus, 
the Rawlsian conditions of reciprocity disqualify some individuals from equal citizenship and bar 
them from having the same democratic opportunities as other persons.   
The separate or deferred consideration of people lacking certain rational capacities within 
Rawls’ theory of justice is a consequence of how he conceives of a just and stable society. This 
stance of deferring consideration of this group therefore acts as a logical consequence of the sorts 
of capacities that are deemed necessary for citizens to possess. This conceptual marginalization 
is also seen within educational theory and philosophy in which scholars discuss what is required 
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of a democratic society in educating its members to be productive and active citizens. Rawls’ 
framework represents an important – and much theorized – example of the philosophical 
omission or postponement of consideration of those who are understood to lack particular 
cognitive abilities or capacities.  
A fair number of philosophers have followed Rawls’ reasoning about the necessity of 
deferring consideration of people whose reasoning capacities are deemed abnormal. For 
example, Erin Kelly (2010) writes it is “highly demanding to require persons to share the fruits 
of their cooperative efforts equally with those who do not participate” (p. 65-6). In other words, 
it would be unfair to apparently productive members of society if people with significant 
disabilities, because they cannot participate in producing the resources – including intellectual 
ones – that drive and stabilize society, were entitled to the same advantages and recognition as 
citizens. Conversely, Elizabeth Anderson (1999), in considering who is a civic equal, writes that 
“In a liberal democratic state, all citizens are entitled to the social conditions of their freedom 
and standing as equals in civil society, regardless of handicap, physical appearance, or 
intelligence” (p. 331). In a footnote, however, she qualifies this: “Some exceptions would have to 
be made for those so severely mentally disabled or insane that they cannot function as agents” 
(Anderson, 1999, fn. 97). Finally, philosopher Amy Gutmann (1987) likewise takes the deferral 
approach in her influential Democratic Education, a point I will discuss further later in this 
chapter. 
The postponement of consideration of such individuals – the deferral stance – essentially 
relegates them within theory to second-class status and places certain individuals, by virtue of 
their particular cognitive capacities, in non-decision-making roles. In short, people with 
intellectual disabilities are “outliers” in Rawls’ framework of justice (Silvers, 2009). An outlier, 
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says Anita Silvers (2009), is a person who “lives or is located outside of, or is separated from, 
the locus of productive activity or where others mainly are found...By definition outliers are so 
different from most people as to be distanced from society’s center” (p. 165). Historically, both 
white women as a group and people of color have been placed as outliers within social contract 
theory because they were regarded as lacking the abilities – the rational capacities – necessary to 
be fully cooperating members of society (Silvers & Francis, 2005, p. 40). We know now, of 
course, that such exclusions were based on sexist and racist assumptions about intellect and 
moral status and, moreover, that these assumptions were built into the fabric of philosophical 
reasoning as unquestioned facts about such groups (see Mills, 2001; Stubblefield 2007; Silvers & 
Francis, 2005). It is important, therefore, that we consider how philosophical theorizing about 
educational aims might perform these same unjust exclusions.   
In brief, then, the deferral stance begins by regarding people with intellectual disabilities 
as outliers to the usual frameworks of social obligation because they lack some capacity or set of 
capacities necessary to belong to the in-group. Within the context of education, then, the deferral 
stance takes as given that people with intellectual disabilities are different and questions about 
their education, including its aims, must therefore be considered separately. As I will discuss 
next, there are clear parallels here between the deferral stance within philosophy and that within 
traditional special education.  
  
The Deferral Stance and Educational Aims 
Separate educational aims and practices applied to children with disabilities have 
historically been the norm in schooling policy and practice. Because a significant portion of 
those children labeled with intellectual and developmental disabilities were until the latter 
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quarter of the twentieth century housed in large-scale institutions (Trent, 1994), much of their 
education was aimed at preparing them for institutionalized life and work. James Trent (1994) 
describes an example from an institution in 1920: “By the age of six, young inmates were 
learning how to hammer a nail, punch holes in leather, or wash rags on a miniature washboard. 
All kindergartners too learned to tend a garden. Given the institutional emphasis on agriculture, 
planting seeds, weeding, and observing plant growth became an important part of the education 
of even the youngest children” (p. 109). Because these children were never expected to enter 
mainstream society, providing them with educational opportunities to prepare them for 
mainstream vocations or civic engagement was seen as counterproductive, if not impossible 
(Trent, 1994). The unquestioned necessity of applying separate educational aims was regarded as 
simply a consequence of these students’ disabilities. Thus, separate educational aims were 
structured as for the good of the children themselves, as well as for the benefit of a well-
functioning institution and society outside of that institution. 
The implementation of separate learning aims or educational tracks that accorded with 
children’s perceived and assessed differences can also be seen more generally in the U.S. in 
relation to historical economic circumstances as well as ideas about ability based on race and 
class status. In her comprehensive account of ability tracking in American schools, Jeannie 
Oakes (2005) describes how ability tracking originated in the belief that a well-ordered society, 
and one that permitted individual and collective economic and civic well-being, depended on the 
differentiation of education according to students’ assumed inherent intellectual (and in some 
cases physical) abilities. In fact, social good and individual freedom were so bound up with ideas 
about inherent differences in intellect and morality that democratic education developed in the 
service of these forms of separation and differentiation. Says Oakes:  
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Progressive reformers also encouraged the move toward vocational training programs in 
their attempts to democratize high school education. It was hoped that the differentiated 
curriculum would support a new concept of equal educational opportunity – one that took 
into account differences in students’ interests and abilities. Through the provision of 
different high school curricula, opportunities for success could be equalized by offering 
different groups of students programs suited to their backgrounds and probable futures 
(2005, p. 32).  
 
We see, then, the parallel justifications for separating poor and immigrant children into less 
intellectually demanding educational tracks on the basis of their perceived and assessed (through 
apparently scientifically-based IQ testing) abilities and the justification for institutionalization 
and segregation of students with disabilities.  
Of course, what is at stake in subjecting children to separate aims is the denial of equal 
opportunity to achieve valued learning goals. In the case of poor youth and youth of color this 
denial operates according to ideas about ability based in racism, classism, and white 
ethnocentrism (Artiles, 2011; Oakes, 2005). We might say, then, that in the case of disability it 
operates according to ableism, but this explanation would be too facile. In fact, because ideas 
about ability are so racialized, the very concept of disability and ableism cannot be understood 
apart from the racialization of ability (Artiles, 2011). However, many scholars who work in the 
area of ability tracking and racial overrepresentation decry the lowered expectations and ability 
segregation of poor youth and youth of color while not explicitly questioning the need for 
segregated special education programming for students labeled with intellectual and 
developmental disabilities (e.g. Hibel, Farkas, & Morgan, 2010; Hosp & Reschly, 2003; Oakes, 
2005). The question of what constitutes equal or even fair educational opportunity for children 
with disabilities – and children of other social groups – is, as I discuss, ongoing and complex. It 
is important to note, though, that many scholars worry about how educational stratification 
(whether the result of practice or policy), lowered expectations, and lack of opportunity for 
  
35 
college preparation, vocational training, and civic preparation can affect individuals’ standing as 
social and political equals.  
Nevertheless, as we saw in Oakes’ passage above, the view that equal opportunity is 
better met through separate expectation according to separate needs and abilities has led some 
educational philosophers to conclude that separate aims are required to best serve children with 
intellectual disabilities and their peers. There are clear parallels here between traditional models 
of special education and the arguments of educational philosophers. In considering what 
constitutes educational equality, both sets of scholars express the view that all students ought to 
be treated equitably, whether in terms of the expectations that teachers, administrators, and 
policy makers have of them, or in terms of the resources distributed to them. However, because 
equality does not entail sameness of treatment, educational equality may not be best served by 
having the same expectations for all children. As Martha Minow (1990) and others have shown, 
the failure to treat children differently in accordance with their individual needs can be as 
educationally and socially damaging as the stigma associated with being treated differently. 
Indeed, where educational aims function as prescriptions for the kind of knowledge and skills 
students are expected to develop, then applying the same aims to all children regardless of their 
differences fails to account for, and show respect for and recognition of, individual differences 
(Minow, 1990). This is especially clear when the expectations of ability necessitated by 
educational aims are very demanding of children in terms of their cognitive, communicative, or 
behavioral abilities. To put it another way, and as I will explain further later in this chapter, 
learning demands that are inappropriately matched to a student’s capabilities cannot possibly 
count as equitable or fair. It is on these justificatory grounds that we see arguments for separate 
educational aims arise.  
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In general, arguments for separate educational aims follow two lines of argument relating 
to educational distribution as well as to concern about the quality of education that all children 
receive. These are arguments that express concern for the labeled individuals and their 
educational needs and arguments that express concern over balancing the needs of labeled 
children with the needs of non-labeled children. It is along the lines of these distributive concerns 
that many philosophers of education, special education traditionalists,7 and proponents of 
inclusive education clash (for discussion, see Brantlinger, 1997; Cigman, 2007; Terzi, 2008; 
Warnock, 2010). Foremost, they disagree about the extent to which and in what way existing 
limitations in resources – both material and epistemic – ought to influence the position one takes 
on whether inclusive education is possible and desirable. An example from Harry Brighouse 
(2002) is illustrative of a philosophical approach to thinking about disability relative to 
distributive concerns. Brighouse considers “Kenneth, who is highly talented, and Hugh, who has 
a serious cognitive disability,” and writes that “it seems that Hugh should be granted more 
resources, but…it is hard to see that they could correct for the disability, unless we were willing 
to disable Kenneth” (p. 184).8 By contrast, proponents of inclusive education start by asking 
what sorts of social, institutional, and classroom arrangements facilitate the best use of resources, 
not as competitively distributed, but as cooperatively enabling. For example, Martha Minow 
(2013) writes that “inclusionary efforts call upon general and special education teachers to 
collaborate by bringing the supports to the child rather than moving the child to the supports. 
When done well, inclusionary classrooms can offer benefits in differentiated instruction, smaller 
instructional units, responsiveness to varied learning styles, and access to more teachers and 
                                                
7 This phrase is used by Brantlinger (1997) to distinguish theorists who hold traditional views of special education and disability 
from those who are critical of such traditional views. The latter might also be called “critical special educators.” 
8 Interestingly, Brighouse admits that he feels ill-equipped to answer difficult questions of educational distribution relative to 
differences of ability. He writes that “it may be that clarity on this issue would be easier to achieve in collaboration with others 
whose disciplines are much closer to the distinctive needs and interests of real individual children” (2002, p. 189).  
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helpers for all students” (p. 42). Nevertheless, philosopher Lorella Terzi (2008) criticizes 
inclusive education perspectives for ignoring practical questions and regarding distributive 
concerns as “a mere technicality” (p. 75).9 We can therefore see different orientations towards 
thinking about disability in education.  
Advocates of inclusive education (e.g. Biklen & Burke, 2006; Donnellan, 1984; 
Jorgensen, McSheehan, & Sonnenmeier, 2007) argue that we ought to begin with a presumption 
of inclusion and to position students with disabilities as equals in educational projects to avoid 
the sorts of moral errors that can arise when we exclude those who could otherwise benefit from 
being part of general education classrooms. Proponents of inclusive education also challenge the 
view of abnormal/different versus normal/same that is implied by concerns over balancing the 
needs of labeled and non-labeled students, as well as the understanding of learning difficulties or 
differences as a property of individual children rather than relational between learner and 
learning environment (e.g. Biklen, 2005; Danforth, 2006; Gallagher, 2006; Hehir, 2002; 
Heshusius, 2004; Stoughton, 2006). Finally, and importantly for my argument, they regard the 
“ability expectations” that form the content of educational aims as warranting scrutiny: What are 
the necessary features of educational practices, structures, and aims? What justifies adherence to 
a particular way of learning or teaching such that these ability expectations are necessary? In 
general, these scholars have attempted to steer the debate over inclusive education away from a 
rather myopic focus on the physical schooling environment – that is, the physical space of the 
classroom – and towards a broader framework of inclusive practice that involves transforming 
pedagogy, curricula, assessment, and even teacher education and support.  
                                                
9 I find Terzi’s criticisms limited as they refer mostly to social perspectives on disability and inclusion that emerge within the UK 
context. As I will explain in Chapter Four, these versions of the social model of disability have been criticized as oversocializing 
disability. Terzi’s critique may not bear out when applied to scholarship in inclusive education and disability studies in education 
emerging from other contexts.  
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Why do some philosophers of education arrive at the view that separate educational aims 
for students with significant disabilities are necessary and justifiable? Concerning the first 
category of arguments for the necessity of separate schooling aims, namely those arguments that 
arise out of concern for the well-being of labeled children, we might be concerned that some 
educational aims – to which we are, for good reasons, attached – would be too demanding of 
some children because they require the development of capabilities out of such children’s reach. 
Call this the harm of too high expectations: whereby expectations for learning outcomes are too 
high, they can unduly harm children and can deprive them of learning possibilities more suited to 
them and more consistent with their developmental and ability range. Consider, for example, the 
commonly expressed expectation within frameworks of democratic citizenship education that 
children learn to perform reasoning tasks associated with democratic deliberation, including 
weighing their own reasons against those of other deliberators (Callan, 1997; Gutmann, 1987; 
Gutmann & Thompson, 2004; Hanson & Howe, 2011). Expecting such learning outcomes from 
children who experience significant difficulties in reasoning and cognitive processing would be 
not only inefficient for educators, but also unfair to the children themselves. This is because it 
deprives them of an education from which they can benefit.  
Second, we might consider a related harm, namely that of the frustration and stigma 
associated with struggling and failing that children may experience when educational aims are 
ill-suited to their capacities. Whether conspicuous or not, this struggle or failure may place 
students in positions of school marginalization because they are not performing at the pace 
considered normal or because their disabilities appear to prevent them from being included in the 
“normal” curricula. In fact, this argument has been used by advocates of separate schooling for 
children with disabilities on the grounds of the stigma they experience in being an “abnormal” 
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child in an able-bodied peer group (Cigman, 2007; see also Daniel & King, 1997; Warnock, 
2010). Mary Warnock (2010), for example, argues that disabled children are often bullied 
because of their differences and suggests that the option of their transferring to special schools 
would help alleviate this problem. Such a view, however, while aimed at expressing care and 
respect for stigmatized children, nevertheless places the burden of injustice on the individual 
child, rather than on the school system or the perpetrators. Furthermore, it ignores the role of 
school climate and culture in students’ treatment of one another. In doing so, the view that 
Warnock espouses excuses schooling systems – and the actors within them – from having to 
make changes to their institutional practices and culture.  
What, then, are arguments that arise out of concern for balancing the needs of labeled 
children with the needs of non-labeled children? One line of argument is based on the 
acknowledgement that many educational institutions have a finite amount of resources and must 
balance the needs of all children in the school and classroom. Such resources are not limited to 
educational materials – access to computers, labs, books, athletic and art equipment, and so on – 
but include also teacher attention and care (Jencks, 1988). In ensuring that children achieve the 
educational aims set out schools must acknowledge the differences in learning abilities among 
students and provide resources to them on the basis of need. The question of the just distribution 
of resources to children with disabilities – especially those regarded as having learning, 
developmental, and intellectual disabilities – has been a main area of focus within educational 
philosophy that addresses disability (see Ladenson, 2005; Merry, 2008; Norwich, 2002; Terzi, 
2008). Certainly, educating children with significant disabilities is frequently quite a bit more 
expensive than educating children regarded as having “normal” abilities.10 Indeed, some scholars 
                                                
10 Of course, lots of schooling activities and priorities are expensive. It is important, then, to consider where we place our values 
in making decisions (or ethical evaluations) about how to spend resources.  
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regard the redistribution of resources to children with disabilities as potentially taking away 
resources that could be used to cultivate the abilities of children assessed as gifted, who also 
often demand increased resources to adequately support their educational growth (see Lekan, 
2009; Merry, 2008). Some also raise concerns that the provision of additional resources to 
children with disabilities will amount to a “bottomless pit” problem, in which resources are 
expended with no end in sight (see Ahlberg, 2014, for discussion of this line of argument). A 
related worry is that applying the same educational aims to all children will require that schools 
level down the academic content of schooling so as to meet levels attainable for students with 
disabilities, especially intellectual disabilities. This would leave more intellectually and 
developmentally advanced students with inadequate educational challenges and learning 
potential (see Warnock, 2010). This is another version of the worry that some students will 
experience a deprived education because other students are unable to meet the same level of 
learning goals.11  
Abiding by separate educational aims for children with significant disabilities would 
address this problem of resource scarcity and leveling down – or so the argument goes – because 
it would mean that schools aren’t required to spend extra resources on children who are regarded 
as being “bottomless pits” or level down academic content, all the while adhering to educational 
aims that they have good reason to value. It is important to note that having separate aims does 
not necessarily entail having unequal aims that require less of some children and provide less to 
them. However, concerns that separate will mean unequal cannot be easily dismissed. This is 
especially worrisome when exclusion could affect an individuals’ social standing or their access 
                                                
11 Philosophers’ opinions on the justifiability of leveling down education are mixed and vary depending on their view of equality 
and in virtue of what students are considered equal. A lot depends on whether one sees equality as an ideal of social relations 
(equality of respect, of social status, etc.) or primarily as parity in distribution of resources. For some, like Anderson (2007), 
leveling down ought to be rejected because education, and the development of talents, is an intrinsic good and because education 
facilitates the capabilities of talented individuals to serve the less advantaged. See Anderson (2007) for discussion.  
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to equal respect, particularly because some aims, like democratic citizenship aims, correspond to 
individuals’ status as members of the political community (see Anderson, 1999). Moreover, 
some exclusions, because they affect social belonging and social respect, strike at the very core 
of human dignity, a point I will discuss further in the end of this chapter (see Nussbaum, 2006).  
 
Logics of Deferral in Special Education Policy and Practice 
The arguments outlined above are provided by those who support the use of separate 
educational aims in the education of children with significant disabilities, including intellectual 
disabilities. These are generally arguments given on the basis of egalitarian concern, not only for 
non-labeled children but also for those labeled with disabilities. As I suggested, these arguments 
may also suggest reasons for separate placement options for labeled children, especially when 
their academic development, social development, safety or comfort is impeded or jeopardized by 
a mismatch between their capacities and the educational expectations set out. These arguments 
are based on weighted considerations of equality and fairness, as well as respect, but do not 
usually consider the value of inclusion as such. That is, they begin with concerns over equality 
and fairness and work from there to establish the limits of who can and who cannot be included 
within educational aims and contexts. Further, these philosophical arguments regarding the 
distribution of education to children with and without disabilities do not appear to regard 
inclusion as an important feature of equality, fairness, and respect. How we weigh the value of 
inclusion (and inclusive education) – whether the moral or consequential value – is a 
complicated and important question, which I will not attempt to answer fully here. I will, 
however, provide insight into this debate as it has informed educational theorizing on the 
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education of children with disabilities, especially within the field of inclusive education and 
disability studies in education.  
The worry that educating children with disabilities alongside their putatively able-bodied 
and able-minded peers will detract from the quality of both groups’ education is not a new 
concern. Rather, we can understand it as an extension of the same concerns that led historically 
to the institutionalization and segregation of people with intellectual disabilities. Special 
education classrooms and programs were founded on the belief and perspective that both general 
education and special education instruction could be improved through the removal of labeled 
children into special classes and through the sorting of students according to their perceived and 
assessed abilities (see Oakes, 2005). Danforth, Taff, and Ferguson (2006) call this the 
“geography as curriculum” view in which historically special classes were justified by the need 
to ensure that students with disabilities did not drag down the education of other students (p. 15). 
As such, “The social conscience of addressing the individual needs of the disabled student was 
conceptually and practically inseparable from the organizational convenience of ability tracking 
and segregated programs” (Danforth, Taff, & Ferguson, 2006, p. 15). In other words, the 
geography as curriculum perspective claims the following: a model that adequately attends to the 
individual needs of all children is also one that supports and even promotes the intentional 
educational stratification and separate expectations of children based on assessed ability. 
Physical segregation and differing aims (often instantiated in tracking programs), is seen as a 
necessary response to individual differences in academic development or learning pace.  
Just as it would be a mistake to interpret the philosophical concerns listed above as 
disinterested about the quality of education for labeled students, it would likewise be an error to 
see the origins of special education as rooted in pure malevolence towards people with 
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disabilities. This would actually be too simplistic. As I have already noted, the history of 
separating children with disabilities – and children assessed as having lower academic promise – 
is characterized by both outright discrimination, misguided beliefs, and well-intentioned concern 
over children and their needs. Nevertheless, the argument that many (or even some) students 
with disability labels would be better served through segregated or semi-segregated learning 
(whether for academic or social reasons) or by separate learning aims, strikes many disability 
advocates as unfounded and unfair, as well as ineffective. Firstly, it is based on the belief – again 
a legacy of institutionalization and attendant educational aims – that mainstream schools or 
general education classrooms are unable to serve students with significant disabilities because of 
their complex and significant – “exceptional” – needs. This position is reflective of the 
assumption that the more severe or complex a child’s needs the more likely they are to require 
services that remove them from the classroom, or the assumption that they will simply be better 
served when those services are delivered in separate spaces (see S. Taylor, 2001). Historically 
children assessed as having “feeble-mindedness” or, later, “mental retardation” were 
institutionalized simply because of the perceived severity of their disability and because they 
were regarded as needing highly-structured, medicalized environments of “care” and “training” 
(see Carlson, 2010; Trent, 1994). In other words, separate educational expectations and goals 
that corresponded to more restrictive environments were applied to students because of their 
label or diagnosis, rather than because of any individually assessed support needs. Separation 
was further buttressed by the assumption that such children would not benefit from the usual 
aims of education (see Carlson, 2010, p. 37-8; Trent, 1994). The increased dependence on 
educational assessments and categorization to determine students’ expected educational 
attainment was solidified by the construct of “educability” (Carlson, 2010). As Licia Carlson 
  
44 
(2010) explains, medical professionals closely linked the notion of educability to ideas about 
intellectual disability as, variously and contradictorily, static and dynamic:  
The static and dynamic views of intellectual disability, then, do not directly map onto the 
mild/severe continuum. Both mild and severe forms of intellectual disability were 
presented as dynamic, justifying the existence of the institution as a pedagogical and 
therapeutic instrument. Yet the static character of intellectual disability has also been 
ascribed to both ends of the spectrum: there were always severe cases – the incurables – 
who merited custodial care (Carlson, 2010, p. 39).  
 
Assumptions about educability persist within educational theorizing, including within 
educational philosophy, and lead to conclusions about the abilities of labeled students that are 
misguided. In Chapter Four I bring these philosophical conclusions into conversation with 
inclusive education research and disability studies scholarship to show the epistemic limitations 
that arise from the conversational gap between these disciplines, and to highlight the detrimental 
effects it can have on the educational opportunities of young people with disabilities.  
For now it is important to point out that there is little evidence to suggest that more 
restrictive environments actually yield more or better services; in fact, the opposite is true (S. 
Taylor, 2001). Furthermore, there is ample evidence to show that homogenous grouping leads to 
lower educational outcomes for students (Anderson & Oakes, 2014 for comprehensive 
discussion). Nevertheless, the belief that increased restriction and segregation is therapeutically 
necessary or more academically beneficial for children with significant disabilities persists. 
Indeed, it is common for researchers and laypeople alike to question that services and supports 
for the most significantly disabled children can be delivered within a general education 
classroom (without detracting from other students’ education) or can be aimed at educational 
achievements similar to those of “typically-developing” students. However, this view of the 
necessity of segregated or semi-segregated spaces confuses the need for adaptive approaches to 
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learning – learning with support, learning at a different pace, learning different ways of being 
and doing than other children – with the physical location of those services and supports (see S. 
Taylor, 2001). It also maintains the belief that non-disabled children will not benefit from 
inclusion (or, indeed, will be harmed by it), a belief contradicted by evidence (see Cole, 
Waldron, & Majd, 2004).  
American education law has actually for some time now recognized that more restrictive 
environments do not necessarily impart higher quality services, nor do they provide a better 
education for students with disabilities. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement 
Act of 2004 (IDIEA) mandates that students with disabilities be educated in the least restrictive 
environment (LRE). The principle of LRE acknowledges that students should be educated 
according to their individual needs, not based on their disability label, a principle implemented 
through the Individualized Education Plan (IEP). Although LRE does not preclude the possibility 
that some students will require instruction outside of the general education classroom, it situates 
the default site of instruction as the spaces of general education, rather than segregated or self-
contained classrooms.  
Nevertheless, as Philip Ferguson (2013) points out, the law is worded in such a way as to 
enable schools to remove students from regular education environments when it is deemed 
necessary based on the “nature or severity” of the child’s disability (p. 153). Thus, “For most 
students with intellectual disabilities, this focus on the continuum [or more and less restrictive 
placements] has meant, in practice, a continued exclusion from the regular classroom” 
(Ferguson, 2013, p. 154). Children with intellectual disabilities, in fact, continue to experience 
the most restrictive educational environments (Ferguson, 2013, p. 154, citing OSEP 2010 Report 
to Congress; see also Kurth, Morningstar & Kozleski, 2014): less than 14 percent of students 
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with a label of mental retardation spend 80 percent or more of their day in general education 
classrooms, with 6% in totally separate environments (Ferguson, 2013, p. 154). Furthermore, the 
rate of placement in more restrictive environments increases in relation to students of color: 
racial minority students eligible for special education services attending highly racially 
segregated urban schools were found to be at much higher risk of restrictive educational 
placements compared with students in suburban schools (Fierros & Conroy, 2002; see also 
Artiles et al., 2002; Artiles, 2011). Ferri and Connor (2005b) argue that these findings and other 
related research “suggests that the amount of time a student with disabilities is removed from the 
general education classroom is directly related not only to the so-called ‘severity’ of the 
disability classification, but also to his or her race” (p. 179). Thus, the promise of the law has not 
translated into a substantially different experience for labeled students relative to restrictive and 
segregated environments. Moreover, it is especially failing to halt the compounding and, indeed, 
generative effect of race and class on disability marginalization.   
We can see, then, that the assumption of restrictiveness betrays a skeptical stance towards 
inclusion that is reflective of the deferral approach taken by philosophers in approaching 
questions around disability. Perhaps this is not hard to understand given its consistency with 
historical and dominant frameworks of education for those labeled with intellectual disabilities. 
However, inclusive schools are increasingly demonstrating that services and supports, even for 
the most significantly disabled children, depend on a combination of physical setting, educator 
aptitude, administrative and educator will, and classroom practice and pedagogy (see Hehir & 
Katzman, 2012; McLeskey, Waldron, & Redd, 2012; Rea, Mclaughlin, & Walther-Thomas, 
2002). Studies have shown that students labeled with intellectual disabilities make as much, if 
not more, academic progress in inclusive settings as they do in segregated settings (see Sermier 
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Dessemontet, Bless, & Morin, 2012 for a review of the research). According to Patricia J. Rea, 
Virgina L. Mclaughlin, and ChrissWalther-Thomas (2002), students with disabilities who are 
included in a general education classroom show increased or comparable academic gains and 
increased attendance when compared with peers in pull-out programs. Rachel Sermier 
Dessemontet, Gérard Bless, & Diane Morin (2012) found that while there was no significant 
difference in math or adaptive behavior achievement between the progress of children with 
intellectual disabilities in general education versus segregated setting, children in the general 
education context made “significant, but slight,” gains in literacy. Finally, although Cassandra 
M. Cole, Nancy Waldron and Massoumeh Majd (2004) found no significant difference in 
reading and math achievement between students labeled with mild intellectual disabilities who 
were educated in inclusive settings and those educated in pull-out settings, they did find that 
students without disabilities made significantly greater academic gains in academic achievement 
when they were educated in inclusive settings. This research challenges the assumption that the 
feasibility and efficiency of supports requires separated or segregated spaces of learning in order 
for students with disability labels to achieve academically. It also challenges the belief that non-
disabled students learn better in non-inclusive classrooms (see also Danforth, Taff, & Ferguson, 
2006; Ferguson, 2013; Hehir & Katzman, 2012). This research reveals as myth that students with 
disabilities detract from the education of non-labeled students; this myth is simply unsupported 
by research.12  
Importantly, this research can be read as suggesting that the burden of proof be placed on 
those who would continue to support restrictive environments for learning over more integrated 
                                                
12 One question we might want to ask in considering the benefits of inclusive education is the extent to which the degree of 
benefit matters. Do labeled students need to benefit only minimally or significantly? What constitutes a significant benefit? 
Moreover (and perhaps centrally), what degree of potential harm to non-labeled students will be considered tolerable? Indeed, 
what constitutes harm in this evaluation? Thanks to Beth Ferri for prompting me to consider these questions, which I hope to take 
up in future work.   
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and less restrictive ones. This is because these findings demonstrate that it is not only possible, 
but also desirable to educate children with intellectual disabilities alongside their non-disabled 
peers. Even if one objects that inclusion is simply easier with children with less severe 
disabilities, the notion that there is some demarcated limit to the potential for effective inclusion 
is simply to privilege the assumption of the need for restrictiveness all over again. My point here 
is that it is arbitrary and unfair to begin with the assumption of segregation rather than an 
assumption of inclusion. Even if one finds the empirical work unpersuasive, surely one must 
contend with the argument that the presumption of exclusion (and the stance of deferral) is 
unfair.  
 
Questioning the Deferral Stance 
The expectation of necessity for restrictiveness and the Least Restrictive Environment 
principle itself demonstrate the very important, but rather myopic, focus on the problem of 
“place” in the education of children with disability labels. The focus on place has characterized 
the development of the special education field, where place – along with professionalism – 
became the focus of special education policy and research debates (Danforth, Taff, & Ferguson, 
2006). This problematic focus on space has been decisively challenged by inclusive education 
scholars who point to an important distinction between the practice of mainstreaming and the 
practice, pedagogy, and philosophy of inclusion. Mainstreaming demands that children with 
disability labels spend a portion of their time in the general education classroom – that is, 
learning alongside their non-labeled peers – but does not require that the general education 
classroom, schooling environment or even, perhaps, teacher and administrator attitudes, change 
in any significant way. In other words, it requires bodies in a room, rather than a systematic shift 
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in how schooling is conceptualized and practiced. Mainstreaming also requires that students 
“earn” their place within general education by meeting expectations of behavior, learning, and 
achievement. By contrast, inclusive education requires significant changes to the schooling 
environment – physical, attitudinal, social, pedagogical – and requires that all parties orient 
themselves towards expecting a diversity of abilities. It is not simply an approach to schooling, 
but a principled deconstruction of the values and structures of education that have generated our 
current system.  
In addition to challenging the conflation of level of support with restrictiveness of 
placement, inclusive education proponents have also critiqued the reliance on deficit-based 
assumptions about disability and disabled students’ learning potential (e.g. Biklen, 2005; Biklen 
& Burke, 2006; Danforth, 2006; Davis 2006; Erevelles, Kanga & Middleton, 2006). That is, 
labeled students are regarded as being deficient or lacking in some way, such that their learning 
difficulties are understood as individual properties, rather than as relational between learner and 
learning environment. This critique emerges from a foundational assumption within disability 
studies: that it is society and its structures, institutions, attitudes, and policies that determine who 
is and who is not disabled.13 To approach the question of disability as if it is wholly separate 
from other equality considerations is to simply affirm the otherness of disabled people. An 
affirmative stance, by contrast, starts from the assumption of inclusion.  
According to disability studies scholars, students’ experiences of learning difficulties are 
not a result simply of their biological deficits but rather of how their particular mode of learning 
is not accommodated by the educational environment (Biklen, 2005; Danforth, 2006; Gallagher, 
                                                
13 Note that I did not say “determine who is impaired.” There is an important difference, as I will discuss in Chapter Four, 
between arguing that society creates disability and arguing that it creates impairment. There are many ways in which social 
values and norms structure how disability is experienced, interpreted, and responded to, and, because we are never outside of 
society, we are never free from these effects. Nevertheless, I do not subscribe to the view that all impairments are socially 
produced. This is a short explanation in a very large debate within disability studies. I hope my reasoning will become clearer in 
Chapter Four. 
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2006; Hehir, 2002; Heshusius, 2004; Stoughton, 2006). As long as the problem is located within 
the individual child, however, the school’s responsibility and incentive to change or adapt is 
diminished because it is the child who does not fit, rather than the schooling environment that 
fails to provide for the child. Such a perspective sustains the able-bodied norms upon which 
schools were established. Moreover, segregated placements and educational goals unfairly 
position people with disabilities as responsible for the injustice committed against them, whether 
by individuals or institutions. For example, while it may be responsive to well-being and safety, 
advocating for the removal of children who are being bullied by their non-disabled peers because 
of their disabilities means the labeled child carries the burden of an unjust system. Moreover, 
social stigma and hostile behavior is far from inevitable and the placement of stigmatized or 
bullied children in separate schools, even by their own or their parents’ choice impedes their 
right to fair and equitable education (Norwich, 2010). Even when such a move is made according 
to the child’s expressed wishes, it is a response to an injustice for which they are not responsible, 
and which deprives them of equal opportunity. Segregated or semi-segregated placements can 
also increase a student’s social stigmatization and marginalization by excusing school 
authorities, teachers, and peers from examining their beliefs about disability and their 
investments in the notion of normal development, learning, and behaviors (Brantlinger, 2004; 
Hehir, 2002). When children are removed from classrooms or schools because of their peers’ or, 
in some cases, instructors’ behavior, this reinforces the message that able-bodiedness is the 
norm. Thus, beyond being a concession to the unjust status quo and requiring students with 
disabilities to bear the burden of the discrimination against them, segregationist responses 
reinforce the belief that students with disabilities are “other.”  
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Another way in which this unfair and misplaced burden is evidenced is in the expectation 
that students with disabilities conform to the behaviors, activities, and ways of learning of 
putatively normal individuals. As I suggested earlier, educational aims for children with 
intellectual and developmental disabilities have historically reflected beliefs about educability 
and this has meant that institutions and later segregated schools and classrooms placed a high 
degree of emphasis on moral development and socialization, including daily living skills, 
behavioral management skills, and skills related to the imitation of putatively normal members of 
society (Danforth, Taff, & Ferguson, 2006). Especially as institutions began to close in the later 
quarter of the twentieth century, institutional and special education environments became 
increasingly attuned to the need for individuals with intellectual disabilities to emulate normal 
behaviors and abilities in order to be integrated into life outside institutions. As I will elaborate 
in Chapter Five, in spite of the positive emphasis on community integration, such programs also 
required the normalization of individuals with disabilities and, in doing so, placed the burden of 
change – assimilation – on labeled individuals. Assimilation essentially represents an 
individual’s best chances of being afforded social benefits rather than social marginalization, but 
it comes at a cost. 
Importantly, the orientation of special education towards assimilation and normalization 
is no accident. Rather, it is a consequence of a field of education developed in response to an 
increased immigrant population in and the presumed – and “scientifically” assessed – mental 
deficiency of this population (Baynton, 2013; Danforth, Taff, & Ferguson, 2006; Oakes, 2005). 
Indeed, the view that schools were fundamentally aimed at assimilating immigrant students into 
norms of American social and economic culture reinforced the notion that some children – 
immigrant, poor, students of color – required different educational aims than white, middle and 
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upper-class students, who were regarded as already normalized by their parentage and 
upbringing. Practices of educational exclusion can be understood as rooted in racist and classist 
eugenics policies. As I will explain in the next chapter, these policies dovetail with racialized, 
classed, gendered, and abled discourses around citizenship.  
As we have seen, disability studies and inclusive education theorists have worked to 
challenge received and misguided wisdom about disability and disabled students’ educational 
needs and to demonstrate that contemporary educational practices, policies and commitments are 
the legacy of ableist – and racist, classist – social, political, and educational ideologies. 
Presuming a need for restrictiveness and separateness applies not only to placement decisions, 
but also to articulated learning goals and educational aims. From the perspective of disability 
studies and inclusive education scholars, we ought to attend to this history in assessing our 
responses to the education of those with significant disabilities. Failing to do so risks repeating 
the injustices of the past and reinforcing what is frequently an educational system hostile to 
students’ perceived and assessed ability differences.  
 
The Affirmative Stance 
Although IDEA has been enormously successful in giving students with disabilities 
access to public education, the large number of students, particularly students of color, 
located in more, rather than less, restrictive placements has led some to characterize LRE 
as a ‘loophole’ that contributed to two largely separate and unequal education systems: 
general education and special education (Linton, 1998; Lipsky, & Gartner, 1996). Thus, 
the historical connections between school desegregation, special education, and 
resegregation are longstanding and complex (Ferri & Connor, 2005b, p. 456) 
 
Paying attention to the history of segregation and ability tracking, scholars in disability 
studies in education and inclusive education have argued that segregated schooling often 
promotes separate and unequal education (e.g. Barton, 2006; Erevelles, Kanga, & Middleton, 
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2006; Ferri & Connor, 2005b; Minow, 2013). As a result, and as I will explain, justifications for 
inclusive schooling have been made on both moral grounds and on the basis of the practical 
consequences of inclusion (and exclusion) for both labeled and non-labeled children and society 
more generally. This includes the consequences of lowered expectations that researchers argue 
arise within educational programs and contexts that subscribe to a segregationist mindset or 
methodology. Other arguments justify inclusive practice by evaluating the potential positive 
effect it can have on the educational development of all children. These include arguments that 
justify integration on the grounds that it best facilitates the development of mutual respect, 
compassion, and cross-positional understanding (see Lipsky & Gartner, 1999; Minow, 2013) as 
well as arguments that our current postindustrial age demands that individuals learn to 
collaborate with diverse others (see Skrtic, Sailor, & Gee, 1996). Each of these arguments and 
justifications is based in a view of the moral and practical benefits of inclusion.  
 
Moral and Practical Arguments for the Inclusion 
The challenges to segregation and separation from disability studies and inclusive 
education theorists that I have described can be understood as based in both moral and practical 
concerns. For example, Beth A. Ferri and David J. Connor (2006) argue that segregation is a 
morally untenable form of education because even when it does not violate principles of equal or 
equitable distribution, the mere fact of segregation upholds the controversial principle of separate 
but equal and marks labeled individuals as other (p. 2). As I have discussed, these challenges to 
special or segregated education emerge from advocates for inclusive schooling who are 
concerned not only with the physical inclusivity of schools – that is, integrated classrooms – but 
also with education as an inclusive project requiring innovative perspectives on pedagogy, 
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curricula, and even – perhaps especially – a shift in attitude about schooling in general. Thus, 
implicit in the stated problems with traditional special education is an understanding of inclusive 
schooling as a moral project – whether because it is morally questionable to segregate students, 
or hold separate expectations for them on the basis of ability, or because of the significant moral 
consequences of that segregation.  
This moral position is instantiated in legal rights frameworks in Canada, the United States 
and elsewhere, and, more recently, in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (UNCRPD). Emphasizing a rights framework, the UNCRPD states:  
The Convention follows decades of work by the United Nations to change attitudes and 
approaches to persons with disabilities. It takes to a new height the movement from 
viewing persons with disabilities as "objects" of charity, medical treatment and social 
protection towards viewing persons with disabilities as “subjects” with rights, who are 
capable of claiming those rights and making decisions for their lives based on their free 
and informed consent as well as being active members of society (United Nations Enable, 
2012) 
 
The language of rights, as Sigal Ben-Porath (2012) has pointed out, ensures that in the absence of 
a just social and political world we are oriented towards the social entitlements that people with 
disabilities have and the corresponding obligations of the state to meet those entitlements. Civil 
and human rights frameworks express the view that labeled students are entitled to integrated 
educational environments, to learning and developmental supports to meet the same educational 
standards as non-labeled children, and to high expectations consistent with valued learning goals. 
These entitlements are independent of any particular consequences of the failure to provide such 
education. By contrast, others may view the outcomes or consequences of a particular form and 
quality of education for labeled students as informing our policies regarding their education.  
Education scholars do disagree over whether it is educational rights or educational 
outcomes that should propel our support – or lack thereof – of inclusive education (e.g. Ben-
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Porath, 2012; Gartner & Lipsky, 1987; Fuchs & Fuchs, 1991; for a comprehensive discussion, 
see Gallagher, 2001). In general, much like the disability rights movements that propelled their 
scholarship, inclusive education scholars tend towards a rights framework (see Kanter, 2013). 
Nevertheless, as I have discussed, inclusive education scholars also point out that special 
education environments have been shown to lower expectations that teachers, parents, and 
administrators have of labeled children, and to focus on behavioral management and life skills 
rather than academic or civic development (Peterson, 2009; Smith & Routel, 2009). Further, 
segregated education environments and pedagogy can impede all children’s abilities to develop 
awareness of and respect for differences, which are regarded as central to the development of 
moral and civic dispositions and skills (Minow, 2013).  
Many advocates for inclusion as an educational project take an affirmative stance towards 
the question of inclusion that corresponds to a legal rights framework while nevertheless 
remaining critical or skeptical of the efficacy of laws instantiated in practice (e.g. Erevelles, 
Kanga, & Middleton; Minow, 2013). That is, they ask how inclusive education can be 
implemented rather than whether it can be implemented. Martha Minow (2013) calls this the 
“integration presumption” (p. 44). This stance places the onus on educational theorists, 
researchers, educators, and administrators to develop innovative ways to put inclusion into 
practice. Says Ellen Brantlinger (1997), “inclusionists believe that all students belong in socially 
comprehensive classrooms and that the onus is on those who would alter that status to show that 
students, as individuals or groups, benefit from other (pull-out) settings” (p. 433-435). To defend 
this affirmative stance, advocates of inclusive schooling frequently emphasize the moral 
dimensions of efforts to segregate or separate students labeled with disabilities, making 
sophisticated legal and philosophical arguments about the intersections of ability segregation and 
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the legal segregation of students of color prior to Brown (Ferri & Connor, 2005a, 2006). They 
also emphasize that it is fundamentally undemocratic to structure schools in ways that privilege 
some students over others (Brantlinger, 1997, p. 435), and that promote the continued 
stratification of different groups of students.  
A frequent criticism lodged against those who take the affirmative stance is that their 
position is simply faith-based; that is, it relies on a commitment to inclusive practice that ignores 
or disregards evidence (Brantlinger, 1997, p. 430) or the practical challenges of putting inclusion 
into practice (Minow, 2013). In short, that advocates value inclusion even over “evidence-based” 
research on students’ academic growth and well-being (see Fuchs & Fuchs, 1994; see also 
Brantlinger, 1997, for discussion) and ignore the fact that inclusion is frequently done badly, 
especially within an education system set up to support and sustain separation between labeled 
and non-labeled students (Minow, 2013, p. 44). However, Minow (2013) points out that this is 
not, in fact, a worry over the presumption of integration stance, but rather a worry over the 
practice of integration – that is, how integration or inclusion is carried out in practice. It is not, 
then, that (in general) proponents of this stance disregard concerns over educational 
achievement, but rather that they regard educational achievement (and educational equality) as 
fundamentally tied to inclusive schooling.  
A primary reason that proponents of inclusive education worry about the application of 
separate aims to labeled students is because of the documented relationship between school 
policy and teacher expectations of students and their learning achievement. Maintaining high 
expectations, then, is a way of not only showing respect for labeled students, but also ensuring 
that they are receiving an education of appropriately high quality and challenge (Cole, Waldron, 
& Majd, 2004). Historically, separate has meant unequal: there is a long history of applying 
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separate learning goals and requiring separate educational programs for children who are 
assessed as having lowered capabilities, and these have corresponded to lowered expectations of 
these children as well as less valued learning goals (Lynch & Baker, 2005). This is perhaps most 
apparent in the practice of ability tracking, a common practice within the US and other Western 
countries (Lynch & Baker, 2005, p. 137; Oakes 2005). Ability tracking usually comes in the 
form of stratified educational pathways to which students are assigned on the basis of their 
assessed aptitude. However, as I have discussed, this practice disproportionately affects low-
income, and ethnically and racially disadvantaged groups, all of whom are more likely to be 
placed on lower educational tracks (Lynch & Baker, 2005, p. 137; Oakes, 2005). For this reason, 
ability tracking has been criticized by educational researchers as contributing to the already 
disparate achievement of black and Latino students and their white and Asian counterparts in the 
US (see Collins, 2003). Further, ability tracking contributes to negative or lowered expectations 
toward lower-tracked students, the vast majority of whom are students of color and students 
labeled with disabilities (Lynch & Baker, 137; Oakes, 2005). Say Kathleen Lynch and John 
Baker (2005), “Remarkably, the deeply inegalitarian implications of grouping and tracking are 
often taken as a given, an inevitable by-product of the educational processes. Yet we know that 
they are social constructs with the most profoundly inegalitarian outcomes for those who are 
placed in low tracks in particular” (p. 137).  
Grouping students on the basis of ability not only requires a commitment to creating 
educational systems that stratify students’ learning opportunities, but also to the belief that 
assessments of students’ disabilities – whether in diagnostic testing or as labels – are objective 
and predictive of their educational prospects. It is well-documented by disability scholars that 
when teachers and other school personnel see students through their disability label – as autistic, 
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as severely intellectually disabled, as emotionally disturbed – they are more likely to judge their 
capabilities as lower and to maintain lower expectations of them (see Jackson et al. 2009; 
Jorgensen, McSheehan, & Sonnenmeier, 2007). Lower expectations result in the denial of 
opportunities to labeled children because they frequently fail to reflect students’ actual potential. 
Furthermore, because labels can mislead educators about students’ abilities, Douglas Biklen 
(2006 [with Jamie Burke]) argues that those who work with students with disabilities should 
“presume competence” (2006, p. 167) which Anne M. Donnellan (1984) called the “Least 
Dangerous Assumption.” 
Another example that demonstrates that separate expectations or goals result in unequal 
learning outcomes can be seen in opposition to proposals for separate diploma options available 
only to students with IEPs. Alternative diplomas have been institutionalized as a response to the 
high drop out rates of struggling students, whether labeled with disabilities or not. However, 
advocates of students with disabilities express concern that these separate diploma options, when 
available to students labeled with disabilities only, promote separate expectations of achievement 
and lowered expectations of educational outcome for them (Advocacy Institute et al., 2014). 
When a separate option is available, IEP teams may not hold students with labels accountable to 
receiving a standard diploma, whether by consciously lowering their expectations of what 
children can achieve based on their label or diagnosis, or by an apparently benign unwillingness 
to challenge these students. Further, advocates worry that an alternative diploma option available 
only to labeled students will be dismissed as meaningless by potential employers and post-
secondary institutions (Shallish & Bacon, 2012). Those who support a single diploma option 
argue that it maintains high expectations across diverse student groups and therefore shows 
respect for all students. It is the task of the school system and school professionals to ensure that 
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all children are able to achieve these goals by implementing educational practices that facilitate 
student achievement across abilities.  
Thus, we see the worry (and evidence) that separate expectations will lead to inequalities 
in educational respect or social standing. Certainly such a slide into lowered expectations is 
contingent; that is, it is conceivable in theory to maintain separate expectations for different 
groups while not placing an unequal value on their learning outcomes. Yet this contingency does 
not give us reason to ignore or minimize the worry I am describing here. This is because separate 
aims are applied within a social and educational world in which individuals with intellectual 
disabilities face barriers to equality and justice on a daily basis. This is the world we live in. 
Thus, separate expectations are already applied in a context of lowered expectations that 
correspond to these individuals’ marginalization and the privileging of able-bodied and able-
minded norms of ability in general. Further, social and cultural norms will always play a role in 
dictating what learning outcomes are valued for students. Educational aims reflect valued 
learning outcomes within a particular social and political world, in this case contemporary 
Western society built on liberal ideals. These ideals include, for example, such outcomes as 
autonomy, socialization, economic self-sufficiency, and so on (see Brighouse, 2006; Levinson, 
1999). Not applying these same aims to all children either explicitly or tacitly expresses a lack of 
expectation for excluded children in achieving valued states. Why do we not, for example, 
examine whether these aims are too demanding, or that they privilege abilities not obviously 
necessary for the goals they value, or that their content narrows the range of options available to 
reach valued adult activities, or, indeed, that what counts as valued adult activities is perhaps too 
narrow?  
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The point is that while exemptions and deferrals may be proposed out of concern for the 
educational well-being and success of labeled students, as we saw earlier in this chapter, they 
nevertheless position these students as unequals within the educational realm. So, we might be 
concerned, then, that different aims reflect different levels of respect and recognition, because 
different aims are more or less socially valued. Indeed, the concerns I have discussed have to do 
with the recognized relationship between educational goals or aims (whether single or multiple) 
and educational outcomes for diverse students. In fact, in both cases we see a worry about 
holding students from diverse communities and with different ways of learning to separate 
standards, especially insofar as these standards correspond to decreased expectations. The 
inclusivity of educational aims – whether conceptualized in more abstract philosophical terms or 
with respect to current educational conditions – are important to how we conceptualize the 
meaning of student differences and how our educational contexts respond to these differences. 
Further, it suggests something about the value we place on academic achievement rather than the 
exposure of students to diverse others.  
 
The Epistemic and Political Values of Inclusion 
Another argument in favor of inclusive practice is that that the value of inclusive 
schooling is instrumental because it facilitates better relationships among children who are 
preparing to be adult citizens of a democracy, or to live together in a diverse society. Indeed, a 
corollary of this argument is that the failure to educate students of differing abilities alongside 
one another simply perpetuates existent social and political problems associated with ability 
differences, such as social and economic hierarchies and disparities in civic participation. 
Although it is an empirical matter whether such outcomes are in fact best supported by inclusive 
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practice, the question of the epistemic value of inclusion is a philosophical one. Despite this, the 
value of ability inclusion (as opposed to say, racial inclusion) has not been well explored by 
philosophers. This omission contributes to an existing epistemic gap in understanding – and 
valuing – the contributions of those with intellectual disabilities to civic spheres.  
Because democratic citizenship aims are directed towards preparing individuals to 
become effective citizens, it is hard to imagine preparing effective citizens within non-inclusive 
environments. If being a good citizen involves being exposed to a diversity of perspectives, and 
many philosophers think it does, then it would seem arbitrary to conclude that this does not 
include individuals with intellectual disabilities. Minow (2013) expresses this view of the 
epistemic and political value of inclusivity well: “Integration in the context of disability holds 
promise of enhancing social understanding and the sense of ‘we’ among all students. Integration 
can give occasions for students who are not identified as disabled to gain life lessons on patience 
and appreciation for what they can do and for what others surmount” (p. 52). The promise that 
integrated education holds for building and sustaining understanding across differences is often 
cited as vital for democratic citizenship aims in education. 
Nevertheless, the sort of learning across difference that needs to take place for students to 
experience substantive engagement – and not just formalized inclusion – with their peers with 
disabilities, is fraught with problems. This is in part because understanding across differences is 
fraught with challenges that arise because of social, communicative, and conceptual impediments 
within dialogic activity (A. Taylor, 2010; see also Jones, 1999; Ellsworth, 1989), and because 
institutional norms and classroom learning practices do not always support students’ abilities to 
understand one another. Further, where educational environments are based on able-bodied and 
able-minded norms and do not already best facilitate inclusion, the attempt to engage students in 
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learning across differences of ability can simply amount to positioning people with intellectual 
disabilities as instrumental to others’ understanding and edification.   
Another reason that inclusion has instrumental value is in promoting democratic 
citizenship and facilitating status equality. This is because democratic citizenship aims are tied to 
civic equality (Anderson, 1999), or one’s status as a member of democratic society. That is, they 
have to do with the development of capabilities to participate in and affect the outcome of 
political decision-making, to take part in deciding upon the social and political future, and to 
affect social meanings about a wide array of societal norms. This relationship would seem to 
support our giving special concern to the inclusivity of aims that bear on persons’ civic standing. 
 
Social Status and Respect 
The view that inclusive practice is necessary for all students’ development as democratic 
citizens and that exclusion runs counter to this development is closely connected to a worry that 
separate (segregated) educational aims and practices can lead to the lowering of individuals’ 
status in society and can amount to a lack of equal respect. As we saw in the quote with which I 
began this chapter, the view that status differences are necessary consequences of ability 
differences can certainly be used to explain away and even justify such lowered status. Further, 
we saw that lowered expectations are frequently attended by a lowering of an individual’s status, 
whether in terms of the quality of education they receive or the social value attached to them. 
There is, then, an important relationship between the sorts of standards and expectations we 
begin with and the outcomes we get – a relationship clearly recognized and instantiated within 
the very concept of educational aims. 
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This relationship between educational aims and social status is very complicated. For 
example, economic aims express learning goals consistent with individuals’ development of the 
knowledge and skills to succeed in careers. Fair equality of opportunity would dictate, then, that 
all individuals be given equal chances – through schooling, economic conditions, hiring 
practices, and so on – to succeed in their choice of career. Yet sometimes the development of 
skills and knowledge required to succeed in future careers requires that schools and schooling 
professionals actually undermine respect for students (Morton, 2011). Economic aims may 
require the educational pursuit of capabilities consistent with labor market advantage, even while 
these impede the development of autonomy, critical thinking skills, or cultural connectedness. 
For example, researchers have demonstrated the importance of particular dispositions or “non-
cognitive skills” – like “grit” and “perseverance” – to a person’s economic and academic success 
(Heckman, 2006; Heckman & Rubinstein, 2001; Duckworth & Seligman, 2005).14 However, the 
acquisition of these dispositions for some students may undermine their connection to their 
cultural community (Morton, 2011). This means that the content of economic aims – that is, the 
expectations they promote in terms of students’ abilities – can actually undermine students’ 
social or personal well-being, even while they promote their opportunity for economic well-
being.  
Other skills demonstrate the relationship between particular abilities and opportunities for 
adult success in our current social and political context. For example, more specific skills like 
literacy can be considered necessary for citizenship; that is, some minimal level of literacy is 
required for the exercise of citizenship. But, as American law recognizes, barring individuals 
from exercising the rights and duties of citizenship because they are illiterate is unjust. 
                                                
14 See also “Promoting Grit, Tenacity, and Perseverance: Critical Factors for Success in the 21st Century,” U.S. Department of 
Education Report (February 2013). 
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Furthermore, the literacy requirement, if upheld, would bar many more individuals than seems 
desirable from the substantive opportunities of citizenship.15 Literacy is therefore better 
understood as a desirable ability rather than a necessary one. This example also gestures towards 
a disconnect between what philosophers often promote as necessary for the achievement of 
effective citizenship and what is actually necessary in our contemporary practices. For example, 
it may be desirable that individuals have some high level of independent critical thinking skills, 
but it is not necessary for political participation. If it were, a lot of people would no longer be 
able to vote or take part in the political process. Gregor Wolbring (2012) describes the problem 
with this reasoning succinctly: “Ability expectation simply signifies that one desires or expects 
certain abilities. Ableism extends these desires and expectations to a different level where one’s 
actions and judgments are shaped according to the perception that certain abilities are essential” 
(p. 151). This is not to say, of course, that critical thinking skills are an insignificant, 
unimportant, or undesirable set of skills for citizens to acquire. Indeed, it is critical thinking skills 
that we seek to cultivate in our students precisely so that they can question social injustices like 
the exclusion of individuals with disabilities from political participation. But critical thinking and 
political decision-making are activities that are highly interdependent and that take place through 
relationships. What is in operation here is a presumption that critical thinking takes place 
independently. As I will argue in later chapters, a more inclusive conception of citizenship 
involves relocating critical thinking and decision-making within relationships rather than 
individual capacities. 
                                                
15 It is also worth noting that how literacy is defined and understood is not set in stone (no pun intended). Indeed, what counts as 
being literate depends on social contexts (e.g. Kliewer et al., 2004) and, likely, on the kinds of technology that individuals and 
school systems have available to them (I’m thinking here of Alternative and Augmentative Communication devices, for 
example). 
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In some instances it is not the aims themselves, but the content of aims that expresses 
disrespect for individuals. Consider how market-based economic aims have permeated 
educational institutions, policies, and practices especially in the United States, where neoliberal 
policies have appeared to steer educational aims away from democratic goals and towards labor 
market ones (see Lipman, 2011). Such educational aims arguably promote status inequalities and 
perpetuate capitalist systems in which particular forms of contribution are valued. Some aims 
may appear to bear less on social standing or social respect, however. For example, we might 
imagine that critical thinking aims or artistic aims bear only indirectly on social standing because 
one’s capacity to think critically does not arguably in itself undermine one’s ability to participate 
in social institutions, make decisions of public concern, or belong to valued social networks and 
communities (although they may certainly enhance these experiences). Perhaps, then, different 
aims demand different levels of attention to inclusivity and whether exclusivity of aims brings 
about disrespect.  
The relationship between democratic citizenship aims and equality highlights the 
significance of inclusion. Martha Nussbaum (2008) expresses this well in relation to democratic 
citizenship: 
To say that this person will have property rights and that one will not, that this one will 
be able to vote and that one will not, seems an intolerable violation of equal respect for 
human dignity. Moreover, if we start fashioning different levels of political entitlement 
we lose a strong incentive that my single conception [of the obligations of justice] gives 
us for making every effort we can to develop the capacities of people with disabilities to 
the point at which they are able to exercise these entitlements on their own (p. 363-4).  
 
According to Nussbaum, holding separate standards of political entitlement based on assessed 
differences can provide us with less incentive to pay equal respect to individuals who are 
exempted and to take affirmative measures to ensure that they are enabled to become democratic 
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citizens. Nussbaum’s worry echoes the concerns of disability studies and inclusive education 
theorists that the focus on and naturalizing of differences of ability will excuse us from our moral 
obligations.   
Although Nussbaum’s views about disability inclusion are not without criticism, her 
conception shares the view with many philosophers that we ought to be concerned with not only 
persons’ social standing but also their political equality and access to the institutions and 
mechanisms of civic power (e.g. Anderson, 1999; Satz, 2007; Young, 2000). It is for this reason 
that some political philosophers and educational scholars have upheld participation in democratic 
citizenship as a threshold of societal obligation (e.g. Anderson, 2007; Gutmann, 1987; Satz, 
2007) and one which societies are obligated to promote through education. The right to 
participate in and make decisions about matters of public concern is upheld for all students as 
necessary for equality. Democratic citizenship aims appear, then, to bear perhaps uniquely on 
social standing and social respect.  
  
Separate But Equal? Lessons from Racial Segregation 
One way to test our intuitions about the value of inclusive education and the affirmative 
stance is to consider parallels with the inclusion of students of color in schooling in the United 
States. Firstly, using the word “inclusion” in this case might strike the perceptive reader as odd, 
even offensive: to include students of color seems to suggest that the space into which they are 
being included is a white space, or, at least, one not constructed with them in mind (for 
discussion, see Graham & Slee, 2008). Indeed, “integration” is the more commonly used term in 
considering how schools serve racially diverse groups of students perhaps in part because it 
signals a more equitable distribution of adjustment. The parallel, then, is to consider that 
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inclusion is frequently regarded as a project of including disabled students in classrooms built 
and structured to accommodate able-bodied and able-minded students, whether physically or 
pedagogically. This is the argument lodged against mainstreaming that I explained above, 
namely that it requires students with disabilities to assimilate without requiring any structural 
changes to the way schooling is done. The term itself almost concedes that education is premised 
on an assumption of able-bodiedness.  
Secondly, arguments concerning the preference for separate education of children of 
color, especially African American children, reference both academic outcomes (low graduation 
rates, for example), stigma, as well as cultural considerations (namely that non-specialized 
school personnel lack the cultural knowledge to serve non-white students) (see Minow, 2013). 
Both of these arguments are based on a view that educational institutions and practices 
systemically and structurally disadvantage non-white students and therefore maintain and even 
promote inequalities in academic, social, and civic outcomes (see Collins, 2003). In other words, 
arguments for separate schools for kids of color – as for LGBT youth – are responses to 
historical and systemic injustice rather than about who these kids are – their differences in skin 
color, gender identity/expression, language, cultural background or any learning deficiencies 
they may be thought to possess; it is based on a recognition that educational systems 
inadequately serve them. As far as I am aware, there are no respected educational theorists who 
argue for separate schools for black children and youth on the basis of their race alone. And 
those who do advocate for separate schools on the basis of cultural or religious identity 
(Afrocentrism, Islamic schools, Quaker schools, etc.) do not generally conclude that these 
schools cannot also be racially integrated or open to those from diverse cultural backgrounds.  
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Certainly such responses to non-ideal circumstances can yield more just educational 
outcomes for students of color – more just than colorblind policies certainly – but these 
consequentialist arguments for separate schooling do not constitute arguments against integration 
as an important educational entitlement or democratic goal, nor do they suggest that integration 
cannot work. Rather, they acknowledge that there persists a lack of institutional knowledge or 
social will to make integration work because of historical injustice (see Minow, 2013). Thus, we 
cannot infer from unsuccessful inclusion – or that its success is questionable – that it is 
unsuccessful because it can’t work. The affirmative stance recognizes this by advancing a 
progressive approach to inclusive practice; that is, by emphasizing that it is a work in progress. 
Accordingly, the response to separate schooling options based on non-ideal circumstances – 
whether for African American students or students with disabilities – ought not be intended as 
goals but rather as temporary responses to injustice. To suggest otherwise is to tacitly embrace 
the status quo.  
Of course, whereas the elected separate education of students on the basis of race occurs 
in part as an acknowledgment of attendant cultural and historical differences, individuals with 
disabilities are not widely – or even narrowly – recognized socially as a cultural group (Davis, 
2011).16 That is, disability is not often regarded by non-disabled people as an affirming identity 
in a way analogous to the identity-shaping experience of race, gender, sexual orientation, 
cultural, linguistic, or religious background and so on. As Lennard Davis (2011) explains, 
“disability isn't just missing from a diversity consciousness, but is antithetical to diversity as it 
                                                
16 There are some notable exceptions. The Deaf community is recognized by many non-disabled people as its own cultural group, 
although it is important to note that those who belong to the Deaf community do not typically identify as disabled. Rather, they 
see themselves as members of a cultural and linguistic minority (for discussion, see Padden & Humphries, 2006). Another 
example is the Neurodiversity movement begun by autistic self-advocates who argue that they be seen not as neurologically 
impaired or deficient but as neurologically different (see Robertson & Ne’eman, 2008). Of course, the extent to which such 
assertions of (cultural) group status are acknowledged or accepted by broader communities in the U.S. and beyond is a different 
question. I certainly do not mean to imply here that people with disabilities do not regard themselves as members of a cultural 
group; indeed many do and find great meaning in this identification.   
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now stands” (n.p.). As I will discuss further in Chapter Four, disabilities are most often 
understood as conditions that reduce individuals’ capacities and potential for contribution to 
various social arenas. Whereas gender, ethnic, racial, or religious identity are celebrated in K-12 
contexts (however inadequately and inappropriately), there is greater difficulty in seeing 
disability as an identity to be proud of because it is so strongly tethered to notions of deficiency 
and pathology (Davis, 2011; see also Ware, 2002). It is for this reason that social institutions like 
education, health care, medicine, charity organizations and so on have promoted both the 
prevention of and in many cases eradication of disability. Such a view contrasts with the notion 
that disability – as an identity, as an experience – could be empowering. Under these conditions, 
it seems at least unlikely that separate schooling environments and separate learning aims could 
promote a feeling of empowerment for children with disability labels. Nevertheless, some 
children with disabilities – especially those with psychosocial or mental health disabilities and 
autism – may experience their separate schooling as positive. In these cases, we ought to take 
seriously their testimonials. We also know, however, that common schools are often ill-equipped 
to provide adequate education to such students, not because of the students themselves, but 
because school people and policy-makers lack a willingness to restructure educational contexts 
to include them. The reason for exclusion are therefore extrinsic to disabled persons themselves 
(their identities or their biology) and again concede to and are shaped by unjust circumstances. 
As such, they do not undermine the value of inclusion but rather point to the continued problems 
of inclusive practice within a society and schooling system structured by able-bodied norms and 
ableist oppression. Certainly schools that are disability-positive (that is, celebrate rather than 
malign or ignore ability differences) are likely to enable more educational flourishing of children 
with disability labels, but this orientation does not require separate schools.  
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The contingency of educational outcomes on historical and contemporary structures and 
systems of oppression illustrates the importance of the affirmative stance and demands attention 
to the difference between inclusive education as an educational goal and inclusive education in 
practice. Thus, to uphold the value of inclusive schooling as a moral project is not to defend 
inclusion as desirable in every case nor is it to suggest that existing non-ideal conditions play no 
role in our evaluations of the desirability of inclusion in particular individual cases. Rather, to 
uphold the value of inclusive schooling is to promote the value of inclusion as a social justice 
concern and regard inclusion as having normative value alongside concerns over equality, 
fairness, and respect. It is to begin with the presumption of integration rather than to continue to 
presume the need for segregation and thereby continue the legacy of ableism in schooling. 
As I have said, the issue of the inclusivity of educational aims is surely different from 
(although intimately connected to) the question of the physical inclusivity of schools, yet both 
raise significant normative questions surrounding the distribution of educational resources, the 
tasks of educators, and so on, questions that track our philosophical orientation towards disability 
and the value of inclusion in general. Further, both pertain to the question of what exactly 
inclusive schooling requires. Does it require inclusive learning spaces? Does it require inclusive 
aims? Of course, it is conceivable that schools could operate according to inclusive aims of 
education while maintaining segregated learning spaces for students with significant disabilities. 
As I think I have shown, theorizing the relationship between separate aims and separate learning 
environments is complicated and surely it is in part an empirical matter whether children can feel 
included, experience belonging, or experience educational achievement when different aims are 
applied to them. However, there is ample research to suggest that separate expectations and 
separate learning goals negatively affect students’ learning outcomes, especially in the context of 
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existing marginalization of people with disabilities. Further, inclusion concerns go beyond 
simply integrating spaces of learning and involve also the transformation of our pedagogy, 
assessment practices, school structure and so on, and this includes attention to the inclusivity of 
educational aims.  
 
Conclusion 
In the previous section I discussed how the project of inclusion extends beyond – and 
problematizes – mere integration of students with disability labels in general education 
classrooms. Rather, full inclusion demands the transformation of ways of thinking about, 
practicing, and evaluating schooling, and especially attending to the ways in which existing 
structures and practices privilege and reinforce able-bodied and able-minded norms of learning 
and development. Of critical importance, then, is not just how the physical space of the 
classroom reflects a diversity of abilities, but also how educational researchers, philosophers, and 
teacher educators understand and respond to the existent differences in ability that children 
embody. As I have shown, inclusion demands the embracing of ability differences and, in 
general, the practical challenges that attend the education of students with very different learning 
needs. Inclusive aims are therefore consistent with treating children differently according to their 
needs. That is, we might hold the same aims for all children while acknowledging and 
accommodating the different ways that children learn towards those ends. However, we must 
also evaluate how the educational aims we value are themselves shaped by problematic ideals. 
This is the subject of the next chapter. 
In considering the philosophical evaluation of the aims of education, especially as they 
apply to children labeled with intellectual disabilities, an inclusion framework would seem to 
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demand that we take an affirmative stance towards inclusive aims; that is, that we begin with the 
presumption that all students can benefit from learning towards valued educational aims like 
democratic citizenship. Again, there are both moral and practical reasons for doing so. One 
reason is that there are significant practical problems in assessing who is and who is not capable 
of meeting certain ability expectations associated with particular aims. This includes errors in 
assessment, assumptions about the connection between label and educational ability, and 
assumptions about the need to perform learning functions in normalized ways. In applying 
separate learning outcome expectations we ought to be quite certain about the particular abilities 
that children have such that we can be sure of their inability to meet the usual objectives. On an 
individual basis, this may not pose such concern (although it may warrant revisiting the learning 
objectives themselves). However, on a policy level it raises enormous problems because it 
permits the separate treatment of people because of their membership in identified (and often 
subjectively determined) groups. I will discuss this problem in Chapter Four.  
A further practical problem, which can have significant moral consequences, is that 
assessment practices may themselves be based on unfair assumptions about ability and disability 
based in a social world that underestimates and devalues the competencies of individuals with 
intellectual disability labels. Further, we face the practical question of whether the application of 
the same aims – democratic citizenship, for example – requires the cultivation of skills and 
knowledge in the same way. This means that we would need to be certain that the content of our 
valued aims does not express ability expectations that are unnecessary for achieving the ends set 
out and that do not unnecessarily privilege able-bodied and able-minded norms and expectations. 
Further, we need to be sure that they have some relationship to the existing social practices of 
actual communities. This involves evaluating whether our existing frameworks of what 
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democratic citizenship entails are too rigid or too narrow or if they are based on unfair norms. I 
will discuss these questions in Chapter Five.  
 It is important to point out that thus far I have referred to educational aims more generally 
and with occasional reference to democratic citizenship aims more specifically, especially in 
gesturing towards why they might present specific worries relative to inclusive education. While 
the applicability of all educational aims to children with significant disabilities concerns me, the 
focus of this project is specifically on democratic citizenship aims. Certainly the focus on 
democratic citizenship aims specifically could offer a nice case study of the significance of 
inclusive educational aims or the problem of exclusivity in aims more generally. However that is 
not my goal in this project. Rather, I am focused on democratic citizenship aims specifically 
because they are perhaps uniquely tied to at least two important justice concerns, namely 
political equality and human dignity. Civic education is tied not only to one’s participation in the 
activities of political life – which can include voting and other forms of decision-making, 
participation in public discourse, protesting and public bargaining, and other as yet unrecognized 
forms – but also to one’s membership in a social and civic community – schooling, 
marrying/partnership, working, bearing children, living in the community, forming friendships 
and so on. In this sense, being discounted as a potential citizen, or being denied the opportunity 
to develop valued civic roles, strikes at the core of human dignity, social belonging, and – 
potentially - moral worth. 
 Furthermore, I focus on democratic citizenship aims specifically because historically the 
citizen – and democratic citizenship conceptually – has been defined in opposition to people with 
intellectual disabilities; that is, and as I will explain, the capacities and characteristics regularly 
attributed to people with intellectual disabilities have exemplified the antithesis of those of “the 
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good citizen.” This means that the norm – good citizenship – upon which philosophical 
frameworks, educational curricula, and schooling practices of democratic citizenship education 
are based is itself rooted in exclusion. Thus, it is not simply that we need to figure out how to 
engage in more inclusive practice relative to this particular learning aim, but also that we must 
transform the thing itself – that is, transform the norms of civic engagement and participation. 
We cannot develop an inclusive conception of democratic citizenship education while retaining a 
conception of citizenship that is exclusive.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION AND THE NORMS OF CITIZENSHIP 
 
In the age of democratic revolutions, the developing new concept of citizenship 
rested on independence; dependency was deemed antithetical to citizenship 
(Fraser & Gordon, 1994, p. 19). 
 
…disability reveals the deep discrepancy between the ways we conceptualize the 
demands of political participation and the actual range of ways people act 
politically (Clifford Simplican, 2015, p. 4). 
 
  
In this chapter I will consider how philosophers have conceptualized democratic 
citizenship and the educational development of abilities related to the exercise of citizenship 
within frameworks of democratic education. My aim is to show how democratic education has 
been theorized in relation to assumed levels of ability, while largely ignoring differences in 
ability – and intellectual ability in particular. I begin by discussing how philosophers have 
thought about the relationship between democracy and education according to their specific 
interpretations of democracy as well as their views of citizenship as an aim of education. Next I 
show how these prevailing conceptions of democratic citizenship aims take up a view of 
citizenship that is explicitly biased against individuals with intellectual and other significant 
disabilities and that privileges able-mindedness. This bias further informs a view of democratic 
equality that leaves people labeled with intellectual disabilities outside of particular civic and 
educational obligations of the state. Finally, I describe how varying forms of democratic 
engagement generate specific “ability expectations” (Wolbring, 2012), or those capacities that 
are regarded by scholars as required for the achievement of citizenship.  
My discussion of expected abilities of citizens is meant to demonstrate not only the 
variability of views on what citizens ought to know and be like, but also to explore the kinds of 
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values that are expressed within philosophical consideration of democratic citizenship and 
corresponding aims of education. As I will show, understanding democratic citizenship as an aim 
of education has involved delineating what sorts of abilities are expected and/or required of 
citizens if they are to participate as equals in democratic politics. This has involved deciding 
upon (either generally or specifically) the sorts of skills and capabilities, including perhaps 
virtues and dispositions, that children need to develop in order to become democratic citizens. 
Further, it has involved asking what levels of skills and knowledge are necessary – adequate – to 
meet the threshold of democratic citizenship. So, for example, there might exist a range of 
abilities in relation to some democratic capability (say, deliberation), but what level of ability is 
sufficient to say that this person has acquired that specific skill or disposition?  
In deciding upon thresholds, moreover, we may have to consider what sort of background 
knowledge should guide our decision. Under what conceptual constraints, according to what 
theory, and in virtue of what existing social conditions do we make such assessments? The 
ability requirements that we settle upon will depend, in part, on whether we base our reasoning in 
the demands of our current political system or we consider those that would arise in ideal 
circumstances. It will also involve considering how our philosophical reasoning is informed by 
prevailing philosophical, scientific, and popular understandings of intellectual disability. An 
important question, then, is how we arrive at the level of ability required through schooling. Not 
only does this depend greatly on the sorts of background conditions that are guiding our 
decision-making, but it also depends on what sort of understanding of democratic participation 
we have. That is the subject of this chapter. 
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Democratic Citizenship Education as an Aim 
Whether they see democratic citizenship education as primarily reproductive or whether 
they regard it as primarily transformative, philosophers of democratic citizenship education are 
generally interested in how educational processes and practices enable students to develop the 
capabilities and dispositions regarded as necessary to engage effectively and cooperatively in 
democratic politics, including public discussion about the common good, decision-making about 
public policy, and, certainly, decisions about educational and schooling goals and aims. Within 
more radical or transformative conceptions of democratic citizenship education, the emphasis is 
on the critical dimensions of such skills and dispositions – the development of competencies to 
recognize and oppose oppressive forces, for example – whereas liberal democrats are primarily 
interested in students developing rationality, respect for the autonomy of others, and a 
disposition towards reasonableness in encountering different conceptions of the good. Both are 
concerned with the extent to which such decisions are made and community is created within 
conditions of interest plurality and identity difference. Such concerns suggest an understanding 
of schools as shaping or forming – in Eammon Callan’s (1997) words, “creating” – democratic 
persons or citizens who embody and instantiate democratic values. Often, then, students judged 
capable of democratic citizenship education are framed as possessing, or possessing the potential 
for, particular abilities that correspond to desirable skills, knowledge, and disposition or 
character (see Biesta, 2006, p. 123). Such capacities usually include levels of cognitive or 
intellectual reasoning, economic and civic reciprocity of a particular level and kind, intellectual 
and social independence, a disposition toward respecting democratic values, and normalized 
  
78 
communication and behavioral expressions. These “ability expectations” frame democratic 
persons as able-bodied and able-minded in particular ways.  
As a topic of philosophical study, democratic education spans a broad area within 
philosophy of education, encompassing both the theoretical questions of democracy’s 
relationship to education (and education’s relationship to democracy) and the practical questions 
surrounding how students are taught about and for democratic citizenship. Broadly, then, 
democratic education is conceptualized as aimed at preparing students for the public 
relationships and participation in decision-making processes that characterize democracy. In 
Democracy and Education (1916) John Dewey expresses this relationship between democracy 
and education as follows: “A society which makes provision for participation in its good of all its 
members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through 
interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic. Such a society must 
have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and 
control, and the habits of mind which secure social changes without introducing disorder” (p. 
99). Accordingly, education is the vehicle through which individuals become democratic persons 
and through which the values of democracy are reproduced and social stability maintained. As 
such, whatever one’s working conception of democracy, schooling and institutions of education 
play important roles in ensuring the reproduction of democratic values and an understanding, 
however thick or thin, of democratic process. 
As a political system in which people govern themselves, democracy is often thought of 
directly in terms of decision-making power, specifically that those who are affected by decisions 
ought to be the ones making them. Binding decisions are only legitimate insofar as they follow 
this democratic value and the procedures it entails. Yet how such decisions are made – by 
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representatives, by referendum and direct voting, by public deliberation, etc. – are the necessary 
practical questions that complicate the neat ideal of democracy. Still other important questions 
involve what sorts of values are democratic in nature or which ones fit with a particular 
conception of democratic practice. Of course we might expect a degree of disagreement among 
visions of democracy and democratic practice and, consequently, disagreement over how 
education serves or ought to serve democracy and democratic aims. Theorists might disagree, for 
example, on whether democracy demands full inclusion, or whether full democratic participation 
involves simply casting a vote or requires active deliberation over matters of public concern. 
Some might regard democracy and democratic participation as primarily aimed at the 
continuation of political, social, and cultural values (including that of democracy itself), while 
others might see it as primarily aimed at the transformation of such values. Importantly, 
democracy can be understood not only as a procedural form, but also as a mode of living. Dewey 
pointed out that seeing democracy as primarily about decision-making procedure neglects the 
important sense in which democracy is also a mode of associated living and “conjoint 
communicated experience” (1916, p. 87). Dewey saw democracy as a mode of living in which 
individuals work out problems and cooperate as social and political actors. In this sense, 
democracy is an ongoing process rather than an achieved state of affairs. Certainly, in discussing 
democratic education philosophers of education have in mind a particular understanding and 
vision of what democracy is, what values it entails and what it demands of individuals in relation 
to one another and to the state. This includes, as I will show, different perspectives on the 
different forms that democratic citizenship takes and the participation it requires. These different 
forms express requirements that are more and less demanding of individuals and which require 
varying degrees of physical, communicative, and cognitive ability and independence.  
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Constructing the Citizen: Fantasies of Race, Gender, and Ability 
Because schools are positioned as the vehicles through which the state reproduces itself 
or, potentially, transforms itself, the broader social values of citizenship – likely based on 
democratic principles – are transmitted through schooling practices and through the skills, 
dispositions, and knowledge advanced, whether implicitly or explicitly, within the classroom. 
For some, notably proponents of liberal democratic education, this construct seems right and 
good; that schools are the vehicles through which the values of liberal democracy are reproduced 
serves the aim of education to prepare young people for their roles as adult citizens of liberal 
democracy. According to a liberal democratic model of education, education or schooling is not 
only an institution of the state that is to be governed according to liberal principles, but it also 
“lies at the heart of the liberal project; it is upon the realization of liberal educational goals that 
the success of liberalism itself depends” (Levinson, 1999, p. 5). Liberal democratic education 
conceives of schooling as aimed primarily at reproducing and sustaining liberal democratic 
values. In this sense, young people are to be schooled to possess those capacities that are deemed 
essential to the preservation of the liberal state (Levinson, 1999, p. 4).  
However, for others, notably feminist critics of liberal democracy, this construct has the 
potential to conserve inequality and sustain injustice, especially where the social values of 
citizenship intentionally or unintentionally privilege the social or cultural norms, or behaviors 
and abilities, of particular groups (Lanoix, 2007; Lister, 1997; Preece, 2002; see also Levinson, 
2012 ). For these scholars, the notion that schools shape the adult citizens that young people are 
to become is less about the promise of education and more about its dangers. For example, 
critical theorists of education, like Peter McLaren (e.g. 2013) and Henry Giroux (e.g. 2005), have 
long sought to reorient educational theorists’ thinking about schooling away from this emphasis 
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on social reproduction towards an emphasis on social transformation and empowerment. Giroux 
(2005) argues that, whereas the liberal democratic tradition regards the individual as largely 
unchanged by his or her participation in democratic exercise, critical theory conceptions of 
democratic education see this transformation as integral to citizenship (p. 21). Such critical 
perspectives on democratic citizenship education dovetail with the challenges posed by inclusive 
education scholars that I discussed in the previous chapter because they highlight the sense in 
which our educational systems and practices participate in reproducing inequalities and social 
oppression. For example, Nirmala Erevelles, Anne Kanga, and Renee Middleton (2006) argue 
that “[p]art of the problem with liberal education policy is that it is committed to social reform 
rather than social transformation” (p. 92). 
What Giroux (2005) calls the “discourse of citizenship” has mirrored and transformed 
itself in relation to particular historical contexts and shifting historical moods. Citizenship is “a 
socially constructed historical practice” that involves struggles over what forms of knowledge, 
what social practices, and what values are accepted and institutionalized (Giroux, 2005, p. 5-6). 
Rather than understanding citizenship as simply a form of political membership, this perspective 
regards citizenship as a power relation; it must be understood as “a political process of meaning-
making, as a process of moral regulation and cultural production, in which particular 
subjectivities are constructed around what it means to be a member of a nation-state” (Giroux, 
2005, p. 7). The struggle for political membership and recognition is a historical struggle framed 
by relations of power and discourses surrounding who is welcome, who belongs, and who is 
regarded as a contributing member of society (Baynton, 2013). Thus citizenship is a 
fundamentally “contested” construct (Field, 2000; Lister, 1997).  
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It is common, however, to think of citizenship purely in its formal-legal (juridical) terms, 
understood as a status one occupies in virtue of being born or naturalized into a particular nation-
state (in this sense it is universal). In contemporary times, citizenship is generally regarded as a 
right that one claims and the corresponding duties that one exercises. It is a series of activities, 
including but not limited to voting, property ownership, freedom of movement, protection from 
state control, and so on.  T. H. Marshall’s (1950 [1987]) oft-cited but rather idealistically neat 
model of citizenship corresponds to this definition. According to Marshall, citizenship consists in 
three areas of state obligation: civil, political, and social elements. The civil element consists of 
the rights necessary for individual freedom (liberty of the person, right to justice, freedom of 
speech, property-ownership); the political element has to do with the right to exercise political 
power and affect the outcome of political processes; and the social element concerns economic 
welfare, right to experience and enjoy one’s “social heritage” and the right to a “modicum of 
economic welfare” (Marshall, 1950 [1987]). In his view, the idea of equal citizenship is 
embedded in modern Western democracies, although not fully instantiated in the policies and 
political practices of those democracies (see Armstrong, 2002). Accordingly, we can measure an 
individuals’ enjoyment of the privileges and responsibilities of citizenship by measuring how 
well they do in each of the three areas listed above. Certainly the specific obligations of the state 
as concerns these entitlements have been and continue to be the subject of great disagreement 
and debate among political philosophers. Suffice it to say, however, the notion that equal 
citizenship is embedded in modern democracy will simply strike some as absurdly revisionist. 
Indeed, we might even regard modern democracies as established on a presumption of inequality 
and exclusion.  
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Feminist scholars in particular have decried this presumption, arguing that traditional 
political philosophical models of citizenship fail to account for how citizenship has historically 
and continues to be sexed, gendered, raced, classed, and abled; that is, it is far from universal. 
Carol Pateman (1989) famously argued that “citizenship has been made in the male image” (p. 
14) and that Western notions of citizenship rearticulate entrenched racism, classism, and sexism 
(see also Armstrong, 2002). Says Allison C. Carey (2009), “According to Marshall the modern 
state grants individuals the legal status of citizenship and confers an identical package of rights 
to all citizens, providing them with the power to call on the state to protect them from and offer 
redress for civil and political abuses. History provides amble evidence that citizenship is 
‘messier’ than Marshall’s status approach suggests” (p. 22). It is messy, in fact, precisely because 
citizenship has always been bound up with rigid – and yet changing – notions of whose bodies 
and minds – even whose lives – have value (see Baynton, 2013).   
A fair number of historians, sociologists, and philosophers of disability have now studied 
and described the racialized, gendered, and classed processes through which people with 
disabilities have been excluded from political membership and citizenship status (see Baynton, 
2013; Carey, 2009; Clifford Simplican, 2015; Schweik, 2009; Stubblefield, 2007). Susan 
Schweik’s (2009) analysis, for example, shows how civic policies of the 19th Century – 
popularly called “ugly laws” – were developed in response to what was seen as the social 
problem of visible disability which was treated as a threat to the aesthetic sanctity of public city 
streets. This policing of public spaces fed the development of segregated private spaces of 
institutions and asylums for those deemed a threat to social hygiene, a normative construct to be 
sure. Such ideas about hygiene and public morality enacted particular belief systems about the 
intersections of race, ethnic, class, and ability origins and their relationship to citizenship. 
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Citizenship itself, argues Douglas C. Baynton (2013), was constructed as a white, able-bodied, 
male prerogative precisely through reference to the inadequacies of these other, undesirable 
social groups: 
Disability was a significant factor in the three great citizenship debates of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries: women’s suffrage, African American freedom and civil 
rights, and the restriction of immigration. When categories of citizenship were 
questioned, challenged, and disrupted, disability was called on to clarify and define who 
deserved, and who was deservedly excluded from, citizenship…Furthermore, disability 
figured prominently not just in arguments for the inequality of women and minorities, but 
also in arguments against those inequalities. Such arguments took the form of vigorous 
denials that the groups in question actually had these disabilities; they were not disabled, 
the argument went, and therefore were not proper subjects for discrimination (p. 34). 
 
Thus, in important inclusion and citizenship debates, disability has remained the uninterrogated 
marker of inferiority and, indeed, as necessitating and justifying exclusions of other groups.  
As I discussed briefly in the previous chapter, the notion of educability and educational 
(or social) fitness arose out of particular social and economic shifts surrounding immigration in 
the 19th and early 20th centuries. The notion of fitness is closely related to the notion of 
citizenship, insofar as it expresses who is a desirable member of society. This is clear in Anna 
Stubblefield’s (2007) exploration of how contemporary popular and philosophical ideas about 
citizenship can be traced to the history of eugenics ideology of the 19th century that regarded the 
existence of so-called “feeble-minded” persons as compromising the purity and integrity of the 
nation and its future. Nation-building was simultaneously about policing who could be admitted 
into the nation-state, who could be allowed to reproduce (to produce future citizens), and who 
could be permitted to influence the future of society. If such ideas cast people with perceived 
physical and sensory impairments as foreigners to acceptable citizenship, it essentially relegated 
people with cognitive and mental health disabilities to the outer reaches of the solar system. 
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Persons with severe cognitive disabilities “are seen to represent inalienable Otherness in ableist 
contexts” (Erevelles, 2002, p. 7).  
This inalienable otherness consists in at least three arenas in which people with 
intellectual disabilities are seen as incapable of participating: economic productivity/reciprocity; 
rational deliberation; and independent self-representation. The inflexible value placed on these 
capabilities is a result of a deeply embedded theoretical reliance on an Enlightenment view of the 
citizen as well as a deeply embedded valuation of principles of individualism, economic self-
sufficiency, and intellectual independence in Western culture. These commitments influence 
philosophical models of democratic citizenship and public and popular notions of good 
citizenship, respectively. One of the most philosophically influential conceptions of the citizen in 
modern political theory comes from Rawls’ framework of justice as fairness, which I discussed 
in the previous chapter. Rawls advances a conception of justice based on the fair and equal 
cooperation of individuals in a scheme of reciprocal advantage (Rawls, 2001). Rawls’ account of 
the conditions of equality and social stability is informed by a particular conception of the person 
and, relatedly, of citizenship, characterized by independence, rationality, and reasonableness. 
This conception leaves those who fall below a particular threshold of rational capacity out of 
equal civic membership and decision-making roles, a consequence accepted by Rawls himself. 
Many people with intellectual disabilities are therefore rendered non-citizens or non-members of 
decision-making society in Rawls’ framework, their needs being met as objects of care rather 
than as subjects of justice. Importantly, Rawls does not stipulate that individuals with intellectual 
disabilities as a group will be non-citizens, but rather that individuals lacking certain capacities – 
what he calls the two moral powers – will not be full- members of society. It is not clear, 
therefore, whether Rawls’ framework necessarily excludes individuals with intellectual 
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disabilities (see Cureton, 2008; Wong, 2010), but it is clear that it relies on a particular idea of 
what capacities are required for citizenship, and these map onto the capacities that are seen to be 
lacking in individuals so labeled.  
Expectations of economic reciprocity also position people labeled with intellectual 
disabilities outside of spheres of political membership. Our modern industrialized world is 
sustained by standards of efficiency and ability that people with disabilities often do not meet 
and, as outside the scheme of production, such people as seen as representing a drain on the 
system and a dependency that increases the vulnerability of all in society (Linton, 1998, p. 45-50; 
see also Fraser & Gordon, 1994). This view is especially detrimental to those whose disabilities 
prevent them from holding recognized work positions (or who are regarded as being unable to 
hold such positions). Furthermore, standards of economic reciprocity and work status spill over 
into who is counted as a citizen. Say Marcus Redley and Darin Weinberg (2007), “to what extent 
can a group of service users, whose very entitlement to state-sponsored assistance is justified by 
putative intellectual impairment (low IQ and deficits in social functioning), be empowered 
according to an exclusively liberal model of citizenship that presumes and requires, as its very 
defining features, intellectual ability and independence?” (p. 768). Simply put, where economic 
productivity and self-sufficiency are the measures through which good citizenship is assessed, 
many people with intellectual disabilities will simply fail to meet standards of good citizenship. 
This is an especially frustrating consequence because it is coupled with a historical and enduring 
neglect of the actual capacities that people with disabilities have when adequately supported. 
That is, because of the absence of proper accommodations and accessible environments, people 
with disabilities seem left to actually prove how burdensome they are thought to be. There is a 
cruel irony to this. 
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When the high standard of independence is evaluated, however, it would seem that many 
of us – most perhaps – would fail to count as good or responsible citizens. The notion of self-
sufficiency is we might even say, a fiction sustained by a fantasy. It ignores, with significant 
consequences, the actual social conditions of material and interpersonal dependency that 
characterize our lives as citizens of liberal democratic states (Erevelles, 2002; Kittay & Feder, 
2002). The majority of us simply do not manage to attain high levels of independence and 
autonomy and many of us have no desire to do so. Critics of the independence ideal argue that 
rather than individual bodily or cultural deficits, it is unfair social disadvantages accompanied by 
able-bodied privilege that render invisible the fact that dependency is a relation that characterizes 
all of our lives (Young, 2002; Erevelles, 2002). Feminist scholars, including those who advance 
an ethics of care, and disability scholars have stressed that conditions of dependency and 
interdependency are in fact normal and even desirable states and are consistent with personal 
autonomy and agency, albeit defined as relational (Kittay, ed., 2013; Erevelles, 2002; Fineman, 
2005; Fraser & Gordon, 1994). In fact, they argue, a lack of support and reliance on others is a 
fiction that is sustained through conditions of unfair privilege and social advantage of the 
wealthy and those (perceived as) able-bodied. For example, at every stage in the voting process, I 
am dependent on family, friends, and strangers to enable my participation, whether because they 
support my learning about candidates and current affairs, because they facilitate my 
transportation to and from polling stations, or because they regard me as intelligibly and legally a 
citizen. Despite this dependency, I am regarded as able-bodied and properly independent in both 
my decision-making and political exercise.  
A common way in which this regard of dependency as an unnatural or undesirable state is 
manifest is through the view of those in extreme states of dependency as comparable to children 
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or in a perpetual state of childhood. In other words, even adulthood, a state to which civic 
education is meant in part to prepare us, is abled in particular ways. Thus adulthood and 
citizenship are tied together through expectations of capacities considered the proper attributes of 
adulthood. For example, individuals considered adults are granted rights of citizenship like 
marriage, voting, parental emancipation, (and in some instances) property ownership. Such rights 
accrue to people based on their chronological age and assessment of a threshold of cognitive 
ability. However, in reality many chronological adults experience states of dependency and 
cognitive, physical, and emotional change that place them in states akin to childhood, whether 
because of accident, illness, or simply aging (Vorhaus, 2005).  
One way that the relationship between adulthood and citizenship is understood is that 
people with intellectual disabilities are regarded as adults in the biological sense, but are seen 
also to lack the abilities that “normal” adults have (including, importantly, practical 
reasoning/wisdom). People with intellectual disabilities are also sometimes understood as 
lacking the capacities or having underdeveloped capacities that are the defining features of 
adulthood, such that they cannot be understood to be adults even in the biological sense. The 
notion of “mental age” – describing a person with an intellectual disability as having the mental 
age of a two-year-old for example – expresses this view well. Here, the absence (or perceived 
absence) of certain capacities disqualifies an individual from membership in a particular category 
and flattens the complexity of their overall abilities and entitlements.  
Consider how adulthood is constructed in opposition to intellectual disability and the 
embodied state of dependency associated with it in the case of Ashley X. Beginning in 2002 
when Ashley was six years old, her parents, with the help of medical professionals, pursued a 
comprehensive plan to attenuate her growth so that Ashley would remain forever small, easy to 
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care for, and child-like. This plan included estrogen dosing, a hysterectomy, and the removal of 
breast buds to prevent breast growth (Kittay, 2011, p. 610-611). These interventions became 
known as The Ashley Treatment. While Ashley’s parents justified these interventions as in 
Ashley’s best interests – they would discourage sexual abuse during Ashley’s later care, prevent 
pregnancy that could arise from that abuse, and keep her more comfortable in her wheelchair – 
they also celebrated Ashley’s smallness and docility, calling her “Pillow Angel” (see Kittay, 
2011, p. 611). Alison Kafer (2013) describes how this preference for smallness translated into a 
preference for childhood, evidenced by the perceived disjuncture between Ashley’s mental 
development – that is, her cognitive disability – and her bodily development into womanhood. 
This disjuncture presented as a kind of temporality problem: Ashley  
was embodied asynchrony; her mind and body were out of sync. By arresting the growth 
of Ashley’s body, the Treatment could stop this gap between mind and body from 
growing wider…Without intervention, the asynchrony between mind and body would 
only grow wider; Ashley’s body would become more and more unbearable to her, to her 
parents, and to those encountering her in public. This future burden, brought on by the 
future Ashley, could only be avoided by arresting the present Ashley in time (Kafer, 
2013, p. 48). 
 
In choosing this treatment for their daughter, not only did Ashley’s parents’ preclude the 
possibility that their future adult daughter could make decisions about her own body (they took 
this choice away from her) they actually precluded the possibility that she would develop into an 
adult at all, at least in bodily form. In other words, it is both the attenuation of growth and the 
denial of potential agency that foreclose Ashley’s emergence into adulthood.  
Among other things, this case reveals that adulthood is not simply a description of 
chronological age, but rather a perceived state of development characterized by symmetry of 
growth between body and mind but also, most centrally, by a vague but rather rigid threshold of 
cognitive ability. Disability – and intellectual disability in particular – disrupts this symmetry. 
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Says Eva Kittay (2011), “Though difficult to grasp while the child is still young, one learns that 
in the case of disability, things don’t just fit together in standard ways” (p. 623). The view of 
people with intellectual disabilities as “unfinished adults,” misidentifies their difference as a 
form of lack (lacking adult competencies) rather than as situated along a spectrum of abilities 
that biological adults possess. The comparison of adults with intellectual disabilities to children 
is not, as the case of Ashley X’s parents illustrates, ill-intentioned; rather it is often putatively 
focused on the best interests of the individual in question. However, the consequence of this 
comparison is that we excuse ourselves from the obligations we normally have to adults, 
including rights to take part in decision-making about one’s residential, medical, social, and 
political opportunities. While one could object that Ashley – and children like her – will never 
develop sufficient communicative abilities to take part in these activities, my simple response is 
that we cannot be sure what individuals will become capable of given the proper supports and 
when we learn to adequately communicate with them. Given this uncertainty, can we justify the 
risk of deprivation?17  
As I will explain, then, ideas about adulthood express “ability expectations,” understood 
as emerging in relation to particular democratic stances, all of which draw upon historicized 
ideas about citizenship and who belongs as a citizen, or even as a member of the human and 
moral community. And, because being an “adult” is not simply descriptive of one’s actual 
(chronological) age but rather prescriptive of a particular social state, the normative 
consequences of being denied that attribute are broad and profound. Indeed, they can result in the 
extreme denial of agency and autonomy.  
                                                
17 Of course there are other important arguments to be made against intervening in Ashley’s body in this way. For example, I am 
very persuaded by the argument that Ashley’s rights to bodily integrity were violated by these treatments.  
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The dominant views of dependency I have described so far regard dependency not as 
consisting in relationships, but rather as an undesirable character trait or the result of biological 
defect that is antithetical to responsible citizenship (Linton, 1998, p. 47-48). Historically, 
characterizing dependency as individual deficit has driven the perception of people with 
disabilities as irresponsible, as living off of the work of others, even as “fakers” (see Samuels, 
2014; Johnson, 2003, p. 47; Schweik, 2009). The state of dependency that characterizes those 
with significant disabilities is therefore a kind of moral vice, positioning the person with 
disability as counter to the virtuous citizen who gives and reciprocates. This is clear when one 
examines the genealogy of the concept of “intellectual disability,” which emerged out of 
gendered, classed and racialized ideas about competence and morality (see Stubblefield, 2007; 
Schweik, 2009; Ferri & Connor, 2006). Those who diverged from socially valued or accepted 
paths – the chaste woman, the compliant black slave, the property-owning male – were in danger 
of being subjected to state mechanisms of social control, including incarceration and 
institutionalization, sterilization, even execution. Frequently targeted were those perceived or 
assessed as intellectually inferior and intellectually dependent (Stubblefield, 2010; Lombardo, 
2008).  
The concept of “intellect” has never been neutral and has always reflected social and 
cultural ideas about the moral standard of societal membership – notably the white, property-
owning male (Stubblefield, 2010). Many disability scholars have traced the historical linking of 
the concept of normalcy to desirable embodiment, showing that able-bodiedness and able-
mindedness are not only markers of wellness but also of civic membership (see Garland 
Thomson, 2006; Davis 2006). Nirmala Erevelles (2002) suggests that racial whiteness and ability 
– often linked together in eugenics and neo-eugenics discourse – each function as property rights 
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that are taken to need protecting as vital to citizenship and moral status, and the function of 
education is to provide the context in which such protection takes place (p. 19; see also Leonardo 
& Broderick, 2011). Each of these critical historical perspectives pushes back against the view 
that philosophical ideas of normal functioning, independence, competency, and so on are 
divested of social and cultural influence. Like feminist theorists and critical race scholars have 
done for gender and race, respectively, disability theorists attempt to deconstruct the 
philosophical dependence on putatively neutral assertions about human ability. 
Contemporary examples of this history and legacy of messy – and precarious – 
citizenship can be found both in the deprivation of entitlements and double-standards applied to 
individuals based on their gender, sexual, ability, racial, and social class identities. For example, 
laws barring marriage between same-sex couples mean that citizenship is sexed heterosexual and 
normatively gendered. The growth of voter identification laws in North Carolina, Texas, and 
Hawaii (among other states) further means that people of color and those of low-income 
backgrounds are disenfranchised. Relevant in particular for our discussion here, citizenship is 
abled in particular ways as well: people with disabilities have been historically denied citizenship 
outright on the basis of their disability or health status (at moment of immigration), relegated to 
second-class citizen status (ugly laws; unjust policy surrounding access and accommodation; 
sterilization and restrictions on marriage; and institutionalization), or through a lack of education 
or social support. In the more contemporary era, people with disabilities are often denied or lack 
access to social entitlements like adequate education, economic equality and competitive 
employment, housing in the wider community, the right to vote, the right to marry, and even, as 
the case of Ashley X illustrates, bodily integrity. This deprivation and lack of safety is especially 
exacerbated when individuals with disabilities also embody other marginalized identities 
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(Erevelles & Minear, 2010; A. Taylor, 2015). For people with disabilities or whose bodies are 
regarded as civic liabilities, citizenship is a precarious, and often unattainable, status.  
We can see that the history of citizenship, as a changing social status and construct, has 
been and continues to be one of exclusion of those identified as having a disability (see Carey, 
2009). These analyses highlight that the struggle over citizenship is not only a struggle over legal 
entitlements – rights – and decision-making power, but, perhaps more concretely, over who is 
regarded as a social equal, as “like us,” and who is regarded as “other.” The processes by which 
people with disability labels – especially women – have been deprived of their rights to bodily 
integrity, reproductive control, social mobility, and democratic exercise, are as much processes 
of dehumanization as they are processes of legal deprivation. However, because of the fluidity 
and changeability of the concept of citizenship, it holds both danger and promise. Further, it 
perhaps by definition demarcates borders around who belongs and who does not within an 
imagined and actual community. It is both exclusive and also the lens through which injustices 
are named and made intelligible. In moving forward, then, I argue for the need to be mindful of 
this fluidity and both the promise and potential danger it represents.  
As my argument develops, it will become clearer how intellectual disability as both a 
concept and material reality is constructed in and through dominant understandings of human 
capability, value, and practice that are tied to notions of citizenship. Importantly, citizenship is 
constructed in opposition to intellectual disability, such that efforts to imagine people with 
intellectual disabilities as capable of citizenship are made difficult. This latter point has 
implications for philosophers’ reasoning about educational aims and education justice in general. 
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The “Good Citizen” in the “Good Society” 
The history I have outlined shows that delineations of what a citizen looks like or is able 
to do are always delineations of what constitutes the good citizen. That is, built into the notion of 
citizenship is the construct or image of the good citizen, a normative assessment, which 
corresponds to how we view the social good, socially desirable behavior and socially desirable 
embodiments. In other words, descriptions and assessments of the construct of “citizen” place 
certain people as inside and outside that social category. There is thus an important relationship 
between how a good society is thought about and how the good citizen is thought to reflect 
aspects of the good society. Philosophical debates and ideological disagreements about what 
constitutes the good society reveal that there is considerable disagreement over what the good 
citizen is or needs to be able to do. For some, the good citizen is a rule follower who abides by 
the law and is kind to his neighbors. For others, a good citizen questions rules, protests policy 
and law, and actively criticizes the government.  
Ideas about good citizenship are also assessments of what kind and level of participation 
is desired or required for active citizenship. For example, our current form of democratic 
citizenship in the U.S. and Canada seems to require very minimal participation on the part of 
citizens; it includes voting (which is not compulsory), paying taxes (which requires very little 
knowledge or investment in democratic process, although it may require the assistance of 
professionals), serving on a jury, and so on. Of course, we might want citizens to be more active 
participants in the democratic process by, for example, engaging in public debate or deliberation, 
belonging to civic advocacy or activist groups, or actively supporting political parties. There are 
a number of important frameworks for thinking about democratic citizenship according to which 
such desirable participation is outlined. I will explore these conceptions and how each expresses 
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different “ability expectations” for citizens. It is important to consider not just how the good 
citizen is constructed but also what kinds and forms of participation are expected of him or her. 
This distinction is important because it gets at the heart of how people unable to participate in 
specific and narrow ways are then regarded as unable to develop into democratic citizens at all.  
The normative attachments that inform who is considered a citizen and what sort of 
participation is required are evident in the research of Joel Westheimer and Joseph Kahne (e.g. 
2004), who argue that whereas ideological liberals (not to be confused with philosophical 
liberals) tend to see a citizenship as involving social critique (citizens actively critique the 
government, laws, policy, etc.), conservatives have tended to see citizenship as tied to character. 
From these conceptions it follows that civic problems are blamed on structural inequalities and 
personal deficits, respectively. Based on their research examining civic education programs, 
Westheimer and Kahne (2004) identify three types of citizens that these programs cultivate, 
recognizing of course that there is no neatness about these distinctions (that is, they often 
overlap): the personally responsible citizen, the participatory citizen, and the justice-oriented 
citizen. Programs that cultivate the personally responsible citizen focus on qualities of good 
character: empathy, charity, compassion, hard work, honesty, and so on. Such programs receive 
the most attention within scholarly research on education and within popular policy (Westheimer 
and Kahne, 2004, p. 243). However, they also receive a significant amount of critique when and 
because they fail to encourage students to examine the structures of inequality. Such critiques 
align with disability studies scholars’ critiques of the way that the emphasis on skills and 
behavior of students with disabilities detracts away from empowering them to question their 
treatment, the social conditions in which they live, and the educational goals of supported civic 
participation (see Harris, Owen, & Ruiter, 2012).  
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Educational programs that aim to promote participatory citizenship emphasize students’ 
participation in collective and community-based activities and efforts in their schools, especially 
organizing social change efforts and social organization. Such a conception of citizenship 
corresponds nicely to Dewey’s view of democracy as a way of life (Dewey, 1916) and is 
reflected in the work of educational theorists who advocate for modeled democratic processes in 
schools (for example, Meier, 2002).  
The justice-oriented citizen is similarly inclined towards community-based and 
participatory efforts but this is accompanied by an emphasis on structural critique. The goal of 
such programs is to emphasize not just social change, but social change that gets at the root 
causes of systemic problems. Such a stance is well-reflected in Meira Levinson’s (2012) 
description of what civic education should involve: “schools need to teach young people 
knowledge and skills to upend and reshape power relationships directly, through public, political, 
and civic action, not just private self-empowerment” (p. 13). As I will discuss further in Chapter 
Five, the emphasis on the development of individualistic and private self-empowerment is often 
the focus within self-determination programs and practice used for children in special education 
contexts (see Peterson, 2009; Smith & Routel, 2009). In sum, “if participatory citizens are 
organizing the food drive and personally responsible citizens are donating food, justice-oriented 
citizens are asking why people are hungry and acting on what they discover” (Westheimer & 
Kahne, 2004, p. 242). 
We see here that differing beliefs about what constitutes a good society as a flourishing 
democracy inform different conceptions of citizenship and the education that supports it. 
Recently in Colorado, for example, students protested changes to the social studies curriculum 
that emphasized compliance with “free enterprise economics” and patriotism (Garcia, 2014). In 
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response, a school board member stated, “I don’t think we should encourage kids to be little 
rebels…We should encourage kids to be good citizens” (Garcia, 2014, n.p.). Here, activism is 
opposed to good citizenship. Within this conservative view, the good citizen is the one who 
conforms. Such ideological positions discourage variability in democratic forms and limit the 
range of what is recognized as civic engagement because they insist on a singular and narrow 
view of citizenship that ignores the complexity of roles, desires, and abilities that individuals 
occupy and possess. These differences have significant implications for pedagogy, curriculum, 
evaluation and education policy, all of which are subject to these differences in ideological 
perspectives (Westheimer and Kahne, 2004, p. 263). When ideological differences intersect with 
the social histories of societal groups, it becomes even more apparent how civic engagement is 
classed, racialized, gendered, and cultured.  
 
Ability Expectations and Democratic Forms 
As we can see, democratic citizenship educational aims always involve a conception of 
what students ought to know and be able to do in order to participate in civic life; in short, they 
express ability expectations (see Wolbring, 2012). Ability expectations are those capabilities 
(and sometimes capacities), dispositions, behaviors, and virtues that are desired or expected 
within a particular contextualized framework of education (Wolbring, 2012; see also Biesta, 
2006; Hehir, 2002). They correspond to and express those activities and behaviors valued within 
a social or political sphere. Importantly, they “influence the very meaning of citizenship” 
(Wolbring, 2012, p. 156) and are shaped by a dominant view of what citizenship requires based 
in historical construction of the citizen. As the above examples of civic education programs 
illustrate, what good citizenship is thought to involve influences the sorts of civic education 
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programs that theorists, policy-makers, and practitioners design and form. Conceptions of civic 
engagement express beliefs that are socially and contextually bound, which is to say that they do 
not express universal truths about citizenship activities, but rather contingent but naturalized 
beliefs about what citizenship requires. Because conceptions of good citizenship imply 
conceptions of a good society, there is always going to be reasonable debate about what 
citizenship means and entails. Nevertheless, this debate largely takes place without considering 
how our attachments to particular norms of intellectual ability, reasoning, communication, and so 
on inform these conceptions.  
For Gert Biesta (2006), philosophical conceptions of democratic citizenship (as well as 
programs of civic education) further express a view of what kind of subjectivity is desirable or 
necessary for a democratic society. That is, it is not just about what individuals can do or what 
they know, but fundamentally who they are and what norms they instantiate. Overwhelmingly, 
the democratic person – the citizen – is thought to possess capabilities that correspond to 
Enlightenment ideals of rationality and independence and is considered to be separate from and 
perhaps unaffected by her social and political context of learning and action and by her 
relationships with others (Biesta, 2006, p. 120). Schools then become the sites of citizenship-
subject production, as it is their task to produce or create individuals expressing this forms of 
subjectivity. In this sense, schools are tasked also with replicating an ideal of the rational and 
independent person and they participate in the discourse of citizenship thus perpetuated.  
Gregor Wolbring (2012) points out that, where citizens are thought to possess particular 
capacities and exhibit particular characteristics, such ability expectations can transform into a 
form of ableism, in which abilities become essential, rather than merely desirable. Consequently, 
citizenship is tied to the possession of particular capacities and the citizen is affirmed as one who 
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is abled in some specific way. While ableism (defined in this way) can be positive – perhaps the 
injunction that we all must possess the ability to live together in harmony – it can also necessitate 
abilities that people with disabilities are unable to possess (Wolbring, 2012, p. 152). Because 
philosophical researchers of democratic education explore the sorts of desired – and even 
necessary – capacities that democratic citizens possess, they likewise express ability expectations 
that reflect ableist norms. Further, they frequently narrow the range of abilities that are desired or 
even expected and contend that particular thresholds of ability are required for civic membership.  
How one conceptualizes democratic education – and the sorts of abilities expected of 
those democratic citizens – depends on one’s view of democratic participation and, indeed, what 
constitutes good citizenship. In exploring different democratic forms, political philosophers have 
described a number of stances or perspectives on what constitutes democratic participation and 
each of these stances maps onto a particular conception of the democratic person, who is thought 
to possess, or potentially possess, through education, the main capacities required for the 
exercise of the democratic activities of decision-making and, in some cases, of living together 
with diverse others. Within liberal democratic theory, the prevailing model of democratic 
decision-making is deliberation. Deliberative democracy is usually contrasted with aggregative 
democracy, where the former’s emphasis on reasoned discussion and debate is lauded as 
increasing the legitimacy and inclusivity of decision-making in contrast to the individual 
preference-based emphasis of the latter. However, while deliberative democracy is often 
described as a discreet form, in practice – and perhaps even in theory – deliberation is not the 
sole mode through which decisions are made. Indeed, as I will show, democratic practice calls 
for a variety of democratic forms, some of which are more cooperative and reasons-based than 
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others. Each stance supports its own vision of what is required of democratic citizens and 
promotes its own ability expectations for students within a democracy.  
I first consider an aggregative stance towards democracy and democratic participation 
that emphasizes the aim of satisfying the greatest number of preferences. The supporter of 
aggregative democracy suggests that democratic decision-making takes place through a process 
in which citizens express their preferences in relation to political problems or policies and that 
decisions are made on the basis of the most widely and strongly-held preferences (Young, 2000, 
p. 19). Individual preferences can be dismissed or excluded, not on an assessment of the reasons 
that support them, but on the basis that they do not support an optimal result, understood as that 
which satisfies the largest number of people (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, p. 14). The optimal 
result may be that which supports the majority of citizens, or it may be that which arises out of a 
cost-benefit analysis. Either way, aggregative democracy defends a majority rule sort of 
decision-making, in which majoritarian or utilitarian ideals provide justification for outcomes 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, p. 15). Under this democratic conception, citizens need only be 
able to formulate and express their preferences and desires and are not required to provide 
reasons to support their preference or opinion. Preferences themselves are taken as given, 
without assessment of their origins or concern over their publicity (Young, 2000, p. 20). 
Aggregative democracy therefore demands very little of citizens; they need only learn to express 
their preferences, likely by casting a vote, and perhaps how to form interest groups to lobby for 
preferences. The democratic person is here conceived as one who expresses preferences and 
lobbies, perhaps through coalition-building or interest group formation, for their satisfaction. 
However, aggregative democracy is quite likely to reinforce dominant group preferences 
because decision-making is based on majority preferences. For some whose definition of 
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democracy requires outcome equality in processes of decision-making influence, aggregative 
democracy can be considered only loosely or “thinly” democratic (see Young, 2000, p. 21). 
Where minority groups or disempowered groups have little to no chance to affect the outcome of 
decisions made, members of these groups have little to no democratic control. Further, 
aggregative models of democracy place no emphasis on the publicity of preferences; that is, they 
do not require that reasons or motivations behind preferences be made public, nor that they be 
rational (Young, 2000, p. 20-21). Thus, despite the rather undemanding ability expectations of 
this model, people with intellectual disabilities, because of their minority-group status and 
position of societal disempowerment, are particularly ill-served by aggregative models of 
democracy (Clifford, 2012). Stacy Clifford (2012) writes, “Aggregative models of 
democracy…fail to capture the political participation of people with profound emotional and 
cognitive disabilities who are either disenfranchised by law or prohibited from voting due to the 
severity of impairment itself” (p. 211). Indeed, if the expected activity of democratic 
participation is voting – and expressing one’s preferences through voting – this model puts many 
people with intellectual disability labels, along with others deemed “mentally incompetent,” at 
risk of being excluded entirely from political influence. This is not to say their exclusion is a 
necessary consequence of this model’s emphasis on voting; in fact, there are many reasons to 
conclude that the disenfranchisement of people with intellectual and other significant disabilities 
is unjust and based on inflexibility and bias within guardianship and other policy, as well as 
because of lack of education (see Agran & Hughes, 2014). At present, all but eleven states have 
laws that restrict the voting rights of people with disabilities, with fourteen states barring 
individuals who are under guardianship outright from voting (Pan, 2012; see also King & 
Ebrahim, 2007). This latter restriction assumes a straightforward relationship between 
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individuals being deemed unable to manage particular aspects of daily care and living, like 
medical and financial activities, and their being unable to make decisions about voting. I will 
return to a discussion of assumptions like these in the next chapter.  
Deliberative democracy emerges in contrast to the majoritarian emphasis in aggregative 
democracy by expressly valuing inclusion and publicity in decision-making, and by viewing 
democracy as a discussion of needs and interests and conflicts over those needs and interests. It 
would seem, then, that the valuation of inclusion of diverse voices (Bohman, 2006), meant to 
yield better outcomes, would well serve those with diverse abilities. However, Amy Gutmann 
and Dennis Thompson (2004) argue that its most important characteristic is its “reason-giving 
requirement,” namely that preferences, needs and interests are supported by reasons that are 
accepted by free and equal persons under fair and public terms of cooperation (p. 3). This is the 
sense in which deliberative democracy is regarded as grounded in an understanding of the moral 
obligation of reciprocity and mutuality (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 55). In Gutmann and 
Thompson’s words, deliberative democracy is “a form of government in which free and equal 
citizens (and their representatives) justify decisions in a process in which they give one another 
reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching 
conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the future” 
(2004, p. 7). Thus, decisions and decision-making are legitimate when reasons are given to 
support an individual or group’s position, and these reasons are public in both form and content, 
and binding but provisional. The emphasis here is on the citizen as an autonomous decision-
maker who actively participates in the process of governance through deliberative activities 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, p. 4-5).  
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 Unlike aggregative models of democracy, deliberative models appear to demand quite a 
bit of citizens as well as of political states. Iris Marion Young (2000) suggests that deliberative 
democracy values four important ideals: inclusion, political equality, reasonableness, and 
publicity. The normative ideal of inclusion regards legitimacy as arising only when all those 
affected by a decision are included in the process of deliberation and decision-making. Political 
equality suggests that mere inclusion is not enough; rather, all those affected by decisions ought 
to be included on equal terms, including equal opportunity to voice their views, and freedom 
from coercion or false consensus (Young, 2000, p. 24). Reasonableness, for Young, expresses a 
kind of disposition, one characterized by, among other things, a willingness to listen to others, 
open-mindedness and a willingness to change one’s opinions in light of others’ persuasive 
reasons (Young, 2000, p. 24-25). Importantly, reasonableness must be distinguished from 
rationality, which refers to the logical quality of individuals’ preferences and convictions, rather 
than their willingness to listen and consider others’ views (Rawls, 1993, p. 49). Finally, the 
normative ideal of publicity corresponds to the understanding that deliberation takes place within 
the context of a plurality of preferences, interests, goals, experiences and so on that inform 
collective decision-making (Young, 2000, p. 25). Publicity requires that one’s contribution to 
discussion be aimed at being understandable and acceptable (Young, 2000, p. 25). Each of these 
suggests particular normative requirements on citizens’ democratic development. If these ideals 
express the values that deliberative democrats place on the democratic process, we can begin to 
see the sorts of knowledge, skills and dispositions that individuals would need to possess in order 
to participate in such civic activities and therefore what might be required of schooling.  
According to this deliberative model of democracy, then, the democratic person is one 
who is motivated to engage in public discussion or debate with others whose views she disagrees 
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with or whose interests are conflicting. She is open to listening to the others and to being 
persuaded by them to change her position. She is able to engage in reasoned argument in which 
she presents reasons that support her position and listens to the reasons presented by others. 
Further, she weighs others’ reason-based contributions to discussions equally. Finally, the 
democratic person is one who has autonomous decision-making capacity, meaning she acts 
independently and freely in giving reasons and forming consensus or disagreement. These ability 
expectations are quite demanding of citizens and would seem to pose significant problems for 
people with intellectual disabilities (although not only this group). 
Amy Gutmann has offered the most attention to deliberative democratic education. In her 
Democratic Education (1987), she argues that it is the job of schools to educate children in a way 
that supports “conscious social reproduction,” such that all children are readied for the task of 
collectively shaping and re-creating the society in which they live. According to Gutmann, 
students ought to be prepared to participate in shaping the political values, attitudes, and 
behaviors of citizens and of the educational sphere, and to influence the development of future 
citizens (1987, p. 14). Citizenship, for Gutmann, is conscious social reproduction enabled by 
deliberation (1987, p. 45). Having the capacity for deliberation is a necessary (although not 
sufficient) condition for this conscious social reproduction because it allows citizens to debate 
and choose among alternative ways of life, both personal and political (1987, p. 40). Thus, 
Gutmann regards the capacity for deliberation as central to democracy and to democratic 
education, even suggesting that the latter is synonymous with deliberation: “In its commitment to 
critical deliberation, democratic education rejects inculcating blind allegiance to any political 
system and to any conception of the good life” (Gutmann, 2007, p. 159). For Gutmann, 
democratic education produces citizens with the capacities for deliberation and this requires an 
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emphasis on both their moral character and their capacity for reasoning. These ability 
expectations include character traits like honesty, veracity, self-discipline, religious toleration, 
and respect for others and the ability to understand and evaluate competing conceptions of the 
good life and good society, and the ability to weigh reasons and evaluate claims (Gutmann, 1987, 
p. 44; 2006, p. 164).  
Gutmann concedes that her account will not fit with the abilities of all children. Some, 
she allows, will lack the ability to develop the capacities required in her account for deliberation 
and effective participation in democratic politics (Gutmann, 1987, p. 155-6). Consequently, they 
are not owed the same opportunities, although they are owed “a good life relative to their 
capacities, a life good for them (not simply convenient for us)” (Gutmann, 1987, p. 155). Here 
Gutmann assumes that certain exclusions will be inevitable because some children will simply 
lack the requisite capacities for democratic citizenship. Her assumption is that the appropriate 
solution is to treat apparently deficient children differently rather than to regard the framework of 
democratic education itself as inadequate in light of this lack of fit. It is for this reason that 
Clifford (2012) charges that deliberative democracy is “implicitly coded as able-bodied” (p. 218) 
and, I would add, able-minded. Gutmann’s approach to thinking about whether and how the aims 
of education apply to children with intellectual disabilities is reflective of the deferral stance that 
I described in the previous chapter. Here we see the same strategy of deferral used that parallels 
the patterns of traditional special education practices. The assumption of the need for separation 
and alternative schooling follows from the view that the exclusion of this population is simply a 
result of this group’s inability to meet the necessary qualifications for citizenship. And yet, the 
value of deliberative democratic practice is not called into question in light of its ill-fit with an 
entire group of children.   
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Democratic Citizenship and Norms of Able-Mindedness 
The view that certain abilities are essential for political membership and participation and 
that assumes that political participation relies on independent self-representation, has its origins 
in political philosophical accounts of personhood and citizenship, most prominent of which, 
again, is Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness. As I have explained, Rawls’ account of the 
conditions of equality and social stability is informed by a particular conception of the person 
and, relatedly, of citizenship, that is characterized by rationality, independence, and 
reasonableness (Rawls, 1993). Recall that being a citizen in Rawls’ conception depends on one’s 
ability to participate in social, political, and economic life and to exercise certain rights and 
duties, activities which demand possession of what Rawls calls the two “moral powers:” the 
capacity to form a sense of justice and the capacity to form a conception of the good life and to 
rationally pursue that conception over the course of a complete life (2001, p. 18-19). Rawls 
argues that persons must fall within what he calls “the normal range,” “the range of differences 
in citizens’ needs and requirements compatible with everyone’s being a normal and cooperating 
member of society” (Rawls, 2001, p. 170). The normal range is therefore conceptualized in 
relation to those activities that are regarded as necessary for political stability and social 
cooperation – that is, citizenship. There is flexibility within this prescribed range of normal 
differences, but it is clear that a demarcated line exists between those who are included as 
decision-makers and those who are excluded as such. Those who fail to meet the conditions of 
this line of demarcation – this minimum threshold of normalcy – are not considered democratic 
equals. Their needs and interests are deferred. Thus, some individuals are regarded as unable to 
be recipients of the duties of justice and are not owed the same democratic opportunities as those 
whose capacities enable their democratic equality.  
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This view therefore leaves those who fall below a particular threshold of rational capacity 
out of equal civic membership and decision-making roles, a consequence accepted by Rawls 
(although in his view only affecting “scattered individuals”) (see Nussbaum, 2006, p. 65). 
Importantly, though, Rawls does not stipulate that individuals with intellectual disabilities as a 
group are non-citizens. Rather, he argues that individuals lacking certain capacities – the two 
moral powers – will not be full members of society. It is clear, then, that Rawls’ account relies 
on a particular idea of what capacities are required for citizenship and these map onto the 
capacities that are seen to be lacking in individuals with intellectual disabilities within 
philosophical and other scholarly accounts of disability. It is cognitive ability or more precisely 
demonstrated cognitive ability that is positioned as an arbiter of citizenship status.  
The view of democratic equality that underpins deliberative democratic education is 
based, as we have seen, in “communicative reciprocity” (Clifford, 2012). Here, it is one’s 
engagement in social relationships (rather than possession of resources) that determines one’s 
standing as an equal. Says Elizabeth Anderson (1999), “democratic equality regards two people 
as equal when each accepts the obligation to justify their actions by principles acceptable to the 
other, and in which they take mutual consultation, reciprocation, and recognition for granted” (p. 
313). Because it consists in relationships of reciprocal obligation and respect, democratic 
equality informs a broader conception of citizenship and the civic and moral obligations that we 
have to one another. The important element of democratic equality is its understanding of 
reciprocity as involved in citizenship relationships. That is, our equal “standing” in society 
depends on our equal contribution to and affirmation of this principle of reciprocity. It is not 
simply participation in democratic practice, then, but participating as a democratic equal. Such 
equality may not be possible for many with significant disabilities (absent a redefinition and 
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reframing of the concept of reciprocity itself). Importantly, this egalitarian conception bases 
political equality – democratic equality – on moral equality, conceived in Rawlsian terms as 
properties of “competent adults” who possess the two moral powers I outlined. In other words, 
we are apparently all equal in our moral worth, regardless of race, social status, gender, even 
genes (Anderson, 1999, p. 12). However, the qualifier “competent” indicates that we are not all 
in fact equal when it comes to the degree of ability differences experienced. Some disabilities 
may not affect our moral equality, while others – those that affect our assessment as competent – 
do undermine our moral equality. Says Clifford (2012), “When communicative reciprocity is the 
foundation of equality, communicatively incompetent participants are denied free and equal 
status” (p. 222). Importantly, it is not only non-normatively communicating individuals’ modes 
of communication that are rendered invisible, but their very value as persons (Clifford, 2012).  
Elizabeth Anderson (1999, 2007) and Debra Satz (2007) also maintain that democratic 
equality is tied to citizenship, and, in particular, stress that certain threshold levels of functioning 
relative to civic participation. Anderson argues that citizenship involves functioning as a political 
agent, including voting, engaging in political speech and petitioning government (1999, p. 317). 
Further, it involves participating as an equal in civil society, that sphere of public social life that 
includes public streets, parks, restaurants, public transportation, libraries, hospitals, and so on 
(Anderson, 1999, p. 317). Here we see two sentiments expressed. First, that citizenship requires 
some level of functioning conducive to political agency, expressed in terms of the acts associated 
with political participation (of which Anderson names a few). In other words, citizenship is tied 
to particular acts. Secondly, institutions of the state have an affirmative duty to respect 
democratic equality by ensuring that all groups have equal opportunity to participate in public or 
civil society. The first expresses capacities of individuals, the second, obligations of the state. 
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However, the state is relieved of some of its obligations of access for those individuals who are 
regarded as not possessing the capacities to function as agents (Anderson, 1999, fn 97). 
Anderson would seem, then, to agree with Gutmann’s position that children who are assessed as 
lacking the potential to function as agents cannot be harmed by a deprivation of democratic 
education – or education aimed at preparing them for democratic citizenship – because they lack 
the capacities to develop this ability in the first place (see Vorhaus, 2005 for critique of Gutmann 
and Anderson). Thus their exclusion from equal access to democratic opportunities is justified by 
their presumed or existent lack of capacity with respect to particular educational abilities. 
Political equality, then, depends on at least some level of rough equality or, put another way, 
depends on one’s being of normal cognitive capacity. 
It is on the basis of this albeit minimal requirement of rough equality – equality in 
person’s capacities – as a necessary condition of justice that Martha Nussbaum (2006) is critical 
of Rawlsian contractualism. This is because such a framework cannot adequately account for the 
moral equality and equal citizenship of persons who fail to fall into a posited range of normal 
human capacity (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 31). In Rawls, the conditions of social cooperation are 
decided upon by parties who are roughly equal in natural capacity, understood in terms of their 
mutual capacity for productive work or participation in a scheme of mutual advantage. These 
conditions of reciprocity that enable the formation of the social contract exclude those persons 
who live their whole (or perhaps most) of their lives in conditions of dependence or non-
reciprocity (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 36). Nussbaum regards this deferral of consideration of 
individuals lacking the moral powers as unnecessary, as she argues that moral equality could be 
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grounded in our common experience of need and animality, rather than independence and 
rationality (2006, p. 134).18  
Although these debates over the moral equality and related democratic equality of 
persons have been active in political philosophy, consideration of how the assumption of rough 
equality informs conceptions of democratic education has yet to occur. Democratic citizenship as 
an aim of schooling is therefore grounded in the assumption of the need for certain minimum 
levels of rationality and cognitive competence. The view of educational adequacy – that 
education is adequate when it enables students to develop these capabilities of democratic 
citizenship – is therefore tied to the requirements democratic equality (Satz, 2007, p. 625). 
Accordingly, a proper aim of education (perhaps the sole aim, depending on the framework) is to 
teach children the knowledge, skills, and behaviors of self-government and of active citizenship 
(see Gutmann, 1987; Callan, 1997; Brighouse, 2006). Such arguments take for granted that 
children possess certain independent rational capacities, such as the capacity to independently 
reason and deliberate, or the capacity to independently weigh different conceptions of individual 
and social good.  
Because of the conclusion that democratic citizenship requires the possession of 
particular skills and knowledge that may be out of reach of some children, some philosophers of 
education, much like special education traditionalists, have proposed that we develop separate 
aims for children unable to meet these “ability expectations.” Gutmann’s (1987) description of 
so-called “brain-damaged” children delineates separate education aims for them, aims that 
exclude democratic citizenship. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the development of 
separate educational aims is significant because philosophers of education use such aims to 
                                                
18 Thomas M. Skrtic and J. Robert Kent (2013) critique Nussbaum’s view, arguing that what is missing from her account “is 
consideration of the scope of democratic citizenship and how the political practice of citizens so construed might be 
institutionalized in a just modern society” (p. 101).   
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develop normative principles by which to guide questions of educational distribution, curricula, 
pedagogy, and so on. These principles tell us how schools ought to be arranged, how and what 
teachers ought to teach, and, importantly, whom they ought to teach. Developing separate 
educational aims for some groups of children – those who are assessed as lacking the capacities 
for democratic citizenship and participation as described above – potentially positions such 
students outside of those pedagogical, curricular, and distributive decisions that apply to children 
generally. And this is on top of the existing historical pattern of bias against people with 
intellectual disabilities in matters of civic membership and social belonging. 
One way that we might address this exclusion from aims is to simply regard educational 
justice as consisting and assessed not in the development of particular aims like democratic 
citizenship or career-readiness, but rather in the capacity to flourish. Because flourishing aims 
are concerned with creating the conditions of well-being and of opportunity for future well-being 
for children, they are broader and more inclusive than democratic citizenship. Jaime Ahlberg 
(2014), for example, argues that we should focus on flourishing aims – the opportunity for 
flourishing – because flourishing is an expansive concept that can include, but need not, 
citizenship aims. Thus, while some children may flourish in relation to the development of 
citizenship aims, others will not. That is, democratic citizenship might be part of what is 
involved in flourishing but so too are other activities and roles; one can flourish without 
participation in democratic citizenship. 
However, focusing on flourishing does not help address the question we are tackling 
here: namely whether existing conceptions of democratic citizenship education can 
accommodate the differences in cognitive ability, communication, and adaptive behavior that 
people with intellectual disabilities exhibit. This is because insofar as some labeled individuals 
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require some level of participation in democratic citizenship in order to flourish, we need to have 
an account of how they can be included and educated toward that end. Further, being a citizen is 
connected to the core of human dignity and social respect, and thus the substantive opportunity 
to participate as a citizen – and to learn towards that goal – must be available to all individuals. 
Thus, it seems that rather than addressing the problem of exclusive aims, this solution simply 
delays it: how would we decide who is capable of learning citizenship skills and dispositions? 
How would we assess such children’s capabilities towards specific ability expectations?  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed how the constructs of citizenship and the good citizen operate 
as organizing concepts tied to expectations of able-mindedness and able-bodiedness. I have also 
described a number of different stances towards democracy and the particular challenges they 
introduce for people with intellectual disabilities. Importantly, though, the existence of different 
notions of the good citizen and of the procedures of democracy point to there being no singular – 
or uncontested – view of the required activities of democracy. In fact, if we look closely at the 
contemporary practices of citizens within the United States and Canada, for example, we see a 
range of (recognized) democratic activities in which individuals take part: voting, negotiating, 
expressing public opinions through media, protesting, deliberating, and so on. These are not 
necessarily (or always) in conflict (see Robertson, 2008). Nevertheless, the description of 
democratic citizenship as an aim of education and the corresponding “ability expectations” 
which are described or assumed in relation to accounts of democratic citizenship – and 
corresponding participation – illustrate how the exclusion or marginalization of children with 
intellectual disabilities – or, at least, many children so labeled – from democratic education is 
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regarded as inevitable and therefore justified. Children are regarded as deficient, rather than the 
framework or frameworks of democratic participation or democratic education. Neither the 
ability expectations nor the corresponding norms of participation are questioned in light of such 
exclusions. In other words, these frameworks privilege the able-minded individual and fail to 
consider the broader range of ways in which people can exercise political agency.  
A further problem that the conceptions of democratic citizenship outlined in this chapter 
represent is the almost exclusive focus on the achievement of states – or capacities – rather than 
on the democratic activities that come about through the process of learning and negotiating 
political agency. In other words, because of the focus on producing particular kinds of citizens, 
these frameworks lose sight of how learning environments create opportunities for us to 
negotiate political belonging in relation to one another. Recall Dewey’s (1916) vision of 
democracy as a process rather than an achieved state. What happens if we focus more on that 
process as citizenship? How are skills, dispositions, and knowledge (those ability expectations or 
achievement states) products of relationships rather than individual learning?  I will return to 
these points in the final two chapters.  
First, though, I will turn to some important epistemic considerations that bear on this 
project. As I have explained, a main concern in permitting or applying separate educational aims 
for children with disabilities is moral, namely that doing so contravenes our goals of inclusion. 
Another concern is that separate aims may be complicated by difficulties (and epistemic errors) 
in grouping persons with disabilities and making assumptions about their globalized capacities. 
To abide by separate aims, we as scholars ought to be quite confident in our ability to assess who 
is and who is not entitled to be included in common learning projects. However, there are 
significant epistemic problems that face theorists and practitioners in doing so, not least of which 
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is our embededness in social and cultural communities that persistently devalue and dehumanize 
people with intellectual disabilities. I turn to this concern next.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 NORMALCY, THAT MOST DANGEROUS EPISTEMIC PITFALL 
 
 
If they have trouble brushing their teeth, I am skeptical…they can…make an 
informed choice to vote (from Agran & Hughes, 2013, p. 60). 
 
…social and material inequities stem from a lack of understanding – a failure to 
‘do justice’ to people, to appreciate them to any degree of complexity (Young & 
Quibell, 2000, p. 747).  
 
In the previous chapters I detailed how current frameworks of democratic education 
express ability expectations that privilege norms of able-bodiedness and able-mindedness. These 
frameworks, as I have shown, delineate not only the sorts of skills, dispositions, and behaviors 
that are required of future citizens – and that they are therefore required to learn and exhibit 
within educational environments – but also the kinds of knowledge that are adequate to meet 
levels of democratic citizenship. I argued that articulating democratic citizenship as an aim of 
education has largely had the result of failing to account for – whether tacitly or explicitly – 
persons with intellectual and other significant disabilities, and that some educational theorists 
propose to address this problem by suggesting that people with significant disabilities be subject 
to different and separate aims. In Chapter Three, I outlined how the construct of the good citizen 
emerges in opposition to the dependent and disabled individual and that democratic forms 
express ability expectations that are often counter – or perceived as counter to – the capabilities 
of those with significant intellectual disabilities. In describing how dominant frameworks of 
justice within liberal political philosophy conceptualize the citizen as able-minded – that is, 
possessing some threshold level of reasoning ability, independence, and behavioral and 
communicative competencies – I began to show how these frameworks participate both in 
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articulating particular ability expectations as required and in constructing people with intellectual 
disabilities as incapable of meeting these expectations.  
In this chapter, I explain how the arguments that support the reliance on these ability 
expectations and that uphold the apparent necessity of exclusions of people perceived or assessed 
as unable to meet them, rely on incorrect and/or misguided assumptions and beliefs about 
disability. In this chapter, therefore, I evaluate the reasons that theorists give to support the 
exemption of (some) individuals with intellectual disabilities from democratic citizenship aims 
and the sorts of hermeneutical resources that they draw from that give rise to and appear to 
justify these reasons. First, I argue that the beliefs and assumptions that underpin reasons given 
in support of separate aims rely on misunderstandings about and underestimations of the 
capabilities of those labeled with intellectual disabilities. Thus, one important goal of this chapter 
is to interrogate educational philosophers’ assertions and assumptions about the capabilities of 
those labeled with intellectual disabilities, including predictions about their educability and their 
potential to advance toward specific learning goals. Second, I argue that this uncritical reliance 
on assumptions about the capabilities of individuals with intellectual disabilities develops 
because of the epistemic context in which theorizing takes place, namely one in which a dearth 
of hermeneutical resources are available to understand individuals with disabilities accurately 
and adequately. Educational theorists’ evaluations of intellectual disability and their 
philosophical reasoning about educational aims is complicated by some important epistemic 
problems, then, some of which arise out of their participation in a social world that devalues 
those labeled with intellectual disabilities.  
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Assumptions of the Deferral Stance 
In Chapter Two, I outlined arguments that support alternative aims for children with 
significant disabilities. These included arguments that express concern for labeled children 
(worries over too high expectations, worries over frustration and stigma) as well as arguments 
that express concern over balancing the needs of labeled children with the needs of non-labeled 
children (worries about resource scarcity and worries about leveling down). These arguments 
rest on the belief that these individuals’ disabilities prevent them from acquiring the capabilities 
required to achieve valued educational aims, such as democratic citizenship. The inability of 
some children to meet ability expectations is assumed as inevitable and their exclusion is 
regarded as justified by their lack of ability. What sustains this view of some students’ lack of 
ability? What beliefs and assumptions about learning performance, educability, and so on 
underlie this claim? I propose that in order to evaluate ability expectations and whether they 
unfairly privilege (I have established in the previous chapter that they do privilege) those who 
are considered able-minded, we need to look at the kinds of beliefs and assumptions that are 
being made about the nature of disability as a diagnosis, label, or educational state.  
First, the argument that children with intellectual disabilities cannot achieve democratic 
citizenship aims relies, at least in some minimal sense, on grouping children based on exhibited 
physical, emotional, or cognitive behaviors and characteristics. In Amy Gutmann’s (1987) 
construction, for example, she specifies “children with brain damage” as a particular group 
having characteristics that disqualify them from government by democratic citizenship aims of 
education (Gutmann, 1987, 155). Even if no particular group is specified, however, some criteria 
of judgment must be used to assess whether children do indeed fall below a threshold level of 
ability deemed necessary for the achievement of this particular educational aim. However, 
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defining disability, perhaps especially within educational contexts and in relation to intellectual 
and learning disabilities, has not turned out to be a straightforward endeavor. Anita Silvers 
(2003) calls disability an “essentially contested concept” because it is a theoretical notion that 
will necessarily be understood differently by different people in accordance with the political 
values they hold (p. 473).19 Thus, while we speak of cognitive disability, intellectual disability, 
autism, learning disabilities and so on as if they are obvious categories, definitions of such 
disabilities have been and continue to be the subject of dispute among special educators, 
disability theorists, psychologists, and medical professionals (Luckasson & Reeve, 2001, p. 48). 
Complicating this state of affairs are popular understandings and portrayals of disability that tend 
to depict only the most extreme cases of intellectual disablement (Carlson, 2010) and portray 
autism as a kind of mystery to be solved (McGuire & Michalko, 2011). One need only think 
about the common pronouncement “Oh, he’s got to be autistic!” or “she’s a retard” to be 
reminded of the level of comfort laypeople have with diagnosing or labeling another person as 
disabled, often quite sincerely, although usually pejoratively. Some philosophers and other 
scholars of disability have argued that this identification process itself is evidence of how 
disability – as a label, as a category – is a social construct (Carlson, 2010; Stubblefield, 2010).  
This grouping can also be seen as a form of stereotyping and discrimination: that is, 
making an assumption about all individuals based on their label. However, for many disability 
appears to pose an altogether different challenge than that posed by the inclusion of individuals 
based on race, gender, sexuality, and so on. Individuals labeled with intellectual disabilities are, 
by the conceptual definition of their disability, understood as impaired in their intellectual 
capacities. People with intellectual disabilities are situated both socially and theoretically as 
                                                
19 We see overlap here between descriptions of disability and citizenship as contested concepts. Of course this is not coincidental 
as part of what I am arguing is that these concepts co-construct one another – they are contested in relation to one another.  
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potentially “irredeemable outliers” (Silvers & Francis, 2005) because of their apparently natural 
(rather than social) deficits. However the question of whether natural deficits or disadvantages 
exist is far from settled. Indeed, many disability studies scholars, and some philosophers, 
contend that these distinctions between natural or biological deficit and social disadvantage are 
themselves socially produced. This concerns, among other things, the extent to which disability 
is a social construct and, indeed, what that means (see Carlson, 2010; Hacking, 2000; Rapley, 
2004).   
In order to know that the exemption of children with intellectual and other significant 
disabilities from democratic citizenship aims is indeed fair and just, I posit that we would need to 
first evaluate: a) our practices of grouping students and inferring their educational abilities from 
their belonging to such groups; b) our criteria for assessing a child’s ability or lack of ability with 
respect to this particular aim; and c) the particular capabilities deemed necessary for developing 
and exercising the skills and dispositions associated with democratic citizenship. Accordingly, 
we can identify at least two areas that complicate our evaluation of the justifiability of exempting 
labeled children from democratic citizenship aims: how disability, intellectual competence, and 
educability are defined and according to the presence or absence of what characteristics and what 
levels of functioning, and how the presence of disability is measured in individuals and the tools 
used to do so. In this section, I will evaluate some specific assumptions regarding definition, 
measurement, and prediction that underpin arguments for exemption.  
 
Defining Disability  
A first assumption is that at least some disabilities are static and immutable conditions, 
their presence in individuals persisting regardless of other aspects of their identity, their social 
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context, or their developmental stage. Licia Carlson (2010) describes this position on intellectual 
disability as follows: “If intellectual disability is understood in organic or biological terms, then 
presumably there are certain immutable limits placed on the possibility of altering the condition 
(a treatment might exist, but it would have to act upon the biological organism, insofar as the 
condition is organic; changing the environment alone would not alter it)” (p. 37). Carlson notes 
that the view of intellectual disability or “mental retardation” as a static condition has been 
historically linked to assessments of incurability and un-educability of those assessed as having a 
biologically present cognitive impairment (2010, p. 36-40). Such individuals were separated 
from those regarded as merely “feeble-minded” as a result of their familial class and moral 
upbringing (Carlson, 2010, p. 39; Lombardo, 2008). This assumption therefore includes a belief 
about educability, namely that we can measure and predict who will and who will not benefit 
from education or a particular type of education in advance of their receiving it.  
As I discussed briefly in Chapter Two, the notion of “educability” has an important 
history in its application to children with disability labels (see Trent, 1994). Historically, children 
with perceived intellectual disabilities were further categorized according to their expected 
developmental capacity through education: educable, trainable, incurable (see Carlson, 2010, p. 
37). Such categorization illustrates what Carlson calls “The dual conception of intellectual 
disability as static and dynamic” (2010, p. 37): “Static and dynamic conceptions of 
feeblemindedness might parallel the distinction between organic and non-organic causes, severe 
and mild cases, or they might also correspond to historical periods: an age of optimism that 
views intellectual disability as dynamic, followed by an age of pessimism that views it as static” 
(Carlson, 2010, p. 36-37). For example, the notion that individuals with intellectual disabilities 
have cognitive limits – and that we might come to know those cognitive limits in studying them 
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– expresses a view of intellectual disability as static. Often, limit expectations are applied to 
delineate severe from less severe “cases” of intellectual disablement, distinctions that are made 
on the basis of observable “functioning” and intelligence scoring. On the other hand, the view 
that education and caring support can enhance labeled individuals’ cognitive competencies sees 
intellectual disability as a dynamic category that interacts with environmental factors. These two 
views perfectly represent the twin conception of intellectual disability as static and dynamic. 
The contemporary (re)emergence of educability as a descriptive category – and the 
assessment of children as having differing levels of educability relative to particular learning 
aims – parallels this historical usage of educability and brings it into present-day assessments. 
The reproduction of the concepts of intellectual ability and disability likewise occurs within 
arguments that uphold the necessity for individuals with significant intellectual disabilities’ 
exclusion from education aimed at democratic citizenship.  
The position on the static nature and immutability of intellectual disability reflects what 
disability rights activists and scholars of disability studies have called a “medical model” view of 
disability, wherein disability is regarded as a biological, static, and individual condition. A 
central distinction within disability studies is the contrast between what is typically called a 
medical model versus a social model approach to disability.20 The medical model of disability 
represents an old and very familiar understanding of disability as existing in the biology of 
individual people. This model regards disability as a medically defined and personal physical 
characteristic or state of individuals caused by natural or biological impairment or defect in their 
bodily functioning. Mental, physical, or behavioral variation is seen as deviance from some norm 
of human characteristics and is regarded as inherently undesirable and in need of cure, 
                                                
20 To say “a social model” approach is misleading. In fact, there are many different instantiations of social model approaches to 
thinking about disability, as I will explain.   
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rehabilitation or segregation. Importantly, the medical model view is supported by, but not 
identical to, what is commonly called the species norm account of disability. According to this 
position, disability is an unchanging and intrinsic property of a person that deviates from the 
normal functioning of the human species (Kahane & Savulescu, 2009, p. 18). However, this view 
of species functioning and disability is meant to be descriptive and not evaluative of the 
experience of apparently deviant embodiment; that is, “deviation from species norm is not 
normative because there is no intrinsic connection between deviation from normal functioning 
and well-being” (Kahane & Savulescu, 2009, p. 19). The conflation of statistical deviance with 
the badness of impairment is a normative assessment that is distinct from the descriptive 
assessment of abnormal functioning (Kahane & Savulescu, 2009; see also Silvers, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the reader might anticipate that this view is contentious among disability theorists 
because it relies on an account of normalcy, which many disability studies scholars reject. I will 
return to this issue later.   
As I have said, disability has overwhelmingly been seen as synonymous with bad luck 
and with natural inequality, meaning that having a disability necessarily entails having unequal 
social, political, and economic circumstances (Anderson, 1999; Baynton, 2013). Because of this 
association of disability and natural inequality, furthermore, disability has been used as a 
justification for the inequality of other social groups, notably women, immigrants, and African 
Americans assessed as intellectually inferior and morally undesirable (Baynton, 2013). 
Consequently, and despite its regard of disability as a personal characteristic, this view assumes 
that people with disabilities should desire and are properly the objects of medical and educational 
interventions that would attempt to normalize their differences. As such, failure of integration 
and acceptance into society is often seen as the result of the disability – and the failure to 
  
123 
normalize – rather than social forces, such as stigma and overt discrimination, lack of physical 
access and accommodation, and lack of institutionalized recognition for ability differences. In 
response, disability rights activists and scholars have developed what is commonly (and 
generally) called the social model of disability, which contends that the prevailing individualized 
and medicalized view of disability is harmful and inadequate in representing the actual lived 
experiences of people with disabilities. Social model proponents argue that disability is a social 
and political category that is based on arbitrary and constructed ideas about bodily normalcy and 
intellectual ability and on normative behavioral expectations that cast individuals into social 
classes and groups. The social model generally regards bodily differences as normal variations 
that become abnormal through social and cultural processes. The contrast between the medical 
model and the social model is a defining feature of disability studies, in particular because the 
move to a social model perspective creates a space for critical evaluation of taken-for-granted 
ideas about how human beings can move about and find happiness in the world. 
Of course, not all versions of or conclusions on the basis of the social model are alike. 
For some, the social model involves a clear distinction between impairment, understood as the 
internal biological or genetic condition that causes problems in development, functioning, and so 
on, and disability, the social “add-on” to impairment – that is, the stigma, social barriers, and 
cultural attitudes that attach to being impaired (Oliver, 1996; see also Shakespeare, 2006). For 
those who hold this view, responses to inequalities on the basis of disability must acknowledge 
the disconnect between impairment and disability, such that impairments are understood as 
insufficient conditions for disability to arise (think near-sightedness), although they may be 
necessary ones (Tremain, 2005). For others, there are distinct problems with the view that 
disability is socially constructed while impairment is biological. One argument is that while the 
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impairment-disability distinction acknowledges that the problem of disability exclusion lies in 
the failure to accommodate and accept impairment – that is, within the social attitudes towards 
and institutionalization of able-bodied norms – it leaves intact the view that disability can 
ultimately be reduced to bodily functioning. That is, it regards impairment as value-neutral and 
removed from social processes (Tremain, 2002, 2005). Says Shelley Tremain (2005), “there is 
indeed a causal relation between impairment and disability, and it is precisely this: the category 
of impairment emerged and, in many respects, persists in order to legitimize the governmental 
practices that generated it in the first place” (p. 11).   
Other versions of the social model do not hold fast to such a distinction between 
impairment and disability but nevertheless argue that disability/impairment is socially 
constructed relative to norms of embodiment and ability. Much like race is a social construction 
in which bodily morphology, skin-color, and other bodily features are interpreted relative to the 
norm of whiteness, physical bodily features like “missing” limbs, levels of IQ, physical energy 
and so on are interpreted relative to an able-bodied norm (see Barnes & Mercer, 2003; Linton, 
1998; Wendell, 1996). For some, however, this view over-socializes disability by focusing too 
heavily on disability as socially constructed and thus ignoring the ways in which the lived 
experience of disability is one that is deeply physical, embodied, and materially constrained 
(Erevelles, 2011; Terzi, 2008; Thomas, 1999). In other words, the focus on the social 
interpretation of physical difference loses sight of the lived experiences of that difference, 
ignoring or diminishing the importance of attention to such bodily experiences as pain, which 
can be mitigated but not eliminated by social recognition and inclusion (Siebers, 2009; Wendell, 
1996). Still further, there is extensive discussion among disability studies theorists, philosophers 
of disability, bioethicists, sociologists and so on over the extent to which disability is socially 
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constructed. These include ontological questions (are some disabilities social while others are 
biological?) as well as epistemological questions (how is disability understood when it is 
described as socially constructed?) and ethical questions (ought we to regard disability as 
socially constructed and what are the normative consequences of doing so?). A lot of these 
questions have to do with sorting out how disability – and different disabilities – are defined and 
described, such that we can answer important philosophical questions about how people with 
disabilities ought to be treated.   
It is clear, then, that defining disability has been and continues to be an area rife with 
disagreement. This is certainly true within special and inclusive education, as well as disability 
studies. In fact, noting that the boundaries of what constitutes a disability is highly 
contextualized is a way of expressing the contingency of definitions of disability as well as 
dispelling the myth that disability labels are comprehensive and definitive. In general, then, this 
definitional uncertainty is seen as a positive thing among inclusive education and disabilities 
studies scholars.  
However, the contingency of disability definitions and labels is not always apparent in 
the way that philosophers describe disabilities. In fact, many speak of intellectual disability as a 
kind of test case for the limits of our normative reasoning or ethical obligations. Others draw 
comparisons between people with significant cognitive disabilities and non-human animals (see 
Singer, 2010; McMahan, 2010). Philosophers of disability Eva Kittay (2005, 2010), Licia 
Carlson (2001, 2010), and Shelley Tremain (2011, 2013) have perhaps done the most work to 
expose the problem of discourse around disability in philosophy, although recent online debates 
over ableist language in philosophy do hold promise for expanding recognition of ableist 
assumptions (for example, see Tremain, 2011). The controversy over well-known bioethicists’ 
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descriptions of and regard of intellectually disabled individuals could occupy a full thesis and I 
will not attempt to explore it comprehensively here.21 Later in this chapter, though, I will discuss 
how these philosophical orientations towards intellectual disability contribute to the positioning 
of individuals so labeled as other to valued social – and civic – roles.  
Whatever the definition or understanding of disability being used, however, the view that 
disability is static and immutable is clearly contradicted by evidence that shows that the presence 
or absence of characteristics and behaviors associated with disability actually depends greatly on 
the social or environmental context and educational conditions under which students are placed, 
values and expectations of physical and cognitive ability, as well as the scientific and normative 
criteria being used to assess disability itself.  
An important challenge to the notion that disability is a static condition is therefore the 
documented relationship between the educational success of individual students labeled with 
disabilities and the expectations of teachers, administrators, parents, and peers, as well as the 
environment, curriculum and pedagogy to which they are exposed. I discussed this relationship 
in Chapter Two surrounding the role of high expectations in the high achievement of labeled 
students (see p. 56). Similarly, sociologists studying disability have noted how societal, familial, 
and professional expectations and institutional context shape disabled individuals’ beliefs about 
their own capabilities (Goffman, 1961; S. Taylor, 2000). Individuals have a tendency to adapt to 
institutional expectations and “[they] frequently construct and come to subscribe to an image of 
themselves which selects and distorts beliefs so as to arrive at a view that is beneficial to 
expound in an institutional setting” (Vorhaus, 2006, p. 316). Disability service-provision and 
educational policy have seen a growing recognition of the significance of these social, political, 
and interpersonal conditions to how disability is experienced and expressed. This recognition is 
                                                
21 Carlson (2010) is a good place to start.  
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evidenced by leading organizations’ efforts to change their definition and assessment practices to 
reflect the role of culture, social context, peer-group membership, language, and communicative 
differences in how disability arises (Schalock et al., 2007). Furthermore, by changing “mental 
retardation” to “intellectual disability,” organizations like the American Association on 
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD, 2013) not only move towards a divestment 
in the social meanings attached to mental retardation, but also to a definition of intellectual 
disability that reflects the dynamic nature of the category. Where intellectual disability has 
traditionally been measured (sometimes exclusively) through intelligence assessments (such as 
IQ tests), more recent legal and educational assessments rely on a more complex combination of 
intelligence measurement, a consideration of individuals’ access to social and developmental 
supports (Schalock et al., 2007, p. 118), and, in the educational context, multiple assessments, 
including measures of cognition, adaptive skills, and the child’s response to educational 
interventions and supports (Coleman, et al., 2007). These changes reflect an understanding that 
levels of support – whether educational, familial, or otherwise – change the extent or severity of 
disability; that is, an individuals’ relationship context affects not only how they are regarded as 
learners, but also how they develop and function (Luckasson and Reeve, 2001). Such insights 
underscore the importance of educational policy on disability, which is informed by views about 
educational aims, to students’ with disabilities overall success, as well as the extent to which 
their disabilities come to matter to their likelihood of schooling achievement. In talking about 
separate aims, then, we ought to pay close attention to the relationship between broad 
philosophical aims and the sorts of aims that are instantiated in practice through teachers, 
curriculum and school policy. 
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As I have suggested, there is a significant amount of disagreement among philosophers 
(as well as other theorists of disability and inclusion) over the extent to which disability is 
socially constructed. Nevertheless, a diverse set of those working on disability are increasingly in 
agreement that social context does affect – to some degree – both the expression and experience 
of disability (Siebers, 2009; Tremain, 2002; Vehmas and Mäkelä, 2009). Further, like other 
aspects of a person’s identity, disability intersects with race, class, gender, language, and so on, a 
point evident in the effect that race, first language, and communicative ability has on a student’s 
likelihood of being diagnosed with a learning or behavioral disability (Artiles et al., 2005; Ferri 
and Connor, 2005a, 2005b). The recognition of the overrepresentation of black and Hispanic 
students receiving special education services has revealed biases implicit in the standardized 
testing practices, including IQ assessments, that favor English-speakers and those of the 
dominant, white cultural groups (Artiles et al., 2005; Ferri and Connor, 2005a, 2005b). In the 
1970s several important legal cases highlighted this disproportionality and revealed biases 
implicit in the standardized testing practices (Ferri and Connor, 2005b). Such early cases 
affirmed that IQ testing, which has been used as a measure (and sometimes the sole measure) of 
intellectual disability or mental retardation, is informed by the notion of white intellectual 
superiority, having origins in racist and classist assumptions that inform both its development 
and implementation (Stubblefield, 2010; see also Gould, 1981). I will return to this point in the 
next section when I discuss disability diagnosis and educational assessment. The relationship of 
both race and poverty to disability diagnosis suggests that assessments of disability are – to at 
least some degree – participating in constructing disability.  
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Assessing Disability and the Predictability of Educational Outcomes 
Even where definitions of disability acknowledge its dynamic nature, the recognition that 
the expression of a disability relies on social, environmental, and interpersonal context still 
leaves open the question of how adequate such definitions are in predicting the likelihood that a 
student will benefit from a particular type of education. We therefore need to look at a second 
assumption, namely that we have some reliable way to measure and predict who can and who 
cannot perform learning functions consistent with particular educational aims and, by extension, 
who does and does not belong to a particular group of children with disabilities. This 
assumption involves predictions about students’ achievements based on their label or diagnosis, 
their medical prognosis, or their assessed abilities relative to particular educational criteria. The 
construction works as follows: we imagine a category or group of individuals who exhibit 
difficulties x or behaviors y. We posit that membership in this category is based on some 
inherent lack or deficit that is predictive of their educational abilities and thus renders them 
candidates for alternative educational aims. However, our attributions of intellectual ability and 
our predictions about educability depend upon our approaches to measuring them. Further, the 
measurement tools we use, such as IQ, are developed within and according to particular beliefs 
about developmental and educational normalcy. This dependency on tools of measurement is 
unavoidable, but it illustrates something about the social nature of our definitions and 
conclusions about educability. 
As I suggested above, there is continued controversy over how IQ tests ought to be used 
in diagnosing intellectual disability or in informing educational assessment and classification, 
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assessing the need for services, and even in assessing legal responsibility.22 Yet even while 
intelligence testing has been acknowledged as biased in particular cases, such as 
disproportionately measuring cognitive impairment in students of color, this bias is seen as a 
contingent feature of intelligence testing: in other words, that bias is present in some assessments 
of cognitive disability, thus rendering that label unreliable and unfair in those cases, does not 
mean that the label or diagnosis is unreliable or unfair in every case (see Gallagher, 2010; 
Stubblefield, 2010; see also Leonardo & Broderick, 2011). Accordingly, such testing continues 
to be relied on as an objective assessment practice. Justifiably relying on such assessment 
practice, however, would seem to require us to clearly distinguish those cases in which bias is 
present from those in which it is absent. Stubblefield (2010) is skeptical that we can make such 
clear distinctions. She disputes the distinction between what she calls “judgment categories,” 
which are based on observer – teacher, psychologist, social worker – judgment and in which no 
accompanying organic or physical impairment is identified (such as “Learning Disabled” or 
“Developmentally Delayed,” or “Emotionally Disturbed”), and “organic categories,” which are 
based in the identification of an organic or physical impairment (and are therefore considered 
objective) (such as “Down Syndrome”). Stubblefield argues that the strict division between these 
two categories “cannot be logically sustained” because it relies on a number of erroneous 
conclusions about the relationship between organic cause and social and educational result 
(Stubblefield, 2010, p. 295; see also Gallagher, 2010). That is, and as I will explain, those 
categories that we take to be objective or “organic” ones involve certain judgments or prognostic 
leaps in their application and in the meaning they have in educational contexts.  
                                                
22 As I write this, the US Supreme Court is preparing to hear arguments on the use of an IQ threshold in exempting criminal 
defendants from the death penalty. See Adam Liptak, “Justices Return to a Death Penalty Issue,” The New York Times (October 
21, 2013). http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/us/justices-agree-to-clarify-mental-disability-in-capital-cases.html?_r=0 
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First, knowing that a physical cognitive impairment is present does not tell us the specific 
difficulties that a person will face in performing each educational task presented to them. 
Certainly there may be patterns among labeled children but we must assess in each case whether 
an individual student’s abilities fit these patterns. In other words, there is a knowledge gap 
between the identification of impairment and the expression of that impairment in social, 
educational, and physical contexts. Second, knowing the cause of impairment is not the same as 
knowing the result; that is, because we can pinpoint a cause of damage to an individual’s brain 
does not mean that we know all the specific developmental or learning consequences it will have 
for a specific child. Where the first point refers to the significance of social and educational 
contexts to the expression of impairment, the second point refers to a prognostic gap between 
knowledge of impairment etiology and observable impairment expression.  
Importantly, maintaining the distinction between judgment categories and organic 
categories masks the sorts of judgments and assumptions that are applied to even those 
categories that are based on physically identifiable impairment. Yet such epistemic problems are 
ignored when, for example, globalized assumptions and expectations are made about children’s 
learning potential in general or ability to perform specific tasks based on their label or diagnosis. 
For example, a child who is asked to count blocks and is consistently and over time unable to do 
so may be taken to have learning or intellectual disabilities. While this certainly could be an 
indication of such difficulties in learning, it can also be an indication of motor skill problems or a 
slower pace of development not connected to overall intelligence or overall learning potential 
(see Stubblefield, 2010, p. 296; see also Biklen, 2005). This gap is also ignored when we make 
unwarranted inferences about children’s capabilities based on their label or diagnosis. That is, 
when we mistake a child’s label for a prognosis of their developmental abilities, we fail to 
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acknowledge the difference between presence of assessed impairment and particularity of 
developmental and learning difficulties. This confusion is particularly evident in inferences made 
about children diagnosed with Down Syndrome or autism, where they are assumed to lack the 
ability to become independent, are assumed to experience significant behavioral problems, and, 
especially in the case of autistic children, to lack communication and social skills and 
connections. Such assumptions are exacerbated by educational expectations about developmental 
normalcy that uphold standards of achievement based on non-disabled children’s abilities, a 
point I will return to in the next chapter.   
 
Epistemic Injustice in Reasoning about Educational Justice and Disability 
As I have shown, there are a number of assumptions that underpin arguments for separate 
educational aims and that uphold the view that people with intellectual disabilities are marginal 
in political and educational theorizing. I have also suggested that these assumptions rely on some 
problematic and even erroneous beliefs and inferences about people with disability labels and 
their capabilities, as well as on beliefs about education based in particular understandings of 
disablement. In this section, I will show how such assumptions and inferences detailed in the 
previous sections arise out of philosophical reasoning conducted within a social context – both 
academic and lay – that influences the way that people with intellectual disabilities are regarded 
and allows educational philosophers and other theorists to make epistemic leaps when reasoning 
about them. Essentially, I will make the case that our philosophical discussions of civic 
education are conditioned by significant knowledge limitations that lead to epistemic pitfalls in 
reasoning about aims.  
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Following the publication of Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics 
of Knowing (2007) a growing number of philosophers have considered how social injustices are 
perpetuated not only through the unjust distribution of social resources but also through the 
unjust distribution of epistemic resources. What this means is that inequalities persist 
surrounding whose testimony is given credence (and how much credence relative to others) and 
whose experience is represented through dominant interpretive resources. While the concept of 
identity prejudice and imbalanced epistemic resources was explored by feminist philosophers 
before Fricker’s (2007) book (see Alcoff, 2001; Bar On, 1993; Janack, 1997), her naming and 
description of the phenomenon as “epistemic injustice,” has generated a significant amount of 
philosophical and sociological attention to knowledge production and social meaning-making, 
including within the context of educational research (for example, Bohman, 2012; Frank, 2013; 
Medina, 2011). This recent literature explores how marginalized social groups are systematically 
excluded from shaping social meanings and generating knowledge about social institutions, like 
education, as well as how individuals who belong to these groups are systematically denied 
testimonial credibility on the basis of their social identities.  
Fricker describes two kinds of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and 
hermeneutical injustice. These are intimately related and both connect in important ways to the 
existing limitations in philosophical research surrounding educational justice and intellectual 
disability that I have been exploring. I will describe them separately and discuss their 
relationship to conceptualizing civic education.  
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Testimonial Injustice  
Testimonial injustice occurs when a person is treated unjustly in her capacity as a 
knower. The exemplar case is when an individual is ascribed diminished credibility based on the 
hearer’s own identity-based prejudice against her, such as when a man discounts a woman’s 
testimony because of his beliefs about her intelligence or credibility tied to her gender. 
Importantly, assessments of credibility occur all the time and require the use of the epistemic 
resources each of us has available to us, however limited. Assessing a person’s credibility in 
claiming x therefore depends on what is known about their relationship to x, but also about their 
social positioning, their expertise, their identity, or their experience. Social practices of 
conferring epistemic authority are commonplace in our daily lives: we assess people’s claims to 
knowledge and truth routinely and with the use of what Fricker calls “heuristics” (2007, p. 16) 
for assessing credibility and the epistemic trustworthiness of those with whom we interact. For 
example, according to Fricker the use of stereotypes in forming judgments about others’ 
credibility is a normal part of our epistemic practices (2007, p. 16-17). While stereotypes can be 
false, misleading, even dangerous (Fricker, 2007, p. 16-17), they are “epistemically desirable” 
(Fricker, 2007, p. 32) in helping us in making credibility judgments: they allow ease in assessing 
another’s claims or information because we can depend on certain features to indicate whether 
they have epistemic authority. An obvious example is that we likely grant epistemic authority to 
a medical doctor on matters pertaining to our health because we know things about her– that she 
is educated, knowledgeable about medicine and health care, and so on – but also because we 
hold certain stereotypes or assumptions about her credibility – that she is honest, reliable, 
trustworthy. The problem, says Fricker, arises when we form credibility judgments without 
sufficient attention to available evidence because we have formed a pre-judgment about a 
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category of person and this clouds or distorts our perception of the speaker (2007, p. 36). In fact, 
these pre-judgments can make it extremely difficult for us to make a fair assessment of another’s 
credibility.  
Consider a man who, because of his sexist beliefs about women’s intellectual 
competence, denies epistemic authority to his female doctor. This resistance comes from the 
prejudices and norms of the “social imaginary” which produce “a strong form of epistemic 
laziness that blocks evidentiary explorations,” making some things obvious, natural, expected, 
and other things invisible, strange, and unintelligible (Medina, 2011, p. 26). Based on our 
perceptions of persons’ identities, physical and behavioral characteristics, we invest some with 
credibility and authority, and deny it to others (Medina, 2011, p. 27). These “identity prejudices” 
affect our ability to make accurate judgments about others’ credibility and, when patterned – 
persistent and systemic – they can lead to a credibility deficit and systematic testimonial injustice 
to testifiers (Fricker, 2007, p. 29). Fricker is especially concerned with those cases that are 
persistent and systematic – rather than those cases of credibility deficit that arise from “epistemic 
bad luck”23 – because they involve “prejudices that track the subject through different 
dimensions of social activity” (2007, p. 27). A good example would be assessments about 
individuals’ with intellectual disabilities testimonial competence based on globalized 
assumptions about their competence in other areas. For example, in R. v D.A.I., a recent case 
before the Supreme Court of Canada, the court ruled on whether a person can testify about her 
experience of sexual assault – that is, give testimony as evidence – while being unable to explain 
                                                
23 Fricker (2007) describes these as instances in which individuals judge based on the evidence presented to them and simply 
judge wrong. See p. 42 of the text for examples. There are some obvious questions, here concerning epistemic responsibility: in 
what situations is a person obligated to look closer at the evidence? What about when the collective imagination prevents one 
from seeing the evidence: for example in the case of publicly obscured understanding about autistic people and how they present 
themselves in communication?  
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the meaning of concepts like truth-telling or giving false testimony (R. v D.A.I., 2012).24 Beyond 
the legal questions at issue in this case are philosophical questions about the role that affected 
competencies in one area play in assessments of credibility in other areas. In other words, 
whether a person can recount their experience of rape can be considered a separate question from 
whether they can understand the concept of telling the truth. Similarly, to recall the quote with 
which I began this chapter, whether a person can brush his own teeth does not directly bear on 
whether or not he can vote, or participate in other forms of democratic process.  
Another example of the slippage between competencies in separate areas is how a 
person’s need for supported or facilitated communication is frequently given as a reason to doubt 
their communicative competence overall. Systematic testimonial injustice is an attack on the 
epistemic authority of the testifier in general because it is about who they are and how they 
appear (Fricker, 2007, p. 48). Such persistent doubt can lead to an individual’s loss of confidence 
in her beliefs and justifications for them, and can inhibit intellectual courage, even affecting the 
development of intellectual and critical capacities (see Fricker, 2007, p. 49). This form of 
epistemic injustice is, then, a harm specifically in one’s capacity as a knower and giver of 
information. When we are consistently undermined in our attempts to express our experiences or 
are consistently spoken for, we can lose both the desire and competence to do so. These 
experiences are commonplace for individuals with intellectual disabilities, who are frequently 
spoken for, spoken about, or ignored altogether.   
Fricker’s analysis of testimonial injustice reveals how credibility judgments are theory-
laden – that is, they are influenced by our prejudices and generalizations about persons’ 
competence and sincerity as they relate to their cognitive abilities and motivational states (2007, 
                                                
24 The Court ruled that the expectation that complainants in sexual assault cases be able to do so would prevent such cases from 
being heard in court and undermine justice for victims with intellectual and other disabilities. 
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p. 66). As I will discuss in a moment, this generates complications in the case of individuals with 
intellectual disabilities because individuals’ difficulties in mental processing, reasoning, or 
memory may affect (although not preclude) their ability to provide accurate testimony. Thus, 
hearers may be justified in assigning diminished credibility to individuals with intellectual 
disabilities in particular cases. However, the case of intellectual disability seems also to suggest 
the need to shift our understanding of what reliable testimony looks like, in part because this 
testimony may not always be autonomous in the way traditionally expected, as the case of 
supported communication demonstrates (see Erevelles, 2002). There may therefore be a parallel 
here between assessments of credibility and assessments of cognitive limitation. For example, 
the same heuristics that we use to assess if a person is lying – lack of eye-contact for example – 
are also used as evidence of cognitive limitation – as in the case of autistic people or people with 
developmental disabilities. However, lack of eye-contact does not necessarily mean cognitive 
limitation, nor does it indicate a lack of credibility; assuming so is part of a deep-seated prejudice 
against individuals with disabilities. The presence of a disability may therefore make our usual 
heuristics inadequate (perhaps calling them into question entirely). In cases where the dominant 
group lacks the epistemic resources necessary to understand or seek to understand individuals 
with significant disabilities, we may be wrong to trust those measures that we otherwise consider 
fair and just. Says Fricker, the hindrance to forms of communication or expressive efforts of 
members of marginalized social groups is “unjust in so far as it derives from the fact that their 
powerlessness bars them from full participation in those practices whereby social meanings are 
generated, for these are also the practices whereby certain expressive styles come to be 
recognized as rational and contextually appropriate” (2007, p. 161).  
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The role of epistemic power imbalances between dominant and non-dominant groups is a 
central part of the problem of testimonial injustice. Such power imbalances not only concern 
who is denied authority in giving testimony or simply as a knower, but who is granted the power 
to shape social meanings; in short, who is given a disproportionate share in shaping social 
meanings. José Medina (2011) makes this disproportionality clear in his argument that epistemic 
authority and assessments of credibility are relational to assessments of credibility excess. 
Medina argues that while the immediate harm in credibility excesses is not (typically) to the 
recipient of the excess – so I am not usually harmed when someone ascribes more credibility to 
my testimony than is due – these attributions can nevertheless harm others because they are 
ultimately relational: when some receive privileged epistemic treatment, others are accorded 
epistemic marginalization. Consider the example of a person who is perceived to communicate 
eloquently in verbal discourse and to make rational and persuasive arguments but who 
nevertheless lacks close contact with individuals with intellectual disabilities. When he is granted 
more authority to speak about the capacities and care of people with intellectual disabilities than 
labeled individuals or their families, his credibility excess directly reinforces the credibility 
deficits of labeled individuals and their families. Says Medina, “Credibility is not assessed in the 
abstract, independently of social positionality and judgments of normalcy, but rather, in a 
comparative and contrastive way – that is, by comparison with what is considered extraordinary, 
normal and abnormal” (2011, p. 20).  
Consider this as a question of epistemic privilege: some persons enjoy – systematically 
and persistently – epistemic privilege because of who they are, who they are perceived to be and 
because of certain attributes, characteristics, and behaviors they possess. This affects their 
capacities as interpreters of the social world and as testifiers about that experience. Steven 
  
139 
Shapin (1995) offers a helpful historical example regarding the epistemic credibility and 
authority enjoyed by gentlemen. The historic gentleman’s epistemic authority was assumed 
because of his social standing, independence, and character, in contrast to common folks’ 
economic and social dependence, presumed to impose constraints on their freedom to know and 
to tell the truth; the latter were seen as less impartial knowers (see also Janack, 1997). Gentlemen 
enjoyed epistemic privilege because they were seen as epistemically advantaged in relation to 
common people.25 A contemporary example is the epistemic privilege from which whites benefit 
in a racist society; where white people’s interpretation of their experiences remains untroubled 
and unquestioned – let’s say in asserting their experience of “reverse racism” – marginalized 
people’s experiences of systematic racist discrimination is held suspect, ignored, dismissed. The 
experience of systematic credibility deficit of marginalized people is enabled by the 
simultaneous attribution of credibility excess – the epistemic privileging – of dominant-group 
individuals. The former’s epistemic authority diminishes in proportion to the epistemic authority 
of the latter (Medina, 2011, p. 24). In this way, systematic imbalances in who shapes and informs 
collective social meanings and social norms – what Fricker (2007) calls “hermeneutical 
injustice” forms the necessary backdrop for the epistemic privileging of dominant groups. 
Before I move to a discussion of hermeneutical injustice I want to briefly clarify the role 
that testimonial injustices play in influencing civic participation and questions about citizenship 
education. In Shapin’s example, we see how socially valued behaviors and capacities are 
connected to ideas about epistemic power – that is, the possession of particular capacities like 
independence, verbal acuity, and markers of moral character are linked to the power a person has 
to express themselves, be heard, and be rendered intelligible. For persons who lack such 
                                                
25 It is important to note that the relationship between social class, maleness, and literacy (as a measure of knowledge – for 
example, signing one’s name) was considered in the nineteenth century as a marker of citizenship (see Kliewer et al., 2004).   
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capacities or whose capacities are less developed in these areas, their epistemic authority is less 
assured, as are their opportunities for being listened to and understood. The opportunities that 
individuals have to be seen as political agents – and to be seen as valued members of the polity – 
are directly affected by how they are regarded as knowers. This relationship becomes clearer 
when we consider the case of hermeneutical injustice.   
 
Hermeneutical Injustice 
 Fricker defines hermeneutical injustice as “the injustice of having some significant area 
of one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to a structural identity 
prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource” (2007, p. 155). As a result of hermeneutical 
injustice those in positions of social power and privilege have an unfair advantage in shaping 
what constitutes knowledge, which can result in a deprivation in language or epistemic tools to 
make sense of and describe diverse experiences and identities. Says Fricker, the powerful have 
an unfair advantage in structuring collective social meanings and understandings (2007, p. 147); 
whereas the powerful interpret their experience of the social world with ease – with the privilege 
that comes with dominance – those who lack power have fewer and more ill-fitting meanings to 
draw on in their efforts to make themselves and their experiences intelligible. Certain styles of 
expression, ways of speaking, as well as the context of that expression are held suspect within a 
context of hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007, p. 160). This “hermeneutical marginalization” 
results in the development and social acceptance of meanings and interpretations of social and 
material phenomena that are biased or one-sided, emerging as they do out of the exclusion of 
alternative understandings. Further, it means that those experiences that marginalized persons do 
share are often misinterpreted, ignored, or misappropriated. Importantly, Fricker contends that 
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hermeneutical injustice is a purely structural form of injustice (2007, p. 159), meaning that the 
injustice is not interpersonal but rather enacted through institutional structures and institutional 
practices.  
In considering epistemic justice in the context of higher education, Elizabeth Anderson 
(2007, 2012) describes how systematic privileging can operate to narrow the field of knowledge 
production so that dominant group members are the ones doing most of the research and making 
major institutional decisions. She writes, “…when groups of inquirers are segregated along the 
same lines that define group inequalities, the shared reality bias will tend to insulate members of 
advantaged groups from the perspectives of the systematically disadvantaged” (Anderson, 2012, 
p. 170). According to Anderson, the fact of cultural, racial, and gender diversity necessitates an 
educational structure that is constituted so as to be “systematically responsive to the interests and 
concerns of people from all walks of life” (2007, p. 596).26 This requires that academic elites 
have some degree of contact with and understanding of people from diverse life situations, but 
also that these latter individuals have equal opportunities to become elites as well. However, just 
as elites are largely constituted from the ranks of white, middle-upper class males, they are also 
largely non-disabled. This lack of cross-positional contact, along with the kinds of prejudices and 
social imaginary around disability that I have described, makes the challenge of producing 
scholarship that includes accurate understanding of disability and positive representation of 
disabled individuals’ capabilities quite challenging.  
The epistemic consequences of hermeneutical injustice are complex. In addition to 
privileging dominant group social meanings, the hermeneutical imbalance means that those in 
disadvantaged positions have fewer interpretive resources to draw from in identifying and 
naming the marginalization they experience. A clear example is the only very recent entrance of 
                                                
26 We’ll assume “all rolls of life” applies here too. 
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the term “ableism” into mainstream English language to describe discrimination towards 
disabled people and to allow people with disabilities to name their oppression in ways intelligible 
to the non-disabled. The hermeneutical imbalance disadvantages those already in positions of 
societal disempowerment while also correspondingly advantaging those already in positions of 
societal power, all the while potentially undermining the quality of research in general. As I 
suggested earlier, it is not always in the interests of non-disabled people to learn about and 
transform social conditions that privilege them. There is an ease of not having to take into 
account how one’s research or theorizing might affect those with disabilities, or how it might 
produce assumptions and expectations that privilege able-bodied people. It is a kind of 
philosophical research that is eased by the privileged epistemic position of its producer. 
However, the so-called “shared reality bias” involves “the tendency of individuals who interact 
frequently to converge in their perspectives on and judgments about the world” (Anderson, 2012, 
170). While this is epistemically useful because it helps to resolve conflicts, keep interlocutors 
on the same plane of understanding (Anderson, 2012), and so on, it can also lead to an epistemic 
insulation and narrowing of hermeneutical resources that is ultimately detrimental to non-
dominant groups. Furthermore, at the same time as the hermeneutical imbalance advantages non-
disabled people, it also potentially undermines the quality of their research. The “shared-reality 
bias” has the tendency to narrow the range of perspectives and interpretive frameworks through 
which researchers approach a problem. When non-disabled researchers have limited contact with 
people with disabilities and, perhaps especially, do not learn from scholars who experience 
disability, the research they produce is far less likely to represent the range of ability differences 
existent in our society.  
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 As I explained in the previous chapter, current research surrounding democratic 
citizenship aims and conceptions of civic participation is shaped according to an idea of the 
citizen as able-bodied and able-minded. We can say that the hermeneutical resources are stacked 
against the view that people with intellectual disabilities can be citizens. This history of 
epistemic marginalization is also one in which academics – perhaps especially medical 
professionals and philosophers – have played an important and dominant role. A quick review of 
this history reveals, moreover, that the hermeneutical resources such academics had available to 
them shaped their conclusions and led to many misguided and unjust conclusions. As I have 
explained, early identification of people as intellectually, behaviorally, or psychologically 
abnormal by academic researchers dovetailed with contemporaneous ideas about morality and 
social value, themselves steeped in attitudes about race, gender, and class. Assessments of 
disability therefore sorted individuals according to their membership in social categories of civic 
and economic worth (Carlson, 2010; Schweik, 2009; Stubblefield, 2010). Segregated private 
spaces of asylums and institutions – sometimes called “schools” – were developed to house those 
deemed a threat to social values at the same time as the growing eugenics movement sought to 
prevent the birth of, and in some cases eradicate, apparently deviant individuals. Ideas about 
moral worth and societal contribution can therefore be seen as acting as hermeneutical resources 
for assessing the social place of individuals in society. Of course, “Deviants” included not only 
those with visible disabilities, but also whole classes of whites born into poverty, blacks of all 
social standings, and immigrants, all of whom were suspected of weakening America (Carlson, 
2010; Selden, 2000; Stubblefield, 2010). As I have discussed, out of this context emerged the 
eugenics term “feeble-minded,” a sort of catch-all term for people perceived as intellectually and 
often morally degenerate (Trent, 1994). Importantly, the eugenics discourse developed out of 
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ideas about human standards and normalcy rooted in – and then justified by – scientific theory 
and investigation (Davis, 2006). For example, the statistics concept of the norm informed early 
eugenicists’ thinking about the “average man,” which took on normative dimensions as applied 
to ideas about normalcy and non-deviance (Davis, 2006, p. 7). With these scientific 
measurements of normalcy eugenicists could identify social deviance, especially by measuring 
physical features that corresponded to identified racial and ethnic differences (Gould, 1981). 
Images of these cultural constructions of normalcy were widely disseminated to laypeople who 
were encouraged to internalize this divide between normal and deviant (Ferri & Connor, 2006), 
thus engaging common folk in participating in identifying disability in others. In this way, the 
relationship between common understandings of disability and putatively scientific ones can be 
see as cyclical.  
The legacy of this construction of normal versus deviant – able-bodied versus disabled – 
is certainly evident in the lingering perception of whites (perhaps not always conscious) that 
people of color – especially African Americans, Latinos, and American Indigenous people – are 
intellectually inferior. It is also apparent in the taken-for-granted ideas that most of us have of 
what is normal and what is abnormal embodiment or cognitive ability. As I suggested above, 
educators are not immune to these cultural constructions of normalcy and these come to inform 
decisions about a child’s educational trajectory. Attributions of intellectual disability or 
uneducability have therefore been and continue to be used to justify existing judgments about 
children’s cognitive or physical inferiority based on their physical or behavioral characteristics. 
Importantly, this is a history of unwarranted assessments of intellectual ability and disability 
being made by those in positions of academic power.  
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Intellectual Disability and Philosophy: A Relationship in Need of Some Therapy 
To clarify, I am arguing that our contemporary social and political context affects how 
philosophers of education reason about the aims of education, and, in particular the justifiability 
of separate aims for some children. As we know, for the most part philosophers of education 
have largely ignored the challenge that intellectual disability presents to foundational 
philosophical concepts that inform conceptions of education generally and democratic education 
more specifically. Within the field of philosophy more broadly, however, a number of political 
philosophers have taken up this challenge as it relates to core philosophical questions of justice 
and equality. These theorists are convincingly documenting and commenting, moreover, upon 
the ways in which ideas about ability and disability already permeate philosophical reasoning as 
assumptions that go unquestioned, even unnoticed (see Carlson & Kittay, 2010; Carlson, 2010; 
Stubblefield, 2007). Carlson writes that “the faces of intellectual disability…haunt philosophy” 
(2010, p. 4). It is not simply that individuals with intellectual disabilities have been forgotten, 
neglected, or otherwise omitted from philosophical consideration, it is that intellectual disability, 
as a gendered, racialized concept or construct stands in as the conceptual other to traditional 
philosophical standards, such as reason and independence. Intellectual disability is both omitted 
or excluded and centralized within philosophy, serving in thought experiments, in arguments 
about personhood, in what it means to be human, and, importantly, as those marginal cases 
which are used to test the validity of normative theories (see Carlson, 2010; Mitchell & Snyder, 
2000). Thus demarcations between apparent intellectual disability – and particularly profound 
intellectual disability – and cognitive “typicality” become central theorizing practice within 
philosophical work on education. Determining what is owed to individuals through education 
becomes equally a discussion of to whom it is owed. And, importantly, through such theorizing, 
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“intellectual disability” as a concept, as a type, as a social category, is re-defined and re-
produced again and again.  
Philosophical theorizing about justice frequently positions those labeled with intellectual 
disabilities as marginal cases or limit cases. This view operates in at least two important ways in 
its positioning of people with intellectual disabilities. First, it subscribes to a view of such 
individuals as having static limits – cognitive limits, competency limits, developmental limits. 
Such a view is consistent with the contemporary instantiations of the notion of uneducability. 
Second, such a view represents a mode of seeing some cognitive differences as too different to 
fit within the particular philosophical framework of justice or equality being outlined or as 
testing the limits of our theories. This is clear in how people with intellectual disabilities are 
placed as “limiting cases” in considerations of justice within political philosophy as 
representative individuals who fall outside the range of capacities deemed necessary for taking 
on the duties and benefits of citizenship, or possessing moral status (Kelly, 2010; Rawls, 2001).  
Consider an example of how this type of threshold thinking might operate in real life 
decision-making: Alison Kafer (2013) recounts one parent’s positive response to learning about 
the Ashley Treatment, which I described in Chapter Two. As Kafer explains, this father 
expresses the desire to seek the treatment for his daughter, who he describes as “born with Spina 
Bifida…paralyzed from the waist down…a handful to lift” (as quoted in Kafer, 2013, p. 59). The 
father states that he would have liked to have the Ashley treatment for his daughter, but that she 
is now too old (at sixteen) to be approved for the treatment. Kafer points out, however, that the 
treatment is considered appropriate for those who are “nonambulatory” and “noncommunicative” 
(2013, p. 59). This young woman is therefore quite different than Ashley in terms of the abilities 
she has, “But, according to her father, she is sufficiently impaired. His comments reveal that the 
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attempt to draw bright lines between classes of disability is rarely successful; one person’s 
“severe” may be another’s “moderate” or “mild.” “ (Kafer, 2013, p. 59).  
Another way in which intellectual disability enters into philosophical debates is through 
discussions in ethics, around moral status and distributive obligations, especially to test the limits 
of a theory (to act as a “limit case”) or to test intuitions using thought experiments. This happens 
most frequently in relation to questions about the moral status of non-human animals. Intellectual 
disability is understood to test the limits of applying moral status to all human beings qua human 
beings and this has the consequence of potentially calling into question either the status of the 
framework of justice being considered or, as is most often the case, the status of those who fall 
below these thresholds as human beings. Consequently, the moral status of individuals with 
intellectual disabilities is called into question again and again through this type of normative 
theorizing. For example, Peter Singer (e.g. 2010) is notable for his reference to individuals with 
severe cognitive disabilities in arguing against what he calls “specism” or the unjust privileging 
of human over non-human animals that he sees as akin to racism. By referring to the apparent 
limitations of such human individuals Singer professes to show the illogic of such preferencing. 
Within such thought experiments, profound intellectual disability becomes a limit case against 
which to test our intuitions about humans’ obligations to non-human animals. The limit case is 
an example not only of how disability is presented as a kind of heuristic to measure our ethical 
conclusions, but it also relies on an archetype of the disabled person that, arguably, doesn’t exist. 
Of course, Singer need not refer to any particular individual to make his case; he need only 
stipulate that such individuals exist. Nevertheless, through these thought experiments, 
generalizations about the extremeness of labeled individuals’ limitations are reaffirmed and 
reinscribed. As Sophia Wong points out (in Wilson, 2009) there is an important analogy that can 
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be made between thought experiments and empirical experiments in terms of the potential harm 
they cause: just as physical experimentation on people with intellectual disabilities would be 
considered by many to be at a minimum morally questionable, so too can thought experiments be 
questioned to the extent that they reinforce problematic stereotypes and misinformation about 
intellectual disability and the capabilities of individuals so labeled. Where these kinds of 
misunderstandings and stereotypes inform our ethical considerations, moreover, they can be 
dangerous, even deadly for people with intellectual disabilities.  
Where other forms of human difference – gender, race, class, etc. – have come, however 
arduously and incompletely, to be regarded within philosophy as morally arbitrary reasons for 
societal exclusion, disability – and particularly intellectual disability – remains seen as a 
difference relevant to moral standing, including citizenship status and social equality. Says Anita 
Silvers, “…disability unmistakably has been embraced as a morally essential attribute, one which 
assigns those who have it to the borderline of moral worth” (1995, p. 35). Thus, it has been 
largely accepted within philosophical theorizing about intellectual disability that certain 
exclusions will be necessitated by some individuals’ lack of capacities. That is, philosophers – 
and other scholars, including traditional special education theorists – assume that some 
individuals will simply fall below the threshold of abilities necessary for performing certain 
social tasks or participating in social institutions. For the most part, as Eva Kittay (2010) has 
pointed out, the assumptions underlying these exclusions are unfounded and based on a lack of 
knowledge about what people with intellectual disability labels are capable of doing and 
knowing. In the next chapter, I will take a closer look at the philosophical construction of normal 
ability – or how normalcy is constructed through core philosophical concepts like independence 
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and rationality – and begin to deconstruct their reliance on mistaken assumptions about 
disability.  
While we should charitably understand limit cases, and the philosophical pattern of 
“using” people with intellectual disabilities in such argument constructions, as conceptualizing 
justice for all persons, limit cases can also be understood as contributing to the problem of 
hermeneutical injustice. This is because the idea that people with significant intellectual 
disabilities occupy the limits of our theorizing or the limits of the applicability of our aims, does 
two things: first, it relies on an archetype of cognitive disability that does not actually exist and, 
second, it situates individuals with such disabilities on the extreme end of what is actually a 
complex spectrum of ability and need.  
A third problem that is important to discuss in relation to the specter of intellectual 
disablement within philosophy is the uncritical reliance upon ahistoricized intuitions about the 
valuation of human lives. For example, Peter Singer (2010) appears to endorse this kind of 
ahistoricized evaluation when, in an essay on moral status and the preferencing of humans over 
animals, he writes:  
So when it comes to making choices for what kind of child we want to have, very few 
among us believe that all human lives are equally worth having, and that it doesn’t really 
matter what level of cognitive ability your child will have. Most of us prefer to have a 
child with normal cognitive abilities when we have the choice. When it comes to the 
crunch, the fiction that we believe in the equal value of all human life breaks down, here 
as in other areas of life-and-death decision making (Singer, 2010, p. 344).  
 
Perhaps Singer is correct that most would-be parents would prefer a child with putatively normal 
cognitive abilities (which remains unqualified in this passage) but all this tells us is their 
preferences. It doesn’t tell us whether they are right or that, under different social circumstances 
(say with appropriate structural conditions of support for parents of children with intellectual 
disabilities) or under different epistemic conditions (with better knowledge of the capabilities of 
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children with significant disabilities [Parens & Asch, 2003]) these parents would hold the same 
preferences. This is an ahistoricized reading of a necessarily historically and discursively 
complex problem. Moreover, parents may prefer any number of attributes or characteristics in 
the child they are expecting, including, perhaps, a certain eye color, gender, or sexual orientation. 
In general, we recognize these preferences as socially produced, or, at the very least, as 
unjustified considerations upon which to base our judgments about the value of future children’s 
lives.  
So why, then, is this relationship between intellectual disability and philosophy so fraught 
with problems? It might be because philosophers frequently lack first-person knowledge of 
disability in general, and certainly intellectual disability in particular. This is in part because 
most philosophers do not themselves experience intellectual disability.27 Such a lack of first-
person experience can lead to epistemic leaps in reasoning about the experience of disablement. 
Consider an example: recent studies in bioethics have shown that able-bodied people vastly 
underestimate the quality of life of those living with disabilities when the judgments about the 
latter’s quality of life by the former are compared with the expressed experiences of the latter 
(Mackenzie & Scully, 2007). Catriona Mackenzie and Jackie Leach Scully (2007) suggest that 
this asymmetry reflects the epistemic problem of imaginative projection, namely that it is always 
founded in personal experience: “body-specific experience modifies conceptual processes, 
including imaginative processes” (p. 343). Thus, able-minded philosophers’ thinking about the 
experiences, the needs, and indeed the abilities of those with significant disabilities is shaped by 
their own unchallenged beliefs about the experience of cognitive disablement. From the 
perspective of an able-minded academic, having such a condition of disablement is likely to be 
                                                
27 During a recent conference presentation, this claim was met with laughter from my audience. Certainly the claim was not 
intended as a joke, yet the fact that it was received that way – or that it elicited laughter at all – has disturbed me. What to make 
of this laughter is a question I plan to pursue.  
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highly undesirable. Thus, despite the fact that moral philosophers are often deferred to on ethical 
and political concerns regarding cognitive disability – even while the experiences of labeled 
individuals is ignored or dismissed – their reasoning is largely informed not by experience with 
disability but rather by their intuitions about mind and body differences (Carlson, 2010; Vorhaus, 
2014). Importantly, these intuitions are shaped by existing bias for particular human ways of 
functioning and against disablement as a valuable condition of living. 
A second way in which philosophers’ reasoning about educational aims is shaped by the 
existing social and political climate around disability, is through the frequency, level, and quality 
of their second-person knowledge of disability in general and intellectual disability in particular. 
The infrequency of contact is largely a result of the continued social segregation of individuals 
labeled with intellectual disabilities, who are rarely participants in university life and who are 
often segregated residentially (Boxall et al., 2004). Of course not all philosophers lack second-
person knowledge of intellectual disability: philosophers like Eva Kittay (e.g. 2010), Martha 
Nussbaum (e.g. 2006), and John Vorhaus (e.g. 2014) write about their labeled loved ones or 
those in their care and the ways in which these relationships have been transformative to their 
way of thinking about philosophical projects. It might be fair to say that for Eva Kittay her 
relationship with her daughter, who Kittay describes as having profound cognitive disabilities, 
has shaped the direction of her research (see Kittay, 1999, 2010). Moreover, it would not be fair 
to pick on philosophers here as if they alone constitute the group of academics whose contact 
with people with intellectual disabilities is minimal; certainly this is true of all academics. Even 
among disability studies scholars, this contact may be quite minimal, given the levels of 
segregation that exist, especially at the level of higher education. Although the exclusion of 
people with intellectual disabilities from doing philosophical theorizing is not itself obviously 
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unjust, academics’ lack of exposure to and learning from people with intellectual disabilities is 
the result of unjust societal conditions, including community and educational segregation, and 
can exacerbate and even contribute to existing injustice toward labeled people.  
Elizabeth Anderson (2007) explores injustices that can arise from the epistemic problems 
of lack of awareness and exposure of professional elites to the experience of the socially 
disadvantaged.28 She describes professional elites as having certain “cognitive deficits”29 related 
to their lack of exposure to non-dominant groups: “When the elite is drawn overwhelmingly 
from multiply advantaged, segregated groups, their cognitive deficits hurt the disadvantaged, 
because elites constituted in this way lack awareness of and responsiveness to the problems and 
interests of the disadvantaged” (2007, p. 602). This lack of exposure and familiarity with 
disability can be seen in the dissonant claims of philosophers and those with intellectual 
disabilities and their families, the latter of whom report far more nuanced descriptions of theirs 
or their loved ones’ competencies than do the philosophers and other academics who write about 
them (Carlson, 2010; see also Kittay, 2010). Thus, this segregation and resulting lack of 
exposure to people’s intellectual differences and abilities results in many philosophers being 
general unaware of people with intellectual disabilities’ actual abilities (Kittay, 2010, p. 403). 
This is in part because problems of moral imagination and epistemic pitfalls militate against their 
abilities to detect bias against those with intellectual disabilities or, perhaps more frequently, 
uphold bias in favor of a particular view of intellectual normalcy. Further, this general 
unawareness is exacerbated by the relative invisibility of the social processes that help to 
                                                
28 Although her discussion concerns the economically and racially privileged, I find her discussion relevant here to the ability 
privileged. Certainly racism and ableism are not analogous. However, the ways in which racism operates to inhibit epistemic 
reasoning seems to apply to ableism as well.  
29 It’s unfortunate that Anderson uses this term as it doesn’t appear to capture what she means and, in the context of my 
argument, might appear odd. I would use the term “epistemic limitations” or “epistemic pitfalls” instead.  
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produce intellectual disability as a construct and which support the popular regard of intellectual 
disability as a static condition predicting a lack of educability towards specific educational goals. 
 
Conclusion 
It is important to note that in evaluating these assumptions that underpin arguments for 
separate educational aims, I am not denying that bodily differences, differences in intellect, or 
differences in developmental pace, exist. Rather, I am suggesting that how we measure and 
interpret those differences is what constructs intellectual ability and disability and what 
contributes to our justification of separate aims. From the above examples, it is clear that 
philosophical reasoning about the usefulness and justifiability of separate educational aims is 
informed by some existing understanding of ability/disability, of developmental normalcy, and 
of the relationship between educational aims and particular ways of being and doing. This is 
especially clear, as I have shown, when we look at how perceived and assessed disabilities are 
used as justification for students’ exclusion from democratic citizenship aims, even while the 
content of those aims is not subjected to scrutiny. What appears, then, to justify the exclusion of 
children with intellectual disability labels from democratic citizenship aims are actually 
erroneous assumptions about the nature and status of disability, about the relationship between 
disability diagnosis and educational potential, and about the ways in which particular learning 
goals ought to be achieved. These mistakes in reasoning are at least significantly a result of the 
social context of theorizing, which is characterized by negative regard of those labeled with 
intellectual disabilities  
My objective in this chapter has been to question the assumed and unevaluated link 
between the label of intellectual disability and the inability to perform particular learning tasks. 
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This is especially relevant to disrupting the presumed link between the presence of particular 
markers of disability – atypical communication, atypical communicative behavior, putatively 
disrupted processes of reasoning, and so on – and the inability to participate in democratic 
citizenship. In doing so, I also aimed to begin to disrupt the acceptance of notions of normalcy 
and abnormality that underpin many philosophical discussions of intellectual disability. In the 
next chapter I will seek to disrupt notions of normalcy that underpin ideas about what political 
agency looks like. In this current chapter, though, I also hoped to expose the kinds of 
assumptions that are made about the capabilities of those labeled with intellectual disabilities and 
that inform judgments about the justifiability of separate educational aims, including such 
persons’ exemption from democratic citizenship educational opportunities. Clearly we need to 
assess our philosophical reasoning about educational aims in light of the moral hazards that exist 
along an academic and social terrain overwhelmingly unfair and exclusionary of people with 
intellectual disability labels.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
TRANSFORMING THE NORMS OF CIVIC PARTICIPATION 
 
 
Citizenship establishes membership in a national community, confers respect and 
rights on its members, and enables their participation in society’s institutions. As 
such, it is not simply a legal status, but rather a dynamic practice in which 
individuals interactively claim rights in negotiation with other citizens in the 
pursuit of their interests (Carey, 2009, p. 213; my emphasis). 
 
Private activities are not simply just the natural rhythms of biological necessity; 
they also have political implications (Prokhovnik, 1998, p. 85, as quoted in 
Preece, 2002.) 
 
 
Throughout the chapters in this dissertation, my analysis responds to and reframes the 
following question: Who is expected as a citizen? I show that the expected citizens within 
philosophical accounts of democratic citizenship and democratic citizenship education are those 
who conform to able-bodied and able-minded norms of cognition, performance, and civic 
contribution through the possession of particular capacities or the perceived ability to acquire a 
narrow range of competencies. In this chapter, I disconnect the relationship between particular 
capacities and citizenship by arguing that the focus on the able-minded citizen distracts from and 
renders invisible existing and potential expressions of political agency available to those with 
intellectual disabilities. I argue that when our frameworks of democratic citizenship, and the 
pedagogies and curricula that are seen to support individuals’ development as citizens, are 
structured around expecting a range of abilities, we reform not only how we see citizenship and 
civic participation, but also change the norms around what is recognized as citizenship. 
As I have shown, the reliance on problematic and misunderstood ideas about disability, and 
what having a disability entails for individuals’ actual abilities to make civic contributions, 
cannot be sustained. It is unjustified to uncritically rely on a) a view of disability that comes out 
of bias and oppression and b) the implicit assumption that a particular level of able-mindedness 
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is required for citizenship. Further, as I showed in Chapter Three, there are a variety of different 
forms that democratic citizenship takes and activities that it requires. Accordingly, it is possible 
to conceive of democratic citizenship not as corresponding to a narrow range of abilities but 
rather as accounting for the different ways in which individuals express political agency and 
participation. 
This chapter will consist of two main parts: First, I argue that dominant conceptions of 
democratic education support a view of civic participation that does not account for or reflect the 
actual diversity of students’ abilities nor of their social or cultural backgrounds. In other words, 
they are ill-suited to the reality of our actual practices and abilities. This argument follows the 
work of other scholars in education like Alison Jones (1999) and Meira Levinson (2012) who 
point out that dominant forms of civic engagement or democratic exchange may not be suited to 
non-dominant communities and may in fact undermine their potential or willingness to 
participate and be recognized. By narrowing the range of what is considered civic engagement 
and what citizenship looks like, dominant conceptions create a vision of democratic citizenship 
education that upholds unjust norms of ability, as well as an understanding of civic participation 
that is based on dominant group norms. As I discuss, particularly problematic is the narrowing of 
civic forms to those that promote the centrality of public deliberation and rational discourse.  
Second, I argue that the narrowing of democratic forms renders invisible the civic projects of 
non-dominant groups, therefore rendering these activities unintelligible as civic projects. This 
includes, for example, the activities of those requiring significant support or whose activities do 
not fit with a constructed model of normal civic behavior. To counteract this invisibilizing 
tendency, I highlight some examples of the activities of individuals with significant disabilities 
that can be acknowledged as forms of political agency. I discuss why these are in fact examples 
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of civic engagement and why they ought to inform our thinking about what democratic 
citizenship entails. I also describe how people with intellectual disabilities can be supported in 
participating and exercising political agency.  
 
A Transformative Approach to Conceptualizing Political Agency and Participation 
 
In the previous chapters I argued that citizenship and the education that supports it has been 
conceptualized in such a way as to exclude people with intellectual disabilities. As I argued, 
these ability expectations conform to particular ideas about what children ought to be able to do 
and be when they become adult citizens and this involves a view of the adult and the citizen as 
necessarily excluding people with intellectual disabilities. Yet, importantly, this exclusion is 
regarded as a consequence of the necessities of citizenship, rather than as founded in socially 
contingent ideas about what people need to be able to do, or what citizenship and its activities 
actually look like. Therefore, the inability of some children to meet ability expectations is 
assumed as inevitable and their exclusion is regarded as justified by their lack of ability. 
However, neither the ability expectations nor the corresponding norms of participation are 
questioned in light of such exclusions. In other words, neither the understanding of citizenship 
nor the view of disability that inform these conclusions faces scrutiny and the norm of the able-
bodied citizen therefore remains firmly intact.  
Certainly it is important to evaluate the assumptions and philosophical errors of conclusions 
about disablement that I outlined in the previous chapter, especially so as to expand who is 
included in existing projects of civic participation. Yet doing so is nevertheless insufficient to 
create substantive structural and cultural change, or to facilitate the inclusion of those with 
significant intellectual disabilities into projects of civic engagement. Rather, we must focus on 
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dismantling how citizenship is defined in opposition to intellectual disability and how civic 
participation appears to necessitate particular abilities. This requires 1) dismantling the assumed 
connection between typical learning functions (verbal communication, autonomous decision-
making) and desirable learning outcomes (capabilities for civic engagement) and 2) recognizing 
the range of possibilities for participation, including what participation looks like for those with 
significant disabilities. I will spell out these two points in this chapter.  
One way to make clearer the difference between simply correcting errors in judgment and 
attending to deeper problems of exclusion is to point to a distinction made by Nancy Fraser 
(1995) between what she calls “affirmative remedies”30 and “transformative remedies.” While 
affirmative remedies for injustice correct “inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without 
disturbing the underlying framework that generates them,” transformative remedies correct these 
by “restructuring the underlying generative framework” (Fraser, 1995, p. 82). To illustrate the 
difference, Fraser uses the example of mainstream multiculturalism: while mainstream 
multiculturalism revalues those group identities that have been excluded and devalued, it 
nevertheless leaves intact systems of valuation of identity, as well as the social and cultural 
mechanisms through which cultural identities are recognized and organized (such as immigration 
reform, racism and ethnocentrism, and so on) (1995, p. 87-88). We might see how this 
affirmative remedy can operate in schools: multiculturalism aims to recognize and affirm cultural 
differences, bringing students’ identities into the classroom as resources, perhaps. Nevertheless, 
multicultural education can also fail to challenge, and indeed can leave intact, the power 
structures that support continued exclusion (see Ngo, 2010; Sarat, 2008). By contrast, “By 
destabilizing existing group identities and differentiations, [transformative] remedies would not 
                                                
30 Not to be confused with the “affirmative stance” towards inclusion that I discussed in Chapter Two.  
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only raise the self-esteem of members of currently disrespected groups. They would change 
everyone’s sense of belonging, affiliation, and self” (Fraser, 1995, p. 83).  
In the case we are considering – the case of individuals with intellectual disabilities being 
recognized as and educated towards becoming citizens – an affirmative remedy would involve 
evaluating our assumptions about what cognitive or intellectual disability means, perhaps even 
adopting what Miranda Fricker (2007) calls “the virtue of hermeneutical justice:” “…an alertness 
or sensitiviety to the possibility that the difficulty one’s interlocutor is having as she tries to 
render something communicatively intelligible is due not to its being a nonsense or her being a 
fool, but rather to some sort of gap in collective hermeneutical resources” (p. 169).31 It would 
further involve understanding that people with intellectual disabilities are capable, especially 
when supported, of performing a variety of existing tasks related to citizenship – voting, 
participating in public forums, civic activism, and so on. However, such remedies fail to be 
transformative in the relevant sense because they do not require substantive structural change – 
that is, in Fraser’s words, they do not involve restructuring the underlying generative framework. 
Rather, a transformative remedy would involve examining how the very concept of citizenship 
excludes those with intellectual disabilities, or how the structural practices around voting, living 
in the community, sexual or romantic partnership and co-habitation (in short, cultural and social 
belonging) actively participate in the construction of people with intellectual disabilities as 
outside the norm. In this chapter, I begin to spell out what I see as a transformative remedial 
approach to the problems of educational injustice surrounding those with intellectual disabilities. 
 
                                                
31 It is unfortunate (and informative for my discussion) that Fricker uses the term “fool” here. The term fool was used in 
institutional and psychological classification systems to help identify supposed gradations of mental deficiency (Carlson, 2010, p. 
25; p. 92). I have written about the philosophical use of terms associated with cognitive and psychiatric “deficiency” elsewhere 
(A. Taylor, 2015).  
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Learning Functions and the Power of Normal 
My first task is to unsettle the notion of a clearly defined understanding of normal ability 
that remains implicit within views of democratic citizenship education and that prevents 
recognition that individuals with intellectual disabilities have democratic interests and are owed 
opportunities to learn and to exercise those interests. The frameworks of democratic citizenship 
and justice discussed in earlier chapters are fundamentally concerned with what is owed to 
individuals as a matter of justice, how equality is to be understood and negotiated, and how we 
stand in relation to one another as members of the polity. As I have argued, each of these 
conceptions frames a discussion of the place of persons labeled with intellectual disabilities – or 
those seen as lacking particular valued capacities – in terms of what is considered normal or 
typical human ability. Within conceptions of democratic education, we see the same ideas about 
normalcy built in. Frequently, a certain degree of cognitive “normalcy” is assumed; that is, the 
arguments neither reference the existence of differences in ability levels nor reflect on the way 
that their educational frameworks might be exclusionary. Where such references do occur, they 
are usually implicit, as in “educable children,” which implicitly points to a distinction between 
apparently educable and non-educable children that bears on what children are owed and what 
will be provided for them within educational contexts. 
 While it would be tempting to think that normalcy is simply a benign statistical 
measurement, disability studies scholars have painstakingly shown how a reliance on the norm 
actually constructs individuals as capable or incapable, as outside and inside of institutions and 
social belonging, and shapes how our institutions are designed and how education is organized 
and distributed (e.g. Davis, 2006; Garland Thomson, 1997). In other words, normalcy is not 
merely descriptive but prescriptive. It upholds ideas about appropriate levels of independence 
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corresponding to stages of development (childhood, adolescence, adulthood); ideas about energy, 
and what are bodily markers of health and well-being; ideas about what autonomous decision-
making involves and how it is developed; and ideas about appropriate learning pace and mode. 
These ideas do not account for the vast majority of those labeled with disabilities, especially 
developmental, intellectual, and learning disabilities. Further, normalcy extends to a view of 
what normal participation looks like – and includes the reliance on putatively normal ways of 
performing educational tasks.  
What complicates projects of evaluating and resisting normalcy in education – and 
elsewhere – is that the ideology of normalcy operates invisibly. For this reason disability scholar 
Tobin Siebers (2009) argues that despite increasing theoretical understanding of impairment, 
disability identity, and the role of the disabled in society, “the ideology of ability remains largely 
unquestioned” (Siebers, 2009, p. 81). As I have argued, even the term “ableism,”32 which 
disability scholars have introduced to describe the pervasive preference for and privileging of 
putatively normal embodiments and cognitive abilities and the corresponding devaluation of 
disabled bodies or minds (Linton, 1998, p. 9), continues to “elicit scowls and smirks, even in 
progressive society” (Siebers, 2009, p. 81). Indeed, the concept and usage of “ableism” to 
describe and push back against discrimination and marginalization of disabled people perfectly 
illustrates the difficulty of hermeneutical resistance. That is, much like how recognition of sexual 
harassment was enabled by the introduction of this new term and accompanying concept, the 
recognition of discrimination against people with disabilities is enabled by the use of the term 
“ableism” and the concepts of oppression that accompany it. Nevertheless, in both cases the 
process of hermeneutical change is difficult and slow, often placing demands on those who resist 
                                                
32 Bob Bogdan and Doug Biklen (1977) introduced the term “handicapism,” defined as “a set of assumptions and practices that 
promote the differential and unequal treatment of people because of apparent or assumed physical, mental, or behavioral 
differences” (p. 14).   
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oppression to face intense scrutiny and criticism. Of course, we need only to look at well-
documented historical examples I described in the previous chapter to see how it is not only the 
overt discrimination and prejudicial treatment of disabled people, but also the long-standing 
acceptance and defense of particular norms of behavior, performance, and communication that 
dictate who and what is recognized and heard. Thus, the social and epistemic context sorts how 
individuals’ experiences are recognized and made intelligible.  
The “ideology of ability” (Siebers, 2009) supports the assumption that certain abilities are 
necessary for the proper achievement of particular educational aims. This follows the 
construction that, for example, because one cannot (or is perceived or assessed to be unable) to 
communicate verbally, then one must be unable to achieve particular democratic citizenship 
aims. This assumption is based in a misguided understanding of the relationship between one’s 
diagnosis with disability and/or the attendant difficulties an individual experiences and the 
educational, social, or indeed political/civic outcomes these are seen to entail. Here the 
assumption is that a real or perceived lack of competence in some particular area or areas renders 
one unable to achieve particular educational aims. For example, the ability to deliberate 
effectively is often described as a necessary component of democratic citizenship aims (Callan, 
1997; Gutmann, 1987; Hanson and Howe, 2011). For the most part, deliberation is understood as 
involving the ability to verbally communicate, a capacity that not all individuals possess. If 
verbal communication is deemed necessary for deliberation, and deliberation is fundamental to 
democratic citizenship, then democratic citizenship aims would seem to leave non-verbal (or 
ineffectively/inefficiently verbal) individuals outside of such aims (Clifford, 2012). It is here that 
alternative aims would be suggested, as accords with the deferral stance. In this case, then, we 
can see that ability expectations are not abstract, but rather quite specified and rigid.  
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The assumption, then, that certain abilities (tasks associated with deliberation) are 
necessary for the proper achievement of particular educational aims (democratic citizenship) 
involves the belief that particular competencies are revealed in particular ways (through verbal 
communication in the example above) or at a pace of development considered normal. Again, 
these assumptions arise from the expectation that children perform particular learning tasks in 
normatively expected ways, an expectation, as I have argued, that can actually deter students’ 
use and development of more educationally efficient functionings (see Hehir, 2002; A. Taylor, 
2012). Thomas Hehir (2002) has documented how norms – or “ableist preferences” – are 
particularly apparent in schooling:  
 
From an ableist perspective, the devaluation of disability results in societal attitudes that 
uncritically assert that it is better for a child to walk than roll, speak than sign, read print 
than read Braille, spell independently than use a spell-check, and hang out with 
nondisabled kids as opposed to other disabled kids, etc. In short, in the eyes of many 
educators and society, it is preferable for disabled students to do things in the same 
manner as nondisabled kids (p. 3).  
 
For example, children who have reading-related learning difficulties are often steered away from 
listening to voice-recordings, while autistic children are expected to learn to communicate 
verbally, even when it is often far more beneficial for them to learn to type to communicate 
(Rubin et al., 2001). As I have argued elsewhere (A. Taylor, 2012), these ableist preferences in 
functioning can lead schools to expressly or tacitly steer disabled children into developing ways 
of being and doing that resemble what is deemed “normal” or “typical,” including those 
associated with democratic participation or career-readiness (see also Hehir, 2002). The failure to 
look towards alternative modes of communication or approaches to learning and assessment is 
often simply a result of educators’ and theorists’ adherence to particular ideas about human 
functioning and what is considered developmentally normal (see Franklin & Sloper, 2009).  
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The practice of preferencing particular ways of being and doing, however, raises 
important ethical questions in addition to the practical concerns surrounding what is most 
efficient for learning and instruction. In many cases, in fact, much class time is spent trying to 
alter the disability to resemble more normal functioning, taking away from time spent on 
academic learning and possibly compounding educational deficits that children experience 
(Hehir, 2002, p. 4-5). Further, the resources – teacher and teaching assistant time and energy, 
student energy and focus – spent on this normalizing effort can involve unnecessarily (and 
unethically) taking resources away from other aspects of learning for all children. And finally, it 
can deprive all children – and not just the child who performs learning tasks in non-dominant 
ways – of the potential to learn in different ways and according to different expectations of pace, 
form, and support. It may in fact be unethical, then, to promote normalized functionings over 
atypical functionings when and because it undermines the quality of education for both labeled 
and non-labeled children.  
 
Normalcy, Respect, and Political Agency 
The construction of normal ability can be seen in how dominant philosophical 
conceptions of democratic citizenship and frameworks of justice more broadly have worked to 
construct borders and boundaries around who is and who is not disabled, who possesses 
“normal” cognitive capacities or abilities and who does not, and who is capable of participating 
in democratic decision-making and who is not. According to these, democratic citizens have 
certain capacities, such as the capacity for verbal communication, the capacity for unsupported 
reasoning, or the capacity for independent voting. Such capacities are those possessed by, in 
John Rawls’s (2001) words, those who fall in the “normal range” over the course of their life.  In 
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response to this almost tyranny of normal ability, disability studies scholars have attempted to 
deconstruct the idea of normalcy and normal functioning, to point out how disability and even 
impairment are socially constructed, and to demonstrate how we rely – culturally, socially, 
politically – on ingrained normalized ideas about communication, behavior, independence, and 
agency in forming our understanding democratic membership, civic participation, and, indeed, 
human belonging.  
The effort to normalize children could be understood as an attempt to bring them 
recognition and respect, especially when we see assimilation as an avenue to this respect. In 
other words, we might conclude that one way to ameliorate the problem of exclusion of 
individuals with intellectual disabilities from democratic citizenship aims is to find ways – if 
possible – to help them perform in socially valued roles. This is difficult, though, when disability 
itself is defined in terms of “abnormal” functioning and the expectation of conformity to normal 
functioning is in part an attempt to eliminate or minimize disability expression in the classroom; 
inclusion through assimilation. While, as Anita Silvers (2003) points out, “The desirability of 
familiar ways of functioning should be an open question for debate” (p. 475), this philosophical 
point is rarely persuasive when concerns arise over children’s immediate well-being and “fitting-
in.” What relationship exists, then, between normalization and respect? 
The debate about whether children with disabilities should be encouraged to develop 
behaviors and activities that are considered normal certainly occupies traditional special 
education researchers and educators who are particularly concerned with ensuring that children 
develop specific socially adaptive skills and have opportunities for social and economic success. 
Such behaviors and adaptive skills are regarded as instrumental to adult success and to 
promoting respect and recognition within existing social contexts. Erving Goffman showed in 
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Asylums (1961) that while institutions support individuals’ development of institutionally-
adaptive behaviors, they also support behaviors that are fundamentally incompatible with non-
institutional – or civil – life. This is because the behaviors of conformity, acquiescence, and 
epistemic deference are inconsistent with political agency defined in terms of independence and 
autonomy. Such a realization would therefore seem to support the necessity for integration if 
individuals with disabilities are to develop “normal” behaviors. Wolf Wolfensberger (1972, 
2000), and proponents of self-determination theory (e.g. Wehmeyer & Palmer, 2003; Palmer et 
al., 2004) have advanced the potential for the acquisition of socially valued behaviors to increase 
persons’ with disabilities chances for social integration and valorization. The idea here is that if 
children and adults learn to display behaviors associated with socially valuable dispositions and 
character traits – honesty, maturity, attentiveness, self-control – then more competence will be 
attributed to them and they will have an easier time positioning themselves within communities 
and workplaces; in short, they will come to exhibit more socially valuable behaviors and occupy 
more valued social roles. Within some frameworks – notably Social Role Valorization – this 
process has been extended even to the ways in which disabled people dress or the ways in which 
they communicate (Wolfensberger, 1972).  
Another example of the effort to encourage socially adaptive behavior and skills in 
labeled individuals is the teaching of self-determination skills to students with learning, 
developmental, and intellectual disabilities. This educational practice is aimed at promoting 
adaptive behaviors in students as well as the dispositions that promote such behaviors – 
assertiveness, independence, self-advocacy and self-representation, creativity, and so on. Special 
educational researchers often cite the development of the skills of self-determination as 
improving the post K-12 outcomes for students with such disabilities, in particular their 
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transition to college programs, workplaces, and more independent living (Wehmeyer & Palmer, 
2003; Durlack, Rose, & Bursuck, 1994). Indeed, the Individuals with Disabilities in Education 
Act (IDEA) recognizes the development of such skills as part of the Individualized Education 
Plan (IEP) and transition planning (Cowley & Bacon, 2013; Seong et al., 2014). Self-
determination skills place the emphasis on those behaviors that are regarded as demonstrative of 
underlying dispositions because these are the source of future adaptation to adult life.  
Of course special educators are not alone in their concern about children’s development 
of socially adaptive and opportunity-enhancing behaviors and skills: character education, college 
and career-readiness curricula, and so on are all about helping children to develop socially 
adaptive skills. We can also recognize that this is a fundamental part of parenting: socialization. 
However, socialization and normalization are not the same. Where the former emphasizes the 
development of socially adaptive behavior and skills as desirable, the other makes these 
behaviors and skills necessary. The difference between them can, in part, be measured by the 
degree of harm the preferencing for normal behaviors and modes of communication do to a 
child. This harm can be illustrated in the story of Shana, an African-American woman with 
cerebral palsy and vision impairment whose experiences in special education counter a view that 
the teaching of self-determination skills are beneficial. Amy J. Peterson (2009) recounts:  
Yet as I listened to Shana share her story, I realized that while she had received a “life 
skills” curriculum centered on teaching the perceived skills needed to live and work 
independently, her experiences did not entirely resemble self-determination as a 
democratic ethos. Although the legal requirements had been met, I was less certain that 
Shana had been afforded and supported in opportunities to exert authority, autonomy or 
responsibility over her life. There appeared to be a disjuncture between the skills Shana 
learned and the opportunities she had to use the skills in a manner that would support 
self-determination as a democratic outcome….Further illuminating one of the quandaries 
of self-determination, Shana was taught a few select skills and encouraged to enact them 
only in pre-selected environments. For example, she was taught to fill out job 
applications but allowed to apply for one predetermined job. Thus, while her curriculum 
focused on the teaching of skills to live independently, she was routinely denied the 
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opportunity to make daily decisions for herself, exemplifying “the paradox of 
empowerment and control” (Brewer, 2002, p. 39) (n.p.). 
 
Shana’s experience is shaped not by an effort to empower her through learning socially-adaptive 
skills, but rather to support her transition into pre-determined and circumscribed adult contexts. 
Interestingly, self-determination theory is in principle focused on enabling students to develop 
freedom, autonomy and responsibility through person-directed and person-centered pedagogical 
practice. However, as the story of Shana above illustrates, and as Amy J. Peterson (2009), 
Danielle M. Cowley and Jessica K. Bacon (2013), and Phil Smith and Christie Routel (2009) 
have pointed out, self-determination practices in schools and transition services have focused 
largely on the acquisition of individualized self-management and character skills rather than self-
actualization. While Shana is taught particular skills related to integration into adult life, she is 
likewise offered a very circumscribed opportunity to act independently and is denied agency in 
many aspects of her life. Thus, self-determination can actually emphasize normalization over the 
development of capabilities for democratic participation when and because normalization is 
regarded as better facilitating integration even at the expense of freedom, choice, and respect.  
 One could argue that self-determination practice is simply being misused and misapplied 
when it does not enact the democratic principles upon which it is based. The point, though, is 
that the focus on skills first undermines the fact that self-determination is fundamentally about a 
basic human entitlement, and not only a set of skills (see Smith & Routel, 2009); in other words, 
the development of skills is important to the realization of values of self-determination but self-
determination cannot be reduced to the acquisition of a set of skills. One’s right to self-determine 
– to participate in decision-making about one’s own life, to shape the sorts of relationships, 
living experiences, and care that one receives – is simply an entitlement one has in virtue of 
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one’s membership in the human community (see Tisdall, 1994, for discussion). To focus 
exclusively on the development of skills turns the whole philosophical concept of self-
determination on its head because it focuses our attention away from creating the social bases of 
freedom and civic empowerment. The point here is not to say that skills are unimportant: there 
would be something rather confusing about asserting this in the context of a project that is so 
concerned about learning outcomes as structural inclusion. Rather, it is to say that we not lose 
sight of the democratic goals of self-determination. Focusing on these democratic aims allows us 
to understand that there are different skill sets that create opportunities for realizing self-
determination and that self-determination is not an individualistic but rather a relational concept. 
The view that self-determination is a relational practice and concept shifts the locus of 
responsibility away from labeled individuals to prove their capacities and onto all us to support 
their agency.  
Nevertheless, it is easy to see how, in the absence of the surety that people with 
intellectual disabilities are seen as human (see Carlson, 2010; A. Taylor, 2012) – and therefore 
entitled to membership in the human community in the first place – this right to self-determine is 
in jeopardy. The emphasis on normalization at the expense of actual empowerment is 
exacerbated by the fact that self-determination is enacted within educational contexts shaped by 
not only ableism – and the preferencing of particular abilities – but also of racism and the 
corresponding requirements of “acting white” and integrating into white society. Say Smith and 
Routel (2009), for students of color who have disabilities, “the failure of transitional supports is 
even more dismal than for those in dominant culture, further evidence that foundational 
constructs on which transition services are based – self-determination and independence – are 
culturally created and mediated” (n.p.). In other words, self-determination’s core concepts – 
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independence, autonomy, freedom – are not, as we saw in Chapter Three, universal ones but 
rather understood according to a dominant economic, political, and cultural milieu. Thus, while 
self-determination practice is intended towards increasing labeled students’ self-empowerment, 
when it is shaped by normalization about function and performance – and by a dominant culture 
at odds with individuals’ experiences – it can not only disempower students but detract from 
their abilities to learn to become activists on their own and others’ behalf.  Put simply, it does not 
amount to a transformative remedy for the problem of civic exclusion that we are looking at.  
These examples illustrate that the effort to encourage valued capabilities in labeled 
individuals can steer educators to neglect the transformative intentions of projects that are aimed 
towards political agency and empowerment. This is not only a problem of practice, however, it is 
also more fundamentally a problem of focusing too heavily on existing idealized forms of 
political agency at the expense of more inclusive forms.  
 
Civic Participation and Standards of Normalcy 
As we have seen, ideas about normal human functioning, as well as about normal levels 
of cognitive ability and modes of communication, are part of the construction of who can 
become a citizen. Just as the status of citizen is conceptualized according to standards of 
normalcy, so too are the activities of the citizen. In fact, the power of normalcy becomes quite 
clear when we consider how civic participation is conceptualized and then recognized within 
social and educational contexts.  
As I explained in Chapter Three, ideas about what constitutes civic engagement and civic 
activities are neither uniform nor universal. Rather, they depend not only upon the particular 
democratic “stance” one endorses but also upon the cultural and social norms around citizenship 
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that exist. A deliberative democratic stance, as the most esteemed among (liberal) educational 
theorists, conceptualizes civic engagement in terms of particular discursive and communicative 
relationships among citizens. However, when examined more closely, we can see how cultural 
and social norms permeate the apparent desirability and neutrality of deliberative aims.   
In her work on the civic engagement gap between racially marginalized groups and 
racially dominant groups, Meira Levinson (2012) describes how dominant norms of civic 
engagement cohere with dominant cultural and racial groups. As a result, the civic participation 
of minority group students is not always recognized as such, nor are the behaviors, knowledge, 
and skills consistent with an individuals’ home culture or racial background understood as forms 
of civic engagement. Levinson describes how civics assessments like that contained in the 
National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) tend not to evaluate students’ knowledge 
of those political events that may be inconsequential to dominant group members but essential to 
the experience of marginalized groups (2012, p. 32). For example, African American students 
might care deeply about the election controversy surrounding the 2000 presidential election in 
the United States while white students remain largely unaware (Levinson, 2012, p. 32). For many 
African American students, this event and others represent important moments of civic rupture 
that shape the political fabric of their lives. We can imagine, moreover, that aboriginal or First 
Nations students in Canada are likely to know a lot more about land treaty politics or the history 
of residential schools than are their white peers simply because these experiences shape 
aboriginal families’ narratives and histories (see Sinclair, 2004). At the same time, the popular 
regard among white Canadians is that aboriginal rights activist groups like Idle No More are 
disruptive, ineffective, and unjustified in their efforts (Ipsos-Reid, 2013). In this climate, how are 
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aboriginal and First Nations students to understand such activities of protest as acts of civic 
engagement? 
It is not only what is recognized as relevant civic knowledge that is at stake, but also the 
sorts of skills and behaviors that students develop within their own cultural, racial, or class 
communities. To follow the above example, aboriginal students’ conceptions of what it means to 
be civically engaged are likely to differ from how new immigrants’ define this engagement. 
What is recognized as forms of civic participation depends, therefore, on social norms that are 
racialized such that some ways that cultural communities engage in activism, protest, and other 
forms of resistance are not counted or are seen as counter to social stability and civic belonging. 
Says Levinson, “Tests and surveys also tend to assess skills associated with conventional forms 
of political participation, rather than young people’s skills in avoiding altercations with the 
transit police or in negotiating with public housing officials to fix chronically neglected public 
spaces” (2012, p. 32-33). When students are not encouraged to recognize these competencies as 
politically adaptive or as relevant to being a citizen in our existing social world, it is not only that 
their lived realities are not recognized, but that they are further discouraged from seeing 
themselves as part of the political community at all.   
Dominant expectations surrounding what civic participation looks like can prevent young 
people from having equal opportunity to become active citizens both because it discourages 
knowledge and behaviors perhaps vital to their cultural identities and because it requires their 
conformity to dominant (and often ineffective) ways of expressing political agency. These 
expectations contribute to what Levinson calls the “civic engagement gap.” In my estimation, 
this civic engagement gap exists for people with disabilities (although it is manifest differently) 
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and arises through the disjuncture between disabled students’ modes of participation and those 
modes of engagement that are expected and valorized.  
A clear example of this disjuncture can be seen in how children’s resistance behaviors are 
read and understood either as bad acts or evidence of pathology (Danforth, 2007; Orsati & 
Causton-Theoharis, 2013). Certainly some children’s acting out or exhibiting “challenging 
behavior” disrupts the flow of the classroom activity centered around academic learning. 
However, rather than understand this behavior as evidence of a child’s unease, frustration, or 
resistance to activities, or indeed to understand this behavior as a form of communication, typical 
educator and institutional responses pathologize that behavior, locating it as a deficiency of the 
child rather than the schooling environment (Danforth, 2007; Orsati & Causton-Theoharis, 
2013). When read through a critical disability studies lens, however, these behaviors (while 
apparently maladaptive within existing educational contexts) can be understood also as 
expressing characteristics of social and political agency – namely resistance to power, 
questioning of authority, negotiation of one’s environment, and so on. Furthermore, as I have 
discussed, many individuals whose lives are restricted by institutionalization (or semi-
institutionalization in group homes) or by guardianship relationships find ways to adapt to the 
circumstances of their lack of freedom. For women especially this adaptation can take the form 
of exaggerated dependency (Cowley & Bacon, 2013); it is a highly adaptive thing to do to be 
docile and compliant when one receives rewards for doing so. Interestingly, however, this kind 
of activity actually disproves that such individuals lack the potential to act as political agents on 
their own behalf.  
In addition to the exercise of political agency looking different for young people with 
significant disabilities, this political agency might be a lot more localized than is regularly 
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expected and accepted in dominant conceptions of political participation. For example, for some 
students, their home and home life or school and school life might constitute a significant portion 
of their social world. The effort to assert control and authority with these realms might simply 
appear about personal dynamics. However, when read through an affirmative stance – that is, the 
effort to presume that political competencies are present – these activities can suggest evidence 
of and potentiality for political agency.  
Still another example can be seen in Anita Franklin and Patricia Sloper’s (2009) study of 
children’s involvement in decision-making. Franklin and Sloper (2009) describe how the reliance 
on able-bodied norms of performance occurs in relation to educators’ attempts to involve 
children with disabilities in decision-making. They observed that educators tended to rely on an 
idealized definition and understanding of participation wherein participation in decision-making 
looked a certain way: 
There sometimes appeared to be a notion that anything less than a child taking part in a 
review meeting and contributing to complex decision-making processes was not valid. 
For example, when the views of children with learning difficulties had been sought, it 
might have been at a level of ‘what I like’ and ‘what I do not like’ about respite, and this 
was sometimes viewed as limited, with a few social workers questioning its validity 
(Franklin & Sloper, 2009, p. 7)  
 
Further, Franklin and Sloper describe how the most attention was placed on children who were 
considered easiest to teach – meaning the least disruptive, requiring the least support – and 
whose ability to communicate was read as highest (2009, p. 6-7). Such an orientation towards 
participation in decision-making obscures the reality that such participation is a continuum of 
different levels of engagement and support. This research seems to suggest that education 
towards this kind of participation in activities important to democratic participation (civic 
practice) depends a lot on how educators understand and define that participation. Further, it 
explains (although it does not justify) some of the conclusions about exclusive educational aims 
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that we discussed earlier – that is, why theorists might be quicker to rely on the need for separate 
aims and expectations. 
Individuals with physical, intellectual, and developmental disabilities often require 
significant (albeit varying) levels of support to exercise political agency. This can take the form 
of considerable investment from caregivers, teachers, and even peers in carefully listening, 
explaining, and assisting in making informed choices. For example, it may take a lot of work 
from teachers and teaching aides, as well as student peers, to listen patiently and carefully to 
someone who needs significant support in communicating their thoughts and opinions. Or, it 
may take a lot of work on the part of caregivers, family members, and teachers working together 
to scaffold a process of informed and autonomous decision-making on the part of the individual 
with significant disability. It is actually hard to imagine something more fundamentally 
democratic than the collaborative efforts that are involved in supported decision-making, 
including circles of support. This work is necessary if people with significant disabilities are 
going to be substantively included in democracy and if their participation is to be recognized. If 
we are invested in educational justice then we must recognize that this is the sort of investment 
that is going to be required. 
These examples suggest that citizenship, political agency, and democratic participation 
are states that are done and undone within schools and community life, rather than states of 
development. The practices of creating and sustaining political agency require relationships of 
care and support. Of course one could object at this point that such a level of investment is too 
demanding on schools that already face limited and often scarce resources. But not all of these 
investments make demands on scarce resources and, in fact, inclusive practices could, in theory, 
mitigate the need for increased resource expenditure. This is because, as I pointed out earlier, 
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schools often promote normative but academically inefficient teaching practices and learning 
modes or demonstrations of learning (Hehir, 2002). As I discussed in Chapter Two, educational 
considerations of distributive justice have tended to focus on educational resources that are finite 
and on weighing the needs of all students relative to the attainment of valued educational aims. 
However, it is possible to imagine that justice considerations of resource allocation and 
educational distribution change in light of inclusive education practice that is truly integrated 
into schools’ curricula and instructional practices. Rather than understanding inclusive aims as 
generating the need for increased resource expenditure, we can understand inclusive aims as 
generating the need for reformed educational practice and attitudes towards students’ differences. 
The embracing of students’ differences in intellectual and communicative ability necessitates 
educational practices that avoid pushing students towards normalized (but frequently 
academically inefficient) behaviors, modes of communication, and modes of learning. Factors of 
integrated inclusive practice that mitigate the need for increased expenditure on students with 
disabilities could include: a) the role of natural supports among children in learning; b) the 
integration of special education teacher and teacher aide resources into the classroom 
(cooperative and co-teaching); and c) the recognition and support of alternative modes of 
communication and performance. Furthermore, while such a conception of inclusive practices 
does not eliminate the problem of scarce resources (educational technology, teacher attention, 
remedial support), these can be understood as generating benefits for all students, rather than 
only those with the most significant needs. The point here is that philosophical debates about 
educational distribution ought to factor in the extent to which inclusive practice mitigates worries 
about weighing the needs of all students or unfairly spending too much on students with 
disabilities. In fact, if discussions about distributive justice take place only from a standpoint of 
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traditional models of special education instruction, then they will continue to promote the view 
that children with disabilities are problems.  
Expectations around putatively normal communication, independence, and behavior 
shape what activities are intelligible as civic projects. The political agency of people with 
intellectual disabilities may be harder to recognize by dominant group able-bodied/able-minded 
people for a variety of reasons, including the ideology of normalcy and attendant anxieties 
surrounding expectations of ability (Clifford Simplican, 2015). Some forms of participation 
simply do not fit within our hermeneutical frames regarding citizenship and this can prompt a 
dismissive response from educational and political theorists or practitioners. As long as 
citizenship is synonymous with independence, autonomy, rationality, and so on, it cannot 
accommodate the sorts of dependency and cognitive differences that people with intellectual 
disabilities embody. A narrow definition of participation is therefore problematic because it 
tacitly privileges the able-bodied and able-minded by upholding standards of normalcy. Further, 
a narrow definition fails to represent the actual ways in which people participate in the 
democratic/civic sphere, including those with significant disabilities. This narrowing therefore 
renders some forms of participation invisible as civic projects. 
 
The Narrowing of Democratic Participation  
As I stated in Chapter Three, existing models of democratic education express 
expectations of ability that do not generally account for the capabilities of those with intellectual 
disabilities and that are based in able-bodied and minded norms of communication, social 
behavior, and democratic participation. This is especially apparent in those models that are based 
in deliberative democratic values of communicative reciprocity, which appear ill-suited to 
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including people with intellectual disabilities and those who experience putatively abnormal 
modes of communication (such as non-verbal communication). In preferencing these abilities, 
these models may disadvantage people with intellectual disabilities in several ways, some of 
which are specific to those with such disabilities and some that are true of all oppressed groups. 
In fact, it is also the case that deliberation has been criticized as potentially alienating and 
harmful to people of color (Blackwell, 2010; Levinson, 2003). Because of norms and standards 
of communication that privilege the able-bodied, and the emphasis on communicative reciprocity 
grounded in rationality and autonomy, people with intellectual disabilities and other disabilities 
affecting communication or comprehension are left on the margins of citizenship by the 
deliberative model. Further, because of its emphasis on the norms of reasonableness and 
dispassion as well as on the requirements of open-mindedness and “civic magnanimity” 
(McGregor, 2004, p. 95), democratic deliberation may actually place unfair demands on those 
who lack power or undermine the authority of those whose lived experience differs from the 
dominant norms (see Ellsworth, 1989; Levinson, 2003; McGregor, 2004). Indeed, deliberative 
democratic conceptions, because they emphasize this reciprocity in reasons-giving exchange, 
presuppose that all parties possess the same level of recognition and influence. It also 
presupposes a degree of what Levinson calls “social trust” among parties in the exchange (2012, 
p. 37). This includes the belief that your views will be taken into consideration and assessed not 
in light of others’ standards of reasonableness, but in light of the standards of reasonableness that 
arise from your particular experiences.  
To illustrate, let me develop an example based on what Levinson (2003) rhetorically calls 
the view of “minority ‘extremism’” (p. 27). Levinson argues that “Because of different life 
experiences or other cultural differences, members of a minority group may put forward claims 
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about a common interest (such as community protection through policing) that appeal to 
common norms, and that seem totally mundane from that group’s perspective, yet seem 
absolutely extreme from the majority group’s perspective” (2003, p. 29). Levinson uses the 
example of black Americans’ distrust in certain state-mandated medical programs, such as 
immunizations or HIV treatment drugs. From the perspective of white Americans, this may seem 
like an extreme, even irrational distrust; however, when understood through a history that 
includes state-sponsored drug research programs such as the Tuskegee syphilis experiment or 
birth-control pill and injection testing on Latina, indigenous, black, and poor women (see 
Washington, 2008), this distrust is not only proportional, it is rational.  
Similarly, such apparent extremism may arise when an able-bodied person is confronted 
with a disabled person’s offense at an innocent and heartfelt offer for assistance, as in the case of 
opening a door for a wheelchair-user, or finishing the sentence of a person with slow speech. 
Adam Cureton (2014) suggests that if we understand these as cases of “offensive beneficence,” 
rather than simple offers of help, it changes our standards of what is considered reasonable from 
that epistemic and social vantage point. It may be the case, for example, that an able-bodied 
individual’s offer to help is well-intended and not intentionally disrespectful or undermining. 
Nevertheless, the disabled individuals’ frustrated and even offended response to it is 
understandable and justified. The worry, overall, is that because differences in interpretive and 
experiential frames not only track differences in social and physical experience but also 
imbalances in power – that is, the power one has to affect social discourse and social meanings – 
then deliberation may unfairly and indeed unjustly favor the powerful. Because of these 
concerns, deliberative democracy has therefore been criticized as unable to account for the 
differences in power experienced by social groups and how these affect the possibilities for 
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deliberation (Ellsworth, 1989; Levinson, 2003). The problem is certainly further compounded 
when troubled not just by the lack of understanding or attentive/careful listening that comes from 
being in a position of racial or gender power, but also the lack of understanding or careful 
listening that comes when one is in a position of able-bodied privilege. There are frequent 
examples of talking past, finishing sentences, pretending to understand to avoid embarrassment, 
and so on that actually amount to a systematic abuse of power and failure to listen to those with 
disabilities (See Redley & Weinberg, 2007; A. Taylor, 2010).  
Even so, democratic deliberation represents a much praised and indeed quite promising 
form of democratic engagement, favored by many scholars of democratic education. It is, 
however, a rather idealized form of engagement and the norms of deliberative communication 
may not adequately represent our most frequent forms of decision-making or working across 
differences. Of course, deliberation is not the only form of decision-making going on in the 
political democratic world and “[p]olitics has other values in addition to, and often in tension 
with, reason: passion, commitment, solidarity, courage, and competitiveness” (Walzer, 1999, p. 
59). In many ways, the idea that we can all reason together in processes of deliberation is 
impractical, according to Michael Walzer (1999), and we may do better to acknowledge existing 
forms of civic participation, including mobilizing, demonstration, bargaining, negotiating, and so 
on. Similarly, Emily Robertson (2009) argues that the role of citizen in a liberal democracy 
actually requires the ability to participate in multiple practices for determining social goods and 
values, or for working through differences. Robertson emphasizes the sphere of “civil society,” 
or the political domain that extends beyond the sphere of the state to broader social and political 
associations. She says, “Including civil society and everyday talk generates a more robust 
domain for consideration without supposing that all citizens will have opportunities to be 
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decision-makers in the narrow sense” (2009; p. 116). This account acknowledges two important 
elements of concerns over models of democratic participation. First, that such philosophical 
models often promote a rather narrow vision of democratic participation that is removed from 
how existing practices take place – that is, it promotes an unnecessarily and perhaps unfairly 
idealistic picture of what democratic participation looks like. Second, it suggests that democratic 
participation – including decision-making – need not be regarded narrowly; in fact, there are 
many forms that such participation can take.  
Descriptions of democratic deliberation  – and the dialogic exercise they require – 
frequently sound quite foreign to our commonplace way of thinking about how democratic 
practice actually takes shape. When we think about our role in the political process, we think 
about casting a vote, perhaps sending a letter to our governmental representative, campaigning 
for or otherwise supporting a political party, or perhaps signing a petition or sending a tweet. We 
may also think about volunteering at the local food bank or animal shelter, protesting the closure 
of our local library, or tending a community garden. We don’t, I think, tend to think of ourselves 
sitting together with diverse others, debating over what constitutes the good life or the good 
society, or even what sorts of policies our local government should enact. Perhaps this sounds 
wonderful to some of us, but to others it likely sounds like a waste of time, or seems unlikely to 
happen given our busy lives and the logistical nightmare doing so would entail. Certainly some 
of these dialogic activities might take place on a more localized scale – we might take part in 
citizens’ volunteer or advocacy groups, the PTA council, etc. Whether we see a relationship 
between these activities and the broader political process is going to depend, most likely, on 
whether we see these as effective politically and the scale of that influence. However, it is 
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unlikely that most of us see these exercises as the only or even the most preferred form of civic 
engagement.  
Jane Mansbridge (1999) suggests that deliberative theorists are far too narrow in their 
descriptions of and attention to deliberative practices, usually emphasizing formal deliberation in 
public arenas (binding decisions) rather than informal conversations or discussions in the public 
sphere, even in private life (non-binding decision-making perhaps). She argues it is the 
“everyday talk” among citizens on matters of public concern that actually informs and enables 
governmental decisions (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 212). An example is the snort of derision a 
woman might have while watching a sexist television show. This “political act” tells her intimate 
others that something is not acceptable to her, thus entering it in as a topic of concern (1999, p. 
214). One can imagine the significance of this act, perhaps, in relation to her children and their 
development of a political consciousness. Similarly, we might imagine a man’s refusal to come 
out his room for dinner as a political act within the context of a rigid and undemocratic group 
home life. Interestingly, Mansbridge’s interpretation of these private statements and activities as 
political acts seems to show that deliberation does not obey the public-private divide. Thus, this 
“deliberative system” – which includes everything from governmental decisions to everyday talk 
– includes formal and informal sharing of ideas and public and private discussion of matters of 
public concern (health care is an example). Argues Mansbridge, everyday talk differs from more 
formal deliberation only in degree and not in kind (1999, p. 227-8). Her point is to emphasize the 
array of different deliberative actions in which each of us is engaged, rather than be beholden to 
a set of deliberative norms that do not well describe our actual ways of engaging in public 
discussion.  
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Mansbridge’s views highlight that discussion is an important form of civic engagement, 
but it does not usually take the abstract form of formalized deliberation and debate. Further, 
everyday talk is a much more universalized and universalizable understanding of civic 
engagement through discussion: that things change because we listen to and learn from others 
need not presuppose a particular arena or format. John S. Dryzek (2000) similarly laments the 
neglect of non-governmental institutional deliberation – that is, deliberation in the public sphere 
rather than in formal government. He suggests that ignoring this everyday public discussion has 
the effect of removing the value of deliberation in the first place. What he calls the “deliberative 
turn” in democratic theory is the weakening of the criticality of deliberative democracy and an 
emphasis on accommodation to rather than contestation of the liberal political system (Dryzek, 
2000, p. 20). Leaving the liberal political system unchallenged, however, ignores how 
discussions and debates take place within the so-called public sphere and how social norms and 
dominant ideologies and discourses are perpetuated through such extra-governmental 
deliberation. It also allows us to maintain a view of the citizen as abstracted from social contexts, 
life commitments and racialized, gendered, classed, and abled norms of participation in 
democratic life. Iris Marion Young (2001) suggests that it is precisely because of these social 
constraints and hegemonic discourses that calls for social activism as part of a healthy 
democracy are required. Challenging hegemonic norms and discourses – such as male 
dominance, racial privilege, able-bodied preferencing, etc. – demands a rupture rather than an 
affirmation of traditional communicative means (Young, 2001, p. 687).  
The point here is first that civic engagement through idealized deliberation need not be 
understood as the only or indeed the most important form of civic engagement, and, secondly, 
that regarding the political significance of everyday talk decenters the abstract notion of 
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deliberation and accounts for the diverse ways that individuals, within their social and cultural 
communities, engage in discursive contestation of matters of civic import, like sexism, or 
economic inequality, or health care decisions. For people with intellectual disabilities – who are 
often prevented from forming relationships beyond their residential community – these points of 
contact can be extremely important in their exercise of political and other forms of agency (see 
Cushing & Lewis, 2002; Kjellberg, 2002). However, if we focus only on these forms of 
discussion-based civic engagement, we neglect the concerns I raised earlier around the ways that 
deliberation ignores or fails to account for differences in social power. This is because we face 
interpersonal problems upheld by power – like the feeling that another’s views are unreasonable 
because we don’t share their experience, or because we regard their speech as incomprehensible, 
or because their behavior appears to belie their disinterest, etc. We also face more systemic 
problems – like the fact of housing and community segregation (racial and around disability) or 
power differentials in who is required to listen that are sustained by class differences, gender 
differences, racial differences, and ability differences.  
Recognizing, then, that deliberation is not the only form of democratic participation that 
objectively has value and that is given value in our society, Robertson (2008, 2009) outlines 
political activities of deliberation, bargaining, and social activism, and defends the place of these 
latter two both within democracy and within democratic education. Learning the skills of 
bargaining, for example, may teach students to engage in conflict resolution, just as it requires a 
degree of interdependence as parties learn to negotiate with one another (Robertson, 2009, p. 
120). Moreover, social activism is often a necessary political practice when existing social 
institutions and arrangements, otherwise supported by deliberative practice, are unjust. Where 
deliberation might leave such arrangements unchallenged, even perpetuate them through 
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deliberative communicative norms, social activism is aimed at disrupting the status quo. Says 
Robertson, each of these has its place in the “repertoire of a democratic citizen” (2009, p. 124).  
This broadening of our understanding of the deliberative arena as well as the scope of 
what is considered democratic participation certainly does appear to make room for the modes of 
engagement, including everyday talk, personal and political activism and resistance, bargaining 
and negotiation that occur between people with intellectual disabilities and their families, friends, 
colleagues, care staff, and so on. However, these intimate expressions of preference and concern, 
while they may fit into what Mansbridge calls everyday talk, are nevertheless largely invisible to 
those outside disabled people’s close relationships. Nevertheless, these activities suggest the 
need for a valuation of a field of democratic participation in which people with intellectual 
disabilities already participate, quite actively, and could participate in greater numbers and in 
more substantive ways if they were properly prepared, supported, and enabled to do so.  
One very important example of an existing mode of political participation in which 
individuals labeled with intellectual disabilities engage is self-advocacy movements. The global 
self-advocacy movement emerged out of the larger disability rights movement of the last half-
century. Through this self-organized and self-motivated activism, people with intellectual 
disabilities campaign for fair access to social services, housing, marriage, sexuality, parenthood, 
community integration, and cultural recognition (see, for example, Docherty et al., 2010; 
Vorhaus, 2005). Self-advocates and their supporters take very seriously – and indeed are 
responsible for – the disability rights slogan “Nothing About Us Without Us.” This is a forceful 
– and often contentious – assertion within the context of presumed total dependency and 
passivity of individuals labeled with intellectual disabilities. Consider the following assertion 
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made within the context of an article by Docherty et al. (2010), all authors identifying as having 
intellectual disabilities:  
Services make the decisions and there’s a lot of broken promises. If learning disabled 
people want a baby, it’s not just about how they would manage with a baby, it’s about 
what it would cost, that’s how they decide. They say ‘Oh we can’t afford this, we can’t 
afford that sort of 24 hour service?’ But we’re people, we’re not a bank statement. The 
services make excuses and put barriers in the way of everything. It’s OK for them to have 
a life; it should be OK for us to get a life too (p. 41; my emphasis).  
 
In this passage, the authors assert their political agency through statements about not only their 
moral equality, but also the effects that economic distributive mechanisms have on their lives. By 
arguing that “we’re not a bank statement,” they challenge the common societal pattern of treating 
labeled people as outliers to the usual entitlements of adult life – namely the right and 
opportunity to become parents.  
The growing public and governmental recognition of self-advocacy movements does 
mean that some individuals with intellectual disabilities do participate in the mainstream 
mechanisms of shaping laws and policies that serve the common good. However, they don’t 
always participate in mainstream ways, or ways considered normal. In fact, often the 
participation of individuals with significant disabilities in self-advocacy contexts requires the 
active care and support of others. At self-advocacy meetings at which I have been a guest, I have 
observed that some members rely heavily on a caregiver or fellow participant to weigh in on 
decisions and generally participate in the activities of the group. Other times I observed that 
some members of the group engage in careful and intentioned scaffolding of ideas and objectives 
to help other members of the group that have a harder time following along. These efforts again 
point to the significance of relationships within civic practices.  
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Along these lines, there has been increasing recognition that the families of people with 
intellectual disabilities have important insight into decision-making about what is best for their 
loved one. However, this attention to the views of loved ones needs to be balanced against the 
surety that supports are also in place to provide the person with disability the opportunity to 
express his or her own desires using different modes of communication, supportive technology 
and so on. Sometimes, for example, an impartial advocate is better positioned to represent the 
interests of individuals whose families do not provide them opportunities to make their own 
decisions.33 Of course, there is no necessary connection between being a family member of a 
person with a disability and having their best interests at heart or understanding their desires and 
preferences best.  
To a certain extent, self-advocacy groups by their very existence contest dominant 
conceptions of citizenship. By adopting and repurposing those mechanisms of structural control 
and decision-making power that were used to marginalize them, people with intellectual and 
developmental disabilities can subvert the power of these mechanisms. Derrick Armstrong 
(2002) puts this well: 
…in contesting the limits of citizenship the group also contests the definition and 
operation of citizenship in political practice. Thus, identity is constructed through the 
actions of the group, not so much by their assertion of independence (which at best is 
partial), but through an ongoing struggle which challenges the socially constructed 
character of ‘autonomy’, ‘rationality’ and ‘choice’ and the socially constructed character 
of labels that signify the absence of the attributes of citizenship, eg ‘learning difficulty’, 
‘mental retardation’, etc. Self-advocacy, in this context, is characterised not by the formal 
structures of the group, but rather by the collective struggle for a meaningful citizenship 
in opposition to the control that is exerted over group members (p. 342)  
 
Of course there is no guarantee that self-advocacy movements will be recognized as movements 
of political participation. Indeed, without the recognition that people with intellectual disabilities 
                                                
33 I am thinking here of the recent story of Jenny Hatch. See Vargas (2013).  
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can be political agents, self-advocacy can be co-opted as a means of reinforcing existing 
practices of medicalization, consumerism, and, ultimately, disempowerment: “Self advocacy has 
become a tool to find out what people with learning difficulties think of services rather than to 
challenge the philosophy of services and systems that create them and their inherent limitations” 
(Aspis, 1997, p. 652). Despite Armstrong’s assertions, self-advocacy groups do face the 
challenge that they frequently draw upon the language of concepts like independence, autonomy, 
and voice that have been used to keep people with intellectual disabilities outside the sphere of 
citizenship (Redley & Weinberg, 2007). There is a tension at work, then, between the assertion 
of the right to membership in existing civic practices and the recognition that those civic 
practices rely on norms of ability that preclude such membership.  
Nevertheless, these examples illustrate how people with intellectual disabilities already 
participate in civic practices. Emphasizing these instances is certainly important in ensuring that 
we do not simply ignore existing examples of political agency. However, I have also showed the 
danger in focusing too much on traditional civic practices. Doing so can simply reintroduce the 
idea that dominant civic practices and models of political agency are or should be our goal in 
civic education.  
 
Making Visible Civic Competencies  
One of the goals of my project is to create a space of recognition for the existing 
contributions of those labeled with intellectual disabilities to civic practices and decision-
making, whether these practices are already understood or intelligible as civic projects or not. 
Civic practices take place through self-advocacy networks, within regional and national 
government structures, within schools, institutions, and/or care-homes, even within workplaces, 
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artistic fora, through play, or through intimate relations of care. Because these activities do not 
always fit within the expected norms of communication or independence assumed by democratic 
education theorists, however, they are frequently not visible as projects of citizenship. The push 
toward normalized learning modes, cognitive processing, and behavioral or communicative 
expression can obscure the kinds of work that people with intellectual disabilities and their 
families are already doing to invest themselves in civic projects. Further, it can result in a range 
of attitudes and expectations towards those who fail to assimilate, including that they make 
themselves intelligible through existing norms, that they prove their abilities within a narrow 
range of ability criteria, or that they excuse themselves from normal social venues or classrooms.  
Such expectations are demonstrated clearly through two examples. First, when it comes 
to thinking about disability, expectations that we have for people with disabilities tend to be less 
flexible than expectations for non-labeled individuals. In some cases this functions through 
double standards for disabled people. Consider two arguments that Mary Warnock (2010) 
advances for the availability of separate schools for disabled children. First, Warnock argues that 
disruptive children adversely affect the learning of all children in schools and that mainstreaming 
enhances the likelihood that both teachers and students (in general) will suffer from the lack of 
availability of “special schools” for children with disabilities. However, the category “disruptive 
children” is surely not synonymous with “disabled children” and includes those without 
identified disabilities.34 Although disruptive children are frequently labeled with disabilities, 
especially students read as racially other (Ferri & Connor, 2005b), the idea that disability and 
disruptiveness go together reveals the bias at work in understanding disability in the first place; 
again disability emerges as the other to civilized life. As I discussed earlier, moreover, 
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education practices (see Collins, 2003; Danforth & Smith, 2004; Orsati & Theoharis, 2013).  
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disruptiveness can be a sign of resistance or an effort at communication. Such behaviors are not 
clearly recognized modes of expression or, indeed, political agency because they do not fit with 
the very narrow range of opportunities that students are given to exercise, practice, or enact civic 
engagement. 
Warnock argues that disabled children are often bullied because of their differences and 
that special schools would help to alleviate this problem. What Warnock leaves out, however, is 
that many children – disabled and non-disabled – are bullied in schools, whether for their gender 
expression, their racial background, their academic interest and so on. The onus is surely on 
schools and school administration to address such instances of bullying, rather than to simply 
outsource stigmatized students to separate schools. It would seem reasonable, then, to suggest 
that the same be true for students with disabilities who face bullying. The double standard 
reinforces the idea that disabled students are problems and that their presence in mainstream 
schools is a threat to the social order.  
Second, consider expectations around voting. Debra Satz (2007), for example, argues that 
education must enable citizens to meet a threshold level of knowledge and competence for the 
exercise of voting, expressed in their being informed about political issues and in their 
possessing knowledge of voting procedures. While many citizens without intellectual disabilities 
fail to meet this standard of knowledge, it is those with intellectual disability labels who are 
legally barred from voting in many U.S. states based on their perceived or assessed lack of 
competence (King & Ebrahim, 2007), and for whom separate educational aims are often 
suggested. Surely we can note by way of objection that current educational systems are failing in 
their task of preparing non-disabled citizens for voting. Can we confidently say that they are not 
also failing those with intellectual disabilities? I think that we cannot.  
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A clear example of the conformity to able-bodied and able-minded norms of behavior 
and ability expectations can be found in a recent Voting Rights Act complaint filed in California. 
The filers of the complaint describe how people with intellectual and developmental disabilities 
who are under conservatorship (adult guardianship) are frequently barred from voting by judges 
because they are unable to complete the voter registration card without assistance (Blood, 2014). 
Advocates argue that such restrictions violate individuals’ rights to reasonable accommodations 
and perpetuate the unfounded belief that an intellectual disability automatically prevents a person 
from voting. Here we can see that a preference for particular abilities (i.e. the ability to 
independently fill out a registration form) shapes what is considered necessary for voting. 
Furthermore, the slide from difficulty in one area (literacy, writing ability, cognitive processing) 
to an assumed inability in another area (decision-making about whom to vote for) is an example 
of the kind of bad logic that I described in the previous chapter.35 This type of ill-informed and 
faulty logic appears almost endemic to much academic theorizing about intellectual disability.  
Voting and other mechanisms of civic engagement require that all people have 
knowledge, preparation, and information about process as well as content; in short, it requires 
education. However, for people with intellectual disabilities, this preparation may need to be 
more involved, or scaffolded in particular ways (Agran & Hughes, 2013, p. 61). Certainly, a 
person with an intellectual disability may not come to know about their opportunities to vote, or 
may not even know what voting is, unless they are given the opportunity to learn about it. And 
knowing about something is a necessary condition of desiring to participate in it. However, in 
their study of voting and individuals with significant disabilities, Martin Agran and Carolyn 
Hughes (2013) found that service-providers frequently expect people with disabilities to express 
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an interest in voting before they are given instruction in voting. This represents an absurd 
standard: 
[It] begs the question that a client must express an interest in a subject or activity to 
warrant necessary instruction. Individuals with extensive support needs may have limited 
communicative skills, topical knowledge, and opportunity to express such an interest and 
thus on this basis would be denied valued instruction. Furthermore, many "typical" 
individuals have little or no interest in voting but this lack of interest does not disqualify 
them from voting. As noted by Bell et al. (2001), lack of interest does not preclude 
people from learning about their right to vote. It goes without saying that service 
providers need to be informed that, in light of current values and best practices, voting 
may represent an appropriate skill to teach individuals with intellectual disabilities 
(Agran & Hughes, 2013, p. 61). 
 
It is absurd to conclude that a lack of expression of interest indicates a lack of ability to perform 
a specific task. But it is equally absurd and certainly unjust to deny a person an opportunity to 
vote because they require significant support in doing so. However, worries over abuse and 
manipulation by those supporting people with intellectual disabilities in voting processes are 
often cited as reasons to deny such people this right. In 2012, in fact, such an argument was the 
subject of a Minnesota court case (Ragsdale, 2012). Fortunately, the judge reasoned in that case 
that simply because a person could be manipulated or their right abused does not justify the 
deprivation of that right. In fact, we can see that making the opposite conclusion would seem to 
support depriving people with intellectual disabilities from being cared for by hired staff, or even 
their families because of the potential (and high existing rate) of physical and sexual abuse that 
they face.  
We can see here that the cultural reliance on a particular understanding of autonomy 
pushes up against the reality that not all individuals can attain that level of autonomy. Where one 
view supports the abandonment of a right because autonomy is not present, the other view sees 
the necessity to create structures and practices that resist abuse. The latter view therefore avoids 
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blaming the victim for her own abuse. I think most of us would rather conclude that we ought to 
study and eliminate the systemic forces that structure this potential for abuse rather than hold 
victims accountable for violence done towards them. Similarly, we should not hold people with 
disabilities accountable for the disrespect done to them, or deprive them of opportunities on that 
basis. Many of those who decry the Ashley Treatment (described in Chapter Two) do so 
precisely on the grounds that it justifies extreme intervention on an individual’s bodily integrity 
to spare them from potential victimization rather than concentrating efforts on protecting 
individuals with significant disabilities from abuse. In a perverse way, the Ashley Treatment 
actually performs an act of violence on the individual that it otherwise seeks to prevent.  
It is important to note, however, that while the issue of voting clearly represents the 
maintenance of separate expectations or double standards of and for people with disabilities, it 
nevertheless represents a problematic case when considering intellectual disability – and 
especially significant intellectual disability. On the one hand it is clear that voting is an important 
part of democratic citizenship – and arguably the main means through which citizens of 
contemporary democracies like the United States and Canada activate their civic membership 
and shape the political landscape. As such, it is important not only that people with intellectual 
disabilities have access to voting, but also that voting be conceptualized and enabled in such a 
way that this access is assured. This includes, certainly, that people with intellectual disabilities 
be provided with an education in voting process, be informed about their choices, and be 
supported in voting and accessing information they need to vote. In fact, as I have said, a 
significant concern of disability advocates is the frequent denial of access to voting of people 
with intellectual disabilities, often through systematic legal mechanisms like guardianship and 
conservatorship laws. Further, because people with intellectual disabilities often rely heavily on 
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the support of family members or professional staff in learning about and participating in 
elections (and even in receiving and reading the newspaper, watching the news, meeting 
candidates, etc.), opportunities to participate in voting are far from assured, even for those who 
express an interest in doing so (Agran & Hughes, 2013; Kjellberg, 2002). In her study of 
citizenship practices of adults with intellectual disabilities in Sweden, Anette Kjellberg (2002) 
found that a crucial factor in a labeled individuals’ access to information about and access to 
voting, as well as in expressed interest in voting, was their relationship to “significant persons,” 
such as family members, staff members, and, less frequently, friends (p. 201). Says Kjellberg, 
“When deciding to vote or not, the significant persons involved are interacting with the 
informants [study participants], which also gives them opportunities to develop a personal view 
of different areas of interest in society” (2002, p. 201). However, many do not have the support 
of significant persons and are not given the choice to vote (see Agran & Hughes, 2013).  
On the other hand, there is a worry that too much emphasis on voting – just like on 
deliberation – as a primary form of political expression or political agency can contribute to a 
narrowing of the range of available civic practices. Voting is not the only activity of democratic 
citizenship and ought not be regarded as the only way people can and do participate in the civic 
community. Further, many people with intellectual disabilities may not ever be able, even with 
significant support, to participate in voting. However, as I have pointed out, this does not mean 
that they cannot participate in democratic citizenship. John Vorhaus (2005) expresses this 
problem with relying too much on enfranchisement in considering citizenship for people with 
intellectual disabilities: 
…the preoccupation with enfranchisement and political participation themselves have a 
denigrating effect; for profoundly disabled people are thereby set up to fail the tests these 
preoccupations tacitly rely upon. And of course, what I have claimed is true of 
profoundly disabled people is also true of many classes of people; very young children 
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and some very old people, and those in the advanced stages of such degenerative diseases 
as Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s. These persons make up a significant portion of our 
population, and we owe it to them to provide a conception of citizenship that does better 
justice to their lives than those whose primary dimension is participation in political 
decision-making. Any conception of citizenship embracing profoundly disabled persons 
will have to prove responsive to the detail of their lives, capacities and potential (p. 474).   
 
Vorhaus’ point here is not to suggest that political participation as voting is unimportant, but 
rather to argue that it is not and ought not be the only form of political participation that is 
valued. His view supports my argument that we need to broaden our understanding and 
recognition of other forms of participation so as to enable a recognition of non-traditional civic 
projects as valid, and help to support their development through schooling.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has focused on exploring the many ways in which people with intellectual 
disabilities participate in traditional, dominant or valued forms of political participation. I have 
also described how this participation does not always come in expected or accepted forms. 
Indeed, some of the expressions of political agency that I described are very localized and highly 
dependent on the direct involvement of significant persons. This level of support runs counter to 
visions of the democratic citizen as able-minded and able-bodied. Asserting that these activities 
are nevertheless forms of political agency and democratic participation is akin to challenging the 
able-minded and able-bodied norms of citizenship and definitional features of citizenship as 
precluding membership of intellectually disabled persons.  
 Furthermore, in this chapter I have sought to emphasize the relational and collaborative 
way that the activities of citizenship take place. Not only is this the case insofar as such activities 
are highly dependent for their recognition on dominant hermeneutical resources, but also insofar 
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as citizenship is a state that comes about through localized and institutionalized processes of 
negotiation. In the next chapter I refer to this as the process of “doing citizenship” and suggest 
that we ought to pay more attention to this process in our philosophical theorizing about 
democratic citizenship education.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
ENVISIONING INCLUSIVE DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 
 
 
 
Whether or not people with severe disabilities will be treated as human beings or 
persons is not a matter of their physical or mental condition. It is a matter of 
definition. We can show that they, and we, are human by including, by accepting 
them rather than separating them out (Bogdan & S. Taylor, 1989, p. 146, my 
emphasis). 
 
It’s very difficult to predict what a child – any child – is ever going to be capable 
of. Especially regarding [disability] labels. You assume the child is able and you 
start from there (Lead teacher of an inclusive preschool classroom, as cited in 
Kliewer et al., 2004, p. 382).   
 
For the majority of my own childhood and adolescence, I did not know anyone with an 
intellectual disability. In fact, for most of my years of school (up until 11th grade in fact) I had no 
contact with anyone whose cognitive abilities, modes of communication, or learning needs 
differed in any significant – or obvious – way from my own. The school I attended for the 
entirety of my K-12 schooling was highly segregated, both with respect to race and to ability; the 
student population was overwhelmingly white and able-bodied. This lack of contact changed for 
me when, in 11th grade, I completed a school-sponsored practicum in a local residential 
community housing people with intellectual and developmental disabilities. A L’Arche36 
community, this geographical setting at once exposed me to a range of people I frankly did not 
know existed and to the love and care that can exist between those people I at that time 
considered normal and those I considered abnormal. At different points over the next ten years I 
                                                
36 L’Arche is an international organization of communities that are home to people with intellectual and developmental 
disabilities and their non-familial caregivers. See http://www.larche.ca. For discussion of L’Arche communities and relations of 
care within them, see Pamela Cushing and Tanya Lewis (2002). My experience at L’Arche was overwhelmingly positive and 
fulfilling, and my respect for L’Arche community members (“core-members” and caregivers alike, and certainly L’Arche’s 
founder Jean Vanier) should not be underestimated. However, in the intervening years since I worked as an “assistant” with 
L’Arche, I have developed a more critical lens through which to think about L’Arche communities. I do not have room to 
elaborate upon the nature of these critiques here, although I can say that they have to do (in large part) with the extent to which 
L’Arche communities are able to facilitate practices of citizenship and belonging of people with intellectual disabilities beyond 
the close-knit communities themselves (that is, integrated with the broader urban, suburban, and rural communities in which they 
are located).  
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worked in two more L’Arche communities as an “assistant” or live-in 
caregiver/friend/companion. In each home that I lived in, home also to between four and six 
“core-members” with disabilities, we all lived together as a kind of hybrid family. This is not to 
say that relations of power and inequality did not exist between us. But the relations of care were 
constant and, in many ways, natural.  
In the last of these communities, in small-town Nova Scotia, Canada, I met a woman who 
I’ll call Tracy. Tracy was around thirty at the time, had dark brown hair cut very short, and a 
thin, lean build. She did not communicate verbally, although she did frequently hum, moan, and 
groan or flap and wave her hands. Because it is not part of the L’Arche practice to inform 
assistants about core-members’ diagnoses or diagnostic labels, I never knew how Tracy had been 
interpreted by medical professionals. Rather, I knew only how her particular needs and abilities 
informed and shaped the relationship we had with one another. For example, I knew that Tracy 
was fast: she could run at great speed away from me on the street, in a shopping mall, on a walk. 
I knew that this meant that I needed to think quickly and be vigilant so as to ensure her safety. I 
knew also that Tracy liked to be solitary, often sitting for hours in a chair by the window, or in 
the corner at her day program. If you asked Tracy to get up and join the dinner table she would 
often refuse, gluing herself to her recliner. Tracy rarely made eye contact, and when she did, it 
usually meant that she was angry or worried. For those caring for her, this was a very important 
mode of communication.  
Although I’m not aware of Tracy’s diagnosis, I can say that she is someone who would 
be read to have a severe intellectual disability.37 At the time that I worked with her, I developed 
an understanding of how Tracy’s behavior was frequently a form of communication, as was her 
                                                
37 I don’t mean this as a diagnosis, but rather to point to the way that Tracy’s behaviors and comportment are read by those 
around her.  
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groaning or moaning. However, I did not interpret any of Tracy’s actions as evidence of political 
agency. It did not cross my mind that she might be expressing politically relevant preferences or 
resistance or ideas. It did not occur to me that her fleeing or refusal to join the dinner table could 
be expressions of intentioned resistance or desire for freedom. In short, I failed to see Tracy as 
potentially a political agent. 
When I began this project I started to think about Tracy. In many ways Tracy would re-
emerge in my mind as a kind of “limit case” that I discussed in Chapter Four. I would imagine 
how my critique of educational philosophical frameworks of democratic citizenship would stack 
up against the realities of Tracy’s disability, or the disabilities of other men and women with 
significant intellectual disabilities with whom I have worked. I would experience a kind of 
cognitive dissonance between my belief in the importance of extending the aims of civic 
education to individuals with significant intellectual disabilities and my internalized regard of my 
former clients’ abilities as limited. Interestingly, this internalized sense of limitation existed 
alongside my deeply-held belief that the exclusion of this population from civic theorizing was 
unjust and I hoped my project would trouble the activities of theorists who perform this kind of 
tacit exclusion. What I did not know was that the project itself would perform a kind of 
hermeneutical reimagining on me. As I began to write this final chapter, then, I began to think: 
how can I re-imagine Tracy’s actions as expressing political agency? How can I re-imagine 
Tracy herself as a political agent? What sort of transformation does this require?  
This final chapter conceptualizes the kind of hermeneutical transformation that I believe 
philosophers of education need to make in their approach to theorizing about educational justice 
and individuals with significant disabilities, especially around the fundamental questions of 
equality, social recognition, and, indeed, citizenship. In addition, it lays the groundwork for a 
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more comprehensive consideration of what teacher educators, teacher practitioners, and 
curriculum developers can do in carrying out inclusive democratic education. I hope therefore to 
accomplish two things: First, to lay out a view of what educational philosophers (and 
theorizers/researchers) need to do differently to reason justly about educational justice for 
individuals with intellectual disabilities. This includes taking an affirmative, rather than a 
deferral stance towards questions of educational entitlement, attending to existing epistemic 
limitations in reasoning about cognitive disability, and paying close attention to the narratives 
and experiences of people with intellectual disabilities and those who work closely to understand 
them. Second, to home in on what I believe to be the most important take away from my 
argument in this project, namely that the embracing of intellectual ability differences in 
democratic education fundamentally requires a substantive shift in our efforts at policy-making, 
curriculum development, and educational practice around envisioning democratic education.  
 
Hermeneutical Justice in Reasoning about Democratic Citizenship Aims 
The preceding chapters have focused on laying out an important problem facing 
educational theory in general: that of the inadequate understanding of and attention to the 
educational preparation of people with intellectual disabilities towards citizenship. As I have 
discussed, one of the major factors working against doing this type of theorizing is the 
naturalized conclusion that the duties of citizenship preclude the possibility that many people 
with intellectual disabilities will become civic agents in any meaningful sense. I have argued that 
this conclusion rests on a number of problematic premises: 1) that it is cognitive inability rather 
than structural impediments or limitations in understanding that prevent people with intellectual 
disabilities from occupying valued civic roles; 2) that political agency requires particular 
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capacities – such as rational deliberation and independent self-representation – that people with 
intellectual disabilities lack; and 3) that valued and idealized activities of citizenship – like 
deliberation – are necessary for the expression of political agency or civic belonging.  
At first the view that schools shape the adult citizens that young people are to become 
appears in many ways a rather obvious and straightforwardly accepted one; it simply expresses 
the important relationship between educational opportunities (expressed in terms of aims) and 
political opportunities (expressed in terms of civic roles). It is a kind of linear relationship. 
However, as we have seen, what exactly democratic citizenship looks like or entails in terms of 
citizens’ performances is not settled. Indeed, it appears that there is a contingent relationship 
between democratic citizenship and specific skills, knowledge, and dispositions that are regarded 
as necessary. Because different forms of democracy require different forms of participation on 
the part of citizens, it is not clear that there is any necessary relationship between a particular 
capability and one’s participation in democratic practice. Thus this rather straightforward linear 
connection suddenly appears quite complicated: how do schools shape adult citizens while also 
being shaped by those ranked as adult citizens already? If the dominant view of the citizen as 
able-minded prevails, can schools really promote civic opportunities for those assessed as 
cognitively disabled?  
Prevailing models of democratic education simply do not appear to take into account, let 
alone embrace, differences in intellectual ability. These models therefore privilege able-
mindedness and tacitly exclude those incapable of performing the tasks of an idealized form of 
citizenship, enshrined in an idealized vision of deliberation and rational discourse. Because 
ability expectations for democratic citizenship are tied to norms of rationality, independence, and 
civic behavior, many people with intellectual disabilities – and other individuals deemed 
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incompetent or cognitively non-conforming – are written out of schemes of democratic education 
to begin with. This is especially the case because individuals’ failures to achieve the 
competencies deemed required are regarded as evidence of their inevitable exclusion, even while 
the framework of democratic education itself remains intact and un-interrogated. As I have 
discussed, such assumptions betray a reliance on outdated understandings of disability and a 
perhaps unconscious sympathy with a medicalized understanding of disability as deficit and lack. 
They also represent the failure to recognize the embeddness of our schemes of democratic 
citizenship education in able-bodied and able-minded norms. How, then, can we disentangle this 
compulsory able-mindedness38 from democratic citizenship aims? 
 
Taking the Affirmative Stance 
I began my discussion in this dissertation by distinguishing between two important but 
divergent methods of dealing with intellectual disability in theorizing about educational justice. 
The first is what I have called the deferral stance, in which theorists begin with particular valued 
goals in mind – like capacities for deliberation, self-representation, knowledge about democratic 
schemes, democratic literacy, and so on – acknowledging that not all individuals will be able to 
reach these valued goals. The deferral stance simply acknowledges this exclusion as a necessary 
consequence of a valued educational scheme and sets out to theorize separately about the 
responsibilities we have towards those who are excluded. I argued that this stance is not ill-
intentioned, but rather born out of a view that educational quality and well-being sometimes 
requires the separate treatment of children based on their differences. This view is reflective of 
traditional special education perspectives that regard disability as a deficit inherent in the child 
and that view cognitive inability as responsible for exclusion (rather than educational 
                                                
38 A term borrowed, and slightly altered, from Robert McRuer (2003).  
  
203 
institutions, instructional practices, etc.). This stance is perfectly consistent with – and even 
justifies – holding to separate aims relative to a variety of educational objectives.   
The second method that I described is what has been called an affirmative stance. This 
stance suggests that we begin with the presumption that all learning aims worth promoting are 
ones towards which all students can be educated. That is, it starts with the presumption of 
inclusion – that all students can be educated toward valued aims – and then delineates the kinds 
of support that students would need to meet these goals. According to the affirmative stance, the 
inability of people with certain disabilities to meet expectations of educational aims does not 
justify the conclusion that they can rightly be excluded, nor does it justify the exclusion itself. 
Rather, the fact that educational aims are too demanding for some individuals says very little 
about those individuals and in fact says a lot about how aims are being conceptualized and how 
different aims are valued relative to one another. The affirmative stance is informed by a 
disability studies perspective that regards exclusions as resulting from inadequate educational 
structures and practices, rather than individual deficits. Further, and importantly, it regards the 
aims themselves (i.e. democratic citizenship) as separate from their content (i.e. deliberative 
capacities, knowledge required for voting, and so on).  
Because the affirmative stance begins with the presumption of inclusion and imagines 
meeting valued educational aims while embracing a range of intellectual abilities, it suggests that 
the embracing of ability differences may necessitate the alteration of concepts like citizenship. In 
fact, as I will explain more below, when viewed against the backdrop of the historical 
construction of the able-minded citizen, our contemporary concept of citizenship appears less 
about a status or threshold position of attainment and more an ongoing process of negotiation. 
This is because political agency is something that is constantly negotiated within social 
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relationships and through social meanings and is either enabled or disabled by economic, 
cultural, and other features of educational and social contexts.  
If philosophical models of democratic citizenship education are going to inform our 
policy-making about citizenship education and how we educate all children toward citizenship in 
comprehensive and informative ways, these models need to account for the diversity of abilities 
that exists. In fact, they need to begin with the assumption that students will exhibit a wide range 
of cognitive abilities, behaviors, and modes of communication. Starting with the affirmative 
stance is therefore certainly a political move insofar as it takes a position in moral debates about 
inclusion. But it is also a practical move because it acknowledges that it is practically more 
efficient to start by assuming or expecting a range of abilities in our theorizing than to 
retroactively add people in after the fact. By endorsing the affirmative stance, then, I am 
suggesting a revision of our discursive and conceptual ordering in theorizing about educational 
justice.  
 
The Affirmative Stance and Hermeneutical Privilege 
In Chapter Four I described how hermeneutical injustice operates to obscure and make 
invisible the social meanings of non-dominant groups. For individuals with intellectual 
disabilities, this can mean that their ways of being and doing, their ways of communicating, and 
their ways of making sense in and of the world are ignored or minimized in their representative 
importance. In my own experience as a caregiver to Tracy, for example, the meanings of political 
agency that I had available to me did not include the sorts of localized and (what might be 
considered to be) small-scale expressions that Tracy enacted. I did not read her resistance 
behaviors as evidence of her enactment of civic preference, even though these acts took place in 
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relation to one of the few areas in which Tracy could exercise control: her home and day 
program. I also did not read Tracy’s frequent public wandering as an effort to engage in her 
social world; I simply saw it as a perhaps only minimally intentional behavior. Although I 
certainly believe my knowledge, expertise, and experience were limited at the time, my attitude 
and perspective were also in a certain way overdetermined by the hermeneutical resources I had 
available to me. That is, there simply did not exist for me a sense of political agency tied to 
significant disability. To understand this connection, I had to undergo my own process of 
recognizing and locating myself within a world that invisibly upholds my cognitive normalcy, 
and that normalizes the otherness of people with significant disabilities.  
In a way, taking an affirmative stance towards theorizing about educational aims enacts a 
kind of recognition of hermeneutical privilege because it requires us to work against the 
epistemic limitations such privilege produces. It requires us to dismantle the presumption of 
able-minded normalcy in not only shaping democratic citizenship aims and what it means to be a 
citizen, but also in shirking the responsibilities we have to others who we perceive as 
intellectually disabled. To this end, disability studies scholars writing about education emphasize 
the need for pedagogical practices that support both pre-service teacher and K-12 students’ 
development of critical attitudes towards ability. For example, Linda Ware (2002) advocates the 
use of disability counternarratives to offset common discourses of ability as naturalized deficits. 
She writes, 
…counternarratives mark a significant departure from the traditional narratives of 
disability grounded in the biological, social, and cognitive sciences that have shaped 
education, rehabilitative medicine, and social work practice. As counternarratives, they 
disrupt the received messages about disability that we have inherited from institutions, 
they incite our imagination about those we name disabled, and they demand self-critical 
analysis of the meaning of humanity (Ware, 2002, p. 146; see also Ferri, 2011 for 
discussion). 
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Importantly, discussions of counternarratives acknowledge the role that “non-disabled” 
individuals play in understanding the responsibility they have to dismantle ideologies of ability 
and places the onus on able-bodied individuals to listen to and grapple with non-traditional 
stories of ability. Further, they gesture towards the responsibilities of schools in supporting all 
students’ negotiation of their civic roles.  
It is important to acknowledge that counternarratives do more than disrupt received 
wisdom and uncritical analysis of the “ideology of ability” (Siebers, 2009). They also keep alive 
– and problematize – the history of exclusion that disabled people face and present opportunities 
for labeled students to assert their competencies and self-identity within the classroom (see 
Kliewer et al., 2004; Ware, 2002). Counternarratives bring the history of exclusion into the 
present and personalize it, demonstrating the way that exclusion continues to play a role in the 
present conceptualizations of educational justice for people with disabilities. Further, 
counternarratives resist the tendency to discount that history in efforts to work out our 
obligations to students with disabilities.39 Frequently philosophical considerations of educational 
justice and disabled students begin from an ahistoricized labeled student, asking questions about 
that student’ needs as if the student’s own history – as well as social history more broadly – were 
not relevant to the student’s emergence in contemporary classrooms, schooling institutions, and 
the broader society.  
For example, a topic of discussion within philosophy of disability centers around the 
question of whether there is a normatively relevant distinction between what is owed to 
individuals who become disabled through social forces (traffic accidents, chemical exposure, 
medical accident, poverty or abuse) versus what is owed to children who are disabled as a result 
                                                
39 Ferri (2011) cautions, however, that mere inclusion of counternarratives into the curriculum is insufficient. Rather, “the 
incorporation of diverse methods of analysis and theoretical framing of those texts,” is necessary “to fully appreciate 
[counternarratives’] transgressive potential” (p. 2271).  
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of the so-called “natural lottery” (that is, because of non-environmental genetic causes) (see 
Pogge, 2010).40 These are certainly important debates, especially insofar as they inform views 
about the distribution of societal resources that could have a significant effect on educational 
policy and entitlements.41 However, this debate is in no way new, nor are the meanings that slip 
into our reasoning about this debate untethered from societal norms around ability and disability. 
In fact, considerations of the moral character of disability – and one’s responsibility for one’s 
state of disablement – are quite old and, as I have shown earlier, map onto changing but powerful 
views on the relationship between poverty, race, sexuality, and gender in forming who is a 
subject worthy of societal care. Any consideration of what is owed to individuals as a matter of 
justice must take into account the role that this history and its loaded concepts – of citizenship, 
moral worth, personal responsibility, and so on – play in our reasoning.   
Taking an affirmative stance and resisting hermeneutical injustice would seem to require 
us to embed our theorizing about educational justice for people with intellectual disabilities in 
acknowledging an existing legacy of exclusion. The idea that people with intellectual disabilities 
and their education can be assessed apart from this history betrays a kind of intellectual hubris, 
because it suggests that we can transcend loaded meanings about ability, competency, intellect, 
and so on. Working out what is owed to children as a matter of justice means acknowledging that 
existing social meanings about disability are historically embedded.  
 
 
 
                                                
40 For comprehensive discussion and critique of luck egalitarian views on disability and these lines of argument, see Anderson 
(1999).  
41 A recent debate surrounding the compensation of “Thalidomide survivors” in Canada illustrates the relevance of this moral 
discussion to questions of distribution and governmental responsibility for well-being. See Chase and Peritz (2014).  
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“Doing” Citizenship rather than “Becoming” a Citizen 
It is clear by now, I hope, that a necessary part of a reimagining of democratic citizenship 
education is to firmly acknowledge how the dominant construct of the citizen within 
philosophical models is inadequate. It is inadequate not only because, as I have argued, the 
dominant construct of the citizen actively works against the possibility that individuals with 
significant disabilities could become recognized citizens, but also because it relies on an 
idealized set of ability expectations that most individuals cannot meet: “no human can emulate 
the disciplined and idealized cognitive demands of the fictive human subject, and yet we 
maintain it as a model of democratic politics” (Clifford Simplican, 2015, p. 4).  
Gert Biesta (2006) has recently argued against traditional conceptions of democratic 
education that emphasize schools’ responsibilities to produce democratic persons or democratic 
citizens. He argues that the emphasis placed on producing subjects actually distracts from the 
work of creating the social conditions for democratic subjectivity to arise. According to Biesta, 
rather than think about democratic citizenship education as about producing citizens, we need to 
think about how schools contribute to creating the conditions “for children and students to be 
subjects, to experience what it is and means to be a subject” and to learn about “the fragile 
conditions under which action and subjectivity are possible” (2006, p. 144). In short, Biesta 
urges us to consider thinking about democratic education not as a project of civic skills 
development, but rather as a process of enabling our own and others’ recognition as subjects in 
democracy. Biesta’s analysis in many ways illustrates the kind of transformative shift in thinking 
that I am advocating for in describing the affirmative stance and in calling for hermeneutical 
justice. Indeed, as Biesta recognizes, sometimes creating space for recognition of others requires 
actually letting go of the desire to know or fully comprehend those others; it means 
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acknowledging but not trying to solve the problem of their unintelligibility to us. This approach 
resonates with a kind of epistemic humility that I described in Chapter Four, as well as with a 
kind of attentiveness to the conditions of subjectivity that I have described elsewhere (A. Taylor, 
2013). However, there is a certain reasonable dissatisfaction with this approach because it does 
not clearly lend itself to understanding the concrete responsibilities and actions of actors within 
educational institutions. How, then, can we find a middle ground between a clear but 
exclusionary view of schools as “creating citizens” with particular developed capacities (skills, 
dispositions, knowledge) and an inclusionary but vague view of schools as enabling civic 
subjectivity? To start, I would like to promote and illustrate a view of schools and school people 
as “doing” citizenship.  
 Let’s consider a view that the role of schools and school people is to “do” citizenship in 
ways that are aimed towards both social justice and inclusion. In “Relationships with Severely 
Disabled People: The Social Construction of Humanness,” Bob Bogdan and Steve Taylor (1989) 
describe how the caregivers, friends, and family members of people with significant disabilities 
negotiate their understanding of their disabled loved one as a thinking and valued human. They 
write that such people “do” humanness in their interactions (Bogdan & S. Taylor, 1989, p. 137). 
Similarly, Pamela Cushing and Tanya Lewis (2002) describe how relations of care between 
caregiver and cared-for involve a complex negotiation of power, intelligibility, and control in the 
achievement of agency for individuals with significant disabilities. In the previous chapter we 
saw how this relational form of agency forms the basis of many individuals’ opportunities to 
participate in traditional political activities like voting, protesting, and making decisions about 
their community. The following story of Loretta further illustrates how political agency is 
mediated and negotiated within relationships:  
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Some kids called me retarded. I don’t like people to call me that cause it hurts. I got me 
power there with me. Sandra [caregiver] was with me and we walked. I told Sandra I hate 
the kids calling me that name. I talked to Sandra about the kids. I cried. She helps me 
[with] my control. She asked to me that I stay calm. So I stay even. Then I talked to the 
kids. I told the kids, ‘Stop! My name is Loretta.’ And I shake hands. They apologized.” 
The friend and caregiver that she was with explained, “At first Loretta wanted to ‘hit 
those kids in the face.’ As we sat there talking it through on the bench, though, she 
moved through her anger to a place that seemed to me to be beyond ‘letting it go,’ a 
phrase she often uses to help her leave difficult things behind. The way that she gathered 
up her courage and risked further ridicule by going back to the kids and telling them that 
they had hurt her made an impression on me that will never fade. Both Sandra and 
Loretta were clearly negotiating power not only within their relationship but also in the 
decisions to intervene-to go back to stand up to the teens, and to decide what to say. 
When Loretta said she was ready to stand alone, her caregiver stood back even though 
she was still worried and said so. Risking failure also brings the opportunity for success 
and the experience of actively making decisions (Cushing and Lewis, 2002, p. 187) 
 
In this example, Loretta asserts herself in the face of the teenagers’ ridicule. Her caregiver does 
not speak for her, but she does assist Loretta in developing her response and, in particular, in 
developing her response in ways recognizable and potentially edifying for the teens. Loretta’s 
assertion of political agency was thus supported by and negotiated through her relationship with 
Sandra.   
Rather than look at whether and how Loretta exercised certain capacities within this 
example, it helps to think about how she and Sandra “do” citizenship within their interaction and 
social relationship. Looking at how individuals do citizenship would, of course, be an empirical 
project; that is, it would involve looking, as do Agran and Hughes (2013), at how civic agency is 
constructed within relationships. However, this orientation towards citizenship also requires non-
empirical work, namely redefining citizenship not as a status achievement, understood through 
the acquisition of skills and dispositions, but rather as an ongoing negotiation. As we saw in 
previous chapters, citizenship is and has been negotiated in relation to broader social meanings 
around race, ethnicity, gender, social class, perceived intellect and bodily health, and perceived 
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moral worth. Such meanings change, though, over time and in relation to evolving relationships 
with concepts like race, gender, class, and so on. It is for this reason that I have emphasized that 
citizenship – and the citizenship of those perceived or assessed as cognitively disabled – cannot 
be detached from racialized social norms, for exammple. This means, of course, that the 
negotiation of meanings attached to citizenship – and who can belong as a citizen – is not an 
even or equal process. Rather it is one in which dominant groups possess undue power in 
“doing” citizenship.  
The language of becoming a citizen places the emphasis on developmental stages and 
achievements rather than on how schools negotiate the meaning of citizenship and how each of 
us participates in doing citizenship and creating the opportunities for others’ recognition. The 
language of doing, by contrast, acknowledges how conceptions of civic participation reflect and 
reify dominant social norms. In this sense, citizenship is a process of valuation (that is not linear) 
rather than a status outcome. This is not to say that we ought not be concerned with the 
substantive experiences of people with significant disabilities relative to social status. Rather, 
and as I have pointed out within this dissertation, questions about who has access to voting 
opportunities, who is supported adequately in participating in decision-making, public discourse, 
localized politics, and civic advocacy, and who is protected from deprivation of bodily agency 
and autonomy, are vitally important. As feminist disability studies scholars have pointed out, the 
focus on material concerns – that is, “the actual historical, social, and economic conditions that 
influence (disabled) people’s lives” (Erevelles, 2011, p. 119) – moves us more toward the radical 
potentiality of disability studies. However, questions about the democratic citizenship aims of 
education can, at this stage, benefit more from asking the question “how do we engage all 
students in processes of civic valuation” than it can from the question “what capacities do 
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students need to be good citizens?” When this is done – when the affirmative stance is taken and 
the deferral stance avoided – we may still conclude that some capacities are necessary for certain 
aspects of citizenship, but we may also understand these as relational rather than individualistic. 
In other words, we dislodge the able-minded person from the position of normalcy and as the 
standard against which political agency is measured.  
 My discussion so far has hinted at but not actually committed to a working definition or 
understanding of citizenship that might serve better our projects of inclusion. Part of my 
avoidance is that any definition of citizenship or “the citizen” is, as I hope I have shown, 
dangerous. Nevertheless, the concept of citizenship is also one through which injustices are 
named and made intelligible. I made this point earlier when I discussed the connection that 
philosophers have made between citizenship and democratic equality; that is, one’s recognition 
as a social equal is tied to one’s opportunities to participate in civic society (Anderson, 1999; 
Satz, 2007). Any definition that I can endorse must be sufficiently meaningful to express this 
important relationship, but also sufficiently capacious to avoid the kinds of exclusions that I have 
been arguing against. To help me develop this working definition, I have looked to the work of 
Simone Aspis, who works with self-advocates and who is herself a self-advocate. Aspis writes,  
Self-advocacy should not just be confined to saying how we feel, what we want to do or what 
choices we want to make. Our ability to think about and interpret the world which we live in 
is just as important, if not more so: What are the meanings of the relationships between 
people with learning disabilities and society? How do we experience these day-to- day 
encounters and what do they stand for? (Aspis, 2002, p. 4)  
 
In this passage, Aspis highlights an important dimension of political agency, namely the 
opportunity42 to influence the world in which we all live. Social meanings, as discussed in 
Chapter Four, are related intimately not only to how people are treated and interpreted as 
                                                
42 Aspis uses the word “ability” but I believe she does not mean this in the capacity sense, but rather in the opportunity or 
capability sense. 
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humans, as agents, as abled or disabled, and so on, but also to the kinds of opportunities some of 
us have to be understood and to make meaning of our experiences. I am persuaded, then, to 
consider that citizenship is connected to the substantive opportunities that individuals have to 
affect social meanings and to members of political communities. This does not mean, of course, 
that individuals must possess the capacity to reason independently or to communicate in 
normatively expected ways; in short, it does not require some threshold level of cognitive 
capacity. It suggests, however, that our locus of attention in considering democratic citizenship 
aims be on how students are enabled to influence social meanings and shape, however minimally 
or locally, the political landscape. They will do so in ways more and less traditionally 
independent. Of course this definition will include attention to some of the capabilities – beings 
and doings, knowledge and skills – that individuals will benefit from in affecting social 
meanings. However, it also allows for an understanding of how the kinds of capabilities 
individuals need to possess are structured by (and conditional upon) their relationships with 
peers, and how these capabilities are fluid, cultural, and changing in relation to dominant values 
and norms. This understanding of citizenship also leaves room for a view that schools’ task is to 
support students in understanding the roles that they play in shaping what sorts of capacities are 
valued and in enabling or foreclosing the political agency of those labeled with disabilities. Of 
course, this cannot be read as an individualistic endeavor. Rather, shaping social meanings 
involves the kind of mutuality, power negotiation, and attentive support that I described earlier. 
For some, their effect on social meanings will be mediated in significant ways by caregivers, 
family members, and peers, but this is merely an instance of a broader way in which our 
opportunities to affect social meanings takes place through our relationships with others.  
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 Let me provide an example of how students’ relationships within the classroom shape, 
mediate, and support their opportunity to affect social meanings. In Christopher Kliewer et al.’s 
(2004) ethnographic research on the literacy learning of young children with significant 
disabilities the authors describe a classroom structured around the expected participation of 
children with a range of intellectual abilities or abilities to engage in practical reasoning with a 
range of communication modes – including perhaps limited speech and use of text-to-speech 
technology – and with a range of expressive behaviors. The children are engaged in an activity of 
debating about and protesting a classroom rule that has been introduced by their teacher. The 
teacher writes the rule on a piece of poster-board and hangs it on the wall with the other official 
classroom rules. The students are then instructed to create signs asserting their position for or 
against the rule. Some together with peers, and some together with the support of adults, create 
their signs almost unilaterally challenging the rule. The rule is voted down. Kliewer et al. state,  
In this hectic scene of preschool/kindergarten ‘hallway-level’ democracy, a vibrant, 
literate community is clearly discernible. Shared graphic (i.e., observable, recorded) 
symbols (including alphabetic text) are used by children and adults of the Corner Nook as 
social tools for formulating, conveying, interpreting, debating, and reformulating ideas 
about personal and collective narratives. An intriguing aspect of this literate 
community…was the seemingly natural and full citizenship of children with significant 
disabilities (2004, p. 376).  
 
What view of citizenship is at work in this scene? We might focus first on how the activities of 
the classroom enable the participation of all students, some with support and others 
collaboratively, in activities of citizenship, namely decision-making about a classroom rule. By 
asking the children to create posters, the teacher not only provides the opportunity for students 
whose pace of performance is slower – or who need assistance – to weigh in on the rule, but she 
also creates the opportunity for students to engage in practices of literacy in ways conducive to 
their learning needs and levels. Importantly, all students are helped to engage in a recognized and 
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valued civic activity. But that’s not all that’s going on here. Non-disabled students are also 
learning that their labeled peers’ perspectives matter, that they need to be supportive and patient 
in learning these perspectives. Some of the children work together to challenge the authority of 
the teacher, others are supported by significant adults. While we might be tempted to focus only 
on the capacities that these students are building (and of course this is important), we should also 
consider the kinds of understanding of belonging that are being promoted, as well as the sense of 
mutuality being cultivated. The children are being supported in acknowledging the political 
agency of others and, importantly, that that political agency doesn’t depend on the ability to 
perform tasks in ways considered “normal.” They are learning, in short, that citizenship is not 
only about skills but also about belonging.  
To understand how and why the working concept of citizenship that I have introduced is 
different from the conception of citizenship based in possession of particular capacities, let’s 
consider how each deals with the problem of dependency. As I have discussed, the dependency 
that is often characteristic of people with significant intellectual disabilities is often regarded as 
antithetical to citizenship, especially within the liberal tradition (for discussion see Bhandary, 
2010; Kittay, 1999; Kittay 2005; Stark, 2007). Because states of dependency complicate and 
potentially foreclose relationships of reciprocity they seem to counter the view of citizens as 
participants in a fair and equal cooperation of individuals in a scheme of reciprocal advantage 
(Rawls, 2001). Accordingly, independence is highly valued achieved state of adults that is 
understood as freedom from the constraints of social relationship (consistent with liberal 
conceptions of autonomy), rather than a quality of relations. Schools have an obligation to 
prepare students for this state of desirable independence because it is the means through which 
they exercise their duties and rights as citizens. A capacity view of citizenship thus treats 
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dependency as undesirable and this contributes to the civic otherness of people whose disabilities 
position them as highly dependent on others, whether physically, emotionally, or intellectually.  
By contrast, the view that citizenship is about opportunities to affect social meanings and 
shape the political landscape does not commit itself to necessitating any particular capacities on 
the part of individuals, although it does place significant demands on schools. This is because 
opportunities to affect social meanings are understood as necessarily formed in relations of 
dependency – including epistemic dependency – rather than apart from them. Our justice 
considerations then become about whether the educational systems of support are in place to 
provide such opportunities and whether relationships are being facilitated among individuals in 
schools to enable these opportunities. This view allows us, then, to disentangle dependency from 
non-citizenship by regarding things like decision-making, political influence, and consent as 
requiring different degrees of support and facilitation. As I have argued already, it is a myth that 
any of us is completely unrestrained in these activities, or that we act outside of our relation with 
others. 
  
Democratic Citizenship as a Project of Inclusion 
In this dissertation I have asked: how would it change our thinking and practice to 
broaden recognized forms of communication, representation, and contribution? How would it 
change our thinking and practice to acknowledge the shifting boundaries of cognition and 
autonomous decision-making in light of the role that others play in these capabilities? How 
would it change our thinking and practice to recognize democratic literacy and political 
knowledge-making as collaborative and interdependent? I ask these questions both to highlight 
the important omissions within current democratic education theory and to elaborate upon the 
new insights and practices that can emerge when we challenge existent philosophical 
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assumptions about the education of children with intellectual disability labels. Further, these 
questions are best answered through the cooperative attention of philosophers of education and 
those working within inclusive education and disability studies.  
In Chapter Two I described inclusion as a principled deconstruction of the values and 
structures of education that have generated our current system. I suggested that it is critically 
important to understand inclusion not as about physical access and space alone (although it is 
also about these things), but rather about how educational researchers, philosophers, theorists, 
teacher educators, and teachers themselves understand and respond to the existent differences in 
ability that children embody. A project of inclusive citizenship is therefore one that demands the 
embracing of ability differences and, in general, the practical challenges that go along with 
schooling children who have very different learning needs. Thus, having inclusive aims is 
different than expecting the same thing of every child. Inclusive aims can be understood as 
shared learning goals rather than shared learning modes or shared capacities. For example, the 
affirmative stance that I am espousing would involve reforming our ideas about what thinking or 
thought entails and divesting it of its automatic connection to verbal or other forms of normative 
communication, or to assumptions of cognitive independence (see Francis, 2009). In fact, a view 
of what thinking entails and the attribution of thinking to an individual involves in every case a 
valuation: “Attributing thinking to a person, with or without severe disabilities is a matter of 
reading meaning into the gestures or movements the person makes” (Bogdan & S. Taylor, 1989, 
p. 139). With people with significant disabilities who are non-verbal, like Tracy, this can be 
especially complicated because it involves a deep investment on the part of the interlocutor to 
both presume competence and make meaning of sometimes very subtle actions (Bogdan & S. 
Taylor, 1989, p 139; see also Cushing & Lewis, 2002).  
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Certainly one could object that there are important problems of interpretation and projection 
that need to be confronted in considering this kind of co-dependent thinking, decision-making, 
and meaning-making. Perhaps nondisabled caregivers, educators, and peers routinely and 
unintentionally project their own desires and beliefs onto disabled people, a product in part of the 
hermeneutical context in which we live. I would respond to this worry in two ways. First, it is 
important that we question whether this kind of projection is a special case or if it is simply an 
instance of what is done within all relationships. If the latter, then worries about epistemic 
relationships of power seem less about the need to ensure that projection doesn’t happen and 
more to do with how we act to guard against epistemic power within these relationships. My 
second response, then, is that rather than conclude that worries over abuse should lead us to 
question dependent decision-making or communication, they should motivate us to act to make 
visible and disrupt these relations of power. Furthermore, there are ways to safeguard against this 
kind of “abuse:” multiple participants can be involved in interpreting individuals’ behaviors, 
modes of communication, or physical responses; we can use mechanisms of augmentative and 
alternative communication, or facilitated communication (although FC continues to be, 
unfortunately, controversial); and so on. Finally, it is important that we resist understanding the 
individual person as in isolation from others or from their own history. In fact, to counteract this 
tendency, the construction of life narratives can be a powerful way to develop a story of that 
person’s preferences, desires, and hopes while also allowing them to be seen as complex 
individuals who do not begin at the point of contact with a new person.  
So what does all this mean for democratic citizenship education? Such attitudes towards 
inclusion – and the work of inclusion – should form the basis of our theorizing about and 
implementation of democratic citizenship aims. We need to have pedagogy, instructional 
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practices, policies, and, importantly, philosophical theorizing surrounding democratic citizenship 
education that are sufficiently complex and multifaceted to allow for those with significant 
disabilities to participate and, importantly, benefit. Inclusive democratic citizenship education 
would entail supporting all students to recognize their responsibilities to enable and sustain the 
democratic contribution of others, especially given the existent differences in ability to reason 
independently or to communicate in ways considered normal or routine. An inclusive democratic 
citizenship education could therefore involve students’ development of different forms of civic 
action that are in the service of inclusion for all individuals. Non-disabled students, for example, 
must learn that they are responsible for the inclusion and support of those who need increased 
levels of support. Civic engagement, under this conception, depends on contribution of all 
members as co-collaborators in democracy. It is here that we return to earlier discussion of the 
epistemic – and democratic – value of inclusion. Indeed, inclusive education is not just about 
how students with disabilities are treated, but also how non-labeled students are treated relative 
to understanding the value of vulnerability, dependency, and collaborative engagement; in other 
words, how they understand themselves as citizens. Just as racially dominant students are taught 
to understand their responsibility towards racially marginalized students, so too are able-bodied 
students taught to understand their responsibilities to include and support disabled students. This 
does not mean, however, that they be included in existing norms. As we have discussed, this is 
not true inclusion. Rather, non-disabled students must critique and challenge their place in these 
norms as part of this civic collaboration.   
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Conclusion 
 Before I conclude, it is important that I acknowledge the reader who reads my critique as 
directed towards an argument for removing all standards or ability expectations from democratic 
participation and the education that prepares children for that participation. How, this reader 
might ask, can we envision educational policy, curricula, pedagogy, and instruction practice if 
we do not have a definitive understanding of who counts as a citizen and what qualities he or she 
should have? If we maintain no threshold of ability, on what basis would we decide whether 
students have acquired an education adequate for democratic citizenship? My response to this is 
first that a nihilistic view is not implied by my argument: that is, a criticism of current standards 
and expectations of ability does not imply a dismissal of all expectations of ability or the 
argument that we ought not have any expectations of ability. Indeed, some ability expectations 
are consistent with respecting differences in ability (see Wolbring, 2012); for example, 
expectations for dignified treatment of others. Further, maintaining a standard of decision-
making does not require that everyone perform the functions of citizenship – whatever these may 
be – in the same way, nor (and this is perhaps the more contentious point) that they be performed 
independently. As I have argued, moreover, there are a variety of existing ways in which people 
with intellectual disabilities already participate in democratic politics. Such reference to existing 
circumstances highlights how we ought to be very careful in our assumptions about labeled 
people’s abilities as we delineate requirements for citizenship and make conclusions about to 
whom they apply.  
 Taking seriously intellectual ability differences, respecting persons labeled with 
intellectual disabilities, and transforming our knowledge about what intellectual disability is and 
means, especially within schooling contexts, demands that we recognize the difference that their 
  
221 
inclusion in educational theorizing makes, both at the conceptual and practical level. Doing so 
will place demands on our educational theorizing and policy decisions to recognize such ability 
differences. It also challenges educational theorists to consider new ways to conceptualize 
democratic participation and the education that supports it. Further, it has important implications 
for schooling practices and teacher education. The recognition of the breadth of existing forms of 
democratic participation and of the variability and contextualized character of abilities and 
capabilities of those labeled with intellectual disabilities challenges teacher-educators, pre-
service and in-service teachers, as well as administrators and policy-makers, to embrace 
intellectual ability differences within education. This happens through the re-shaping of 
curriculum, of teaching practice, of school-community partnerships, and, importantly, through 
the reforming of ideas about how civic knowledge is acquired and put into practice in light of 
varying abilities. Philosophers of education are in a unique position to contribute insights into 
how such reformation can happen in ways that do justice to individuals with disabilities. This 
requires taking the affirmative stance and acknowledging that our philosophical conclusions 
about educational equality and justice – and consequently our education policy and schooling 
decisions – are impoverished when we ignore or sideline consideration of intellectual ability 
differences and defer recognition of individuals labeled with intellectual disabilities.  
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